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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share 
prices of borrowing firms.  I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the 
International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study 
methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the 
borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, 
term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit 
agreements.  I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in 
identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers.  A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows 
share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive.  A 
three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for 
revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements.  My 
results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial 
press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the 
potential for reporting bias.  I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are 
significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for 
the three-day window.  My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different 
sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. 
 
  iiiIn addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the 
loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack.  
Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make 
bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three 
structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely 
match the funds acquired with the firm’s investment needs and to market time by 
borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are 
positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce 
information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow 
borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the 
market timing theory of capital structure.  In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, 
I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans. 
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  ixCHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND  
It is reported that the international market for syndicated loans has been growing 
strongly since the early 1990s and totaled almost USD 1 trillion in 1999 alone. This figure 
climbed to USD 2.26 trillion in 2004.
1 According to Altunbas et al. (2006), signings of 
international syndicated loan facilities account for no less than a third of all international 
financing, including bond, commercial paper and equity issues. As shown in Chart 1.1 
below, the volume of syndicated loans between 1981 and 1992 was not significant. 
Between 1993 and 1997, however, the volume of syndicated loans increased steadily and 
subsequently fell in 1998 with the Asian financial and Russian crises, then increased 
significantly in the following two years and then decreased slightly in 2002 and 2003. The 
highest syndication level was achieved in 2004 in the reported period.  
Chart 1.1: Growth of International market for 
syndicated loans (1981-2004)
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1 Altunbas et al. (2006).  
  1 
Altunbas et al. (2006) also note that the growth of the market was attributed to both 
the increase in average facility size and the rising number of facilities. They report that the 
average size had increased from $100 million in 1993 to $250 million in 2004 and the total 
number of loans had increased from 5,500 loans to 9,100 loans over the same period. 
 
Since the US syndicated loan market is the driving force for the world market and it 
is the focus of this thesis, I provide below some market statistics. As can be seen from 
Chart 1.2 below, the US syndicated loan market grew strongly between 1992 and 1997 with 
the volume traded almost quadrupling over the period. The market then slowed  
 
Chart 1.2: US Syndicated Loan Market 
(1987-2003)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source: Loan Pricing Corporation (cited in Amstrong, 2003) and Altunbas et al. (2006).
U
S
D
 
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
 
 
  2down because of the effect of the Asian and Russian financial crises in the following two 
years and then rebounded in 2000 but shrank to a much lower level in 2003.  Sufi (2007) 
reports in the US almost 90% of the largest 500 non-financial firms in the Compustat 
universe in 2002 obtained a syndicated loan between 1994 and 2002. 
 
It can be seen from the comparison of Charts 1.1 and 1.2 above that the US market 
is undoubtedly the most important segment of the international market for syndicated loans 
over the last two and a half decades. Its movement is almost in tandem with that of the 
international market as a whole. 
 
The main purposes of this thesis are firstly to examine the wealth effects of 
announcements of syndicated loans and secondly to study the long-term performance of 
borrowing firms.  In addition, I review existing literature on capital structure issues to 
search for possible insight into the uniqueness of bank loans. 
 
I note from existing literature that since the studies of pioneer researchers like 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Fama (1985), James (1987) and Diamond (1984), there has been 
abundant research on the role of banks and financial intermediation. For example, in this 
thesis, I reference a number of important papers, among others, such as Lummer and 
McConnell (1989); Best and Zhang (1993); Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993); Allen and  
Santomero (1998); James and Smith (2000); Allen and Santomero (2001); and Chakraborty 
and Hu (2006).  
 
  3Only recently have researchers paid attention to the syndicated loan market. 
Previous studies of syndication indicate that the market reacts favourably to announcements 
of syndicated loans from both the borrower and lender perspectives.  These studies involve 
three main issues. The first issue is the ease of renegotiation associated with syndicated 
loans. The second issue is the impact of the source of announcement information on market 
reaction. Finally, the third issue is the subsequent performance of borrowing firms in the 
long term.  
 
Simons (1993) was one of the first researchers to study syndicated loans. Her study 
was then followed by Armitage (1995) who looks at the stock market response to banks’ 
stock prices on syndicated loan announcements in the United Kingdom. Megginson, 
Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) also look at the impact of syndicated loan announcements on 
the market value of banking firms. On the borrower side, Preece and Mullineaux (1996) 
study the role of lending syndicates in the context of monitoring, loan re-negotiability, and 
firm value and Dennis and Mullineaux (1994, 2000) examine agency costs and syndicated 
loan sales.  
 
Following the above studies, Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004) study the information 
content of quarterly earnings in syndicated bank loan prices. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 
(2006) examine long-term performance of borrowing firms and claim to have provided 
robust evidence against the “specialness” of bank loans.  
 
  4The interesting issue raised in existing literature is whether banks “are special” as 
addressed in James’ (1987) pioneering work. In view of this specialness, the market tends 
to view announcements of bank loans favourably. Other researchers more or less agree with 
James (1987). Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (1999) point out the comparative advantage of 
banks in providing loans and argue that this advantage arises from the dual role of banks as 
deposit takers and providers of highly liquid loans. James and Smith (2000, 63) revisited 
this issue and ask “Are banks still special?” by presenting “New evidence on their role.” 
They find that banks still play “a special role in providing commitment-based financing to 
corporations.” The flexibility offered by this type of financing is “particularly valuable” 
when a firm has an immediate need for funds and when the interest rates in public debt 
markets are “prohibitively high.” However, in a recent study, Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006, 744) arrive at a fairly stunning conclusion that “loan announcements are 
misinterpreted by the market, both in the magnitude of their effect on firm value and, in 
some cases, the direction of it.”  And that “bank loans do not appear to be nearly so 
“special” as previously thought.” 
 
Intertwined with banking issues are those related to the theory of capital structure. A 
number of researchers have examined these issues. For example, Hadlock and James (2002) 
examine whether banks do provide financial slack and hence influence the capital structure 
decision of the firm. In this thesis, I hope to shed further light on the above issues by 
including these questions in my study. 
  51.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay, I examine the stock market 
reaction to announcements of syndicated loans. In particular I examine this announcement 
effect by partitioning loans according to their structures. I ask the question whether the 
structure of loan
2 (i.e. revolving credit, term loans and hybrid loans) has any influence on 
the stock market reaction to syndication announcements. In this essay, I also examine the 
potential for reporting bias by lenders and borrowers. It is argued that loan reporting may 
be biased toward higher quality loans because both borrower and lender are more likely to 
announce positive rather than negative information.  For example, Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) found that favourably revised loans are more likely to be reported in the financial 
press than unfavourably revised loans or loans that are allowed to expire. To overcome the 
potential for reporting bias, I distinguish between announcements in the financial press and 
those by an information provider (International Financing Review (IFR)).   
 
In the first essay of the thesis I will address the following three main research 
questions: 
 
Research question 1: Does the stock market view announcements of syndicated 
loans favourably? 
 
Research question 2: Do loan structures have different impacts on stock market 
reaction to announcement of syndicated loans?    
                                                 
2 In this thesis, we use the terms structure of loan and loan type interchangeably. 
  6 
Research question 3: Does the market react differently to different information 
sources on announcements of syndicated loans? 
 
In addition to above research questions, I also ask other secondary research 
questions. These include: 
  
Research question 4: Is there any difference in share price reaction due to the 
number of syndication announcements? 
 
Research question 5:  Is there any evidence of information leakage prior to 
announcements of syndicated loans?  
 
In the second essay of the thesis, I look at the performance of borrowers from the 
long-term perspective. I examine whether there is any association between long-term 
performance of borrowing firms with their cumulative abnormal returns upon 
announcements of syndicated loans. In addition, I also look at the capital structure issues in 
this essay. The reason being that bank loans are considered to be an inside debt. I look at 
the issue whether banks can reduce information asymmetry and provide financial slack to 
borrowing firms.  I also examine whether borrowing firms exercise market timing when 
they announce syndicated loans. Specifically, I look at three aspects. Firstly, I look at the 
pre-loan and post-loan performance of firms and their association with stock returns. 
Secondly, I examine the impact of earnings announcements on the borrower’s share price 
  7prior to the announcement of the loan as well as the impact after the loan announcement. 
Finally, I also examine whether there is any association between financial performance and 
market returns for borrowers. It should be stressed, however, that I examine all these issues 
in the context of the overarching issue of whether loan structure will make any difference in 
all aforementioned issues. In the second essay, I ask the following research questions: 
 
Research question 6:  Are borrowing firms’ performance in the long run 
associated with a short-term wealth effect due to announcements of syndicated loans? 
 
Research question 7:  Does the market view earnings announcements of 
borrowing firms favourably regardless of whether they are positive or less negative than 
expected?  
 
Research question 8: Is stock market reaction on earnings announcements 
related to the degree of financial flexibility provided by different types of loans. 
 
Research question 9: Is the market reaction to the stock of bank borrowers related 
to accounting measures of performance in pre- and post-announcement periods? 
 
Research question 10: Does loan structure provide financial slack and enhance 
market timing? 
 
  8Figure 1.1 below summarises the sources of external financing and the structure of 
this thesis, which is described under the ‘syndicated loans’ box. The top panel shows the 
possible sources of funds used by firms. These include equity issues, straight and 
convertible debts, private placements and bank loans. For bank loans, firms can use single 
bank loans or syndicated loans. It is apparent that large corporations with significant 
funding needs are likely to seek a large amount of funds and this can be easily done using 
syndicated loans. In this thesis, I examine both the announcement effects and long-term 
effects of syndicated loans. I focus on the impact that loan structures have on 
announcements of syndicated loans. In addition, I examine whether the source of 
information influences these announcements. 
 
As for long-term effects, the diagram shows four aspects considered in this thesis: 
(1) The association between long-term effect and announcement effect; (2) The relation 
between accounting return and market return; (3) the association between earnings 
announcements and market returns; and (4) the issues related to the theory of capital 
structure that might provide further insight into long-term performance of firms following 
the granting of syndicated loans; namely, the market timing issue, the pecking order theory 
and the trade-off theory. 
 
  9 
FIGURE 1.1: EXTERNAL FINANCING 
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  101.3 OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis employs the standard event study methodology. In the first part of the 
thesis, when I examine the announcement effect on borrower share price, I use the market 
model with equal weighting to obtain the abnormal return which results from the 
announcement of syndicated loans. In addition to the common parametric test (Patell test), I 
also use a non-parametric test (the generalized sign test) to test the significance of the 
aforementioned abnormal return.  
 
In the second part of the thesis, when I look at long-term performance of the 
borrower I use the GARCH (1,1) (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity)  model to overcome common problems (e.g., time-varying systematic 
risk parameter (β) and time-varying conditional variance)
3 in measuring performance of 
borrowers. In addition, I examine the market reaction to earnings announcements of 
borrowing firms using the same methodology. Finally, in the second essay, I run 
regressions of borrowing firms’ cumulative abnormal returns on financial ratios to see 
whether there is any association between firm performance and market returns. 
 
 
                                                 
3 There are a number of papers discussing the event study methodology in further detail. For example, see 
Coutts, J.A., Mills, T.C. and Roberts, J. (1994) and Barber, B., Lyon, J. and C-L. Tsai, (1999).  
  
 
  111.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
In the first essay of the thesis, when I examine the impact of announcements of 
syndicated loans on borrower wealth, I observe significant effects over the five day window 
with a cumulative abnormal return of 0.39% and this result is highly positively significant 
at the 1% level. When I partition the data into different loan structures, I find that the 
results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. Specifically, revolving credit 
loans exhibit a cumulative abnormal return of 0.47% which is also significant at the 1% 
level.  In this essay I also find that the size of the event window plays an important role in 
identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers.  A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows 
share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive whereas 
a three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for 
revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements.  I find 
that revolving credit agreements drive the statistically positive borrower share price 
reaction and, thus, find support for the re-negotiability argument.   
 
In addition, I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are 
significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for 
the three-day window.  Furthermore, when the financial press announcements are used I 
find that revolving credit agreements are viewed positively and the term loans negatively. I 
conclude that this finding supports the view that financial press announcements are not 
  12redundant signals and should be used in conjunction with dedicated financial information 
providers. 
 
In the second essay, when I examine the pre-loan and post-loan performance of 
borrowers, I find that cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for all holding 
periods are statistically significantly positive when all loans are included.  Positive CAARs 
are observed for the very short periods of three- and five-days around the announcement 
and, surprisingly, for the very long holding periods of up to three years following the 
announcement.  When I partition the loans according to their types, I also find that 
revolving credit loans are driving the overall results.  The market reacts positively in the 
short run and the positive CAARs persist over the following three years. I find that the 
cumulative abnormal returns range between 2.86% to 3.39% and they are significant at 
either the 1% or 5% levels. This implies that the market values this type of loan from the 
perspective of maximization of shareholder wealth. The initial positive responses suggest 
that the market values the screening and monitoring signals provided by the lender.  In 
addition, this response indicates the financial flexibility provided by the loans is valued.  
The persistence of positive CAARs over time suggests that the borrowers are creating value 
by investing in positive NPV projects above what the market originally anticipated and 
facilitated by the flexibility of the loan structure.   
 
For term loans, a different story emerges.  The initial reaction of the market is 
indifference.  This is shown by the insignificant positive CAARs for the days around the 
announcement.  However, over the following three years, the CAARs become strongly 
  13negative, consistent with the inflexibility of term loans and/or poorly performing 
investment choices.  The hybrid loans exhibit results that vary over time.  A positive 
reaction is observed immediately but there is no abnormal return in the first year in the 
post-announcement period. The market reaction, however, becomes increasingly positive 
over the last two years after the announcement.  I speculate that the hybrid nature of the 
loan allows increased flexibility to match the financing with the investment needs.   
 
In the second essay of the thesis, I also observe substantial differences in market 
responses to the earnings announcements before and after the loan.  Prior to the loan being 
approved, the market views the earnings announcements positively and all are statistically 
significant.  This is more likely the result of these earnings being more positive or less 
negative than expected by the market. Subsequent to the loan announcements, however, I 
find that the market recognizes the differences among the firms and the reactions are 
dependent on the type of loan provided by the lenders.  I find that for firms that received 
revolving credit loans, earnings announcements are statistically significant for all periods. 
This result again supports the view that the greater degree of flexibility inherent in 
revolving credit loans is viewed favourably by the market. Apparently, this feature of 
revolving credit loans allows firms to better match their investment opportunity schedules 
and to renegotiate existing loans in more favourable terms.  In contrast to revolving credit 
loans, I find that earnings announcements for firms with term loans are not viewed 
favourably by the market because borrowers cannot react as easily to changing 
circumstances. I reason that management believes future performance may deteriorate, 
reducing their credit worthiness.  Thus, they prefer to avoid revolving credit renegotiation.   
  14  
Finally, in this thesis I also examine the relations between cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) and accounting measures of firm performance one year prior to the loan 
announcement, the year of the announcement (contemporaneous), and one year after the 
announcement.  In addition to classifying loans into different types, I also partition CARs 
based on whether they are positive or negative for each loan announcement.   
 
I find that some financial ratios are positively related to both negative CARs and 
positive CARS whereas other ratios are negatively correlated with both positive CARs and 
negative CARs. These results also apply when I partition my sample into different types of 
loan.  However, I also find that revolving credit loans again are driving the results of the 
entire sample. Hence, I can neither reject nor accept the hypothesis that favourable or 
unfavourable stock market reaction is related to performance of borrowers in the one year 
prior to or post-loan announcement. This conclusion can also be applied to the 
contemporaneous relation between firm performance and market returns, albeit the relation 
between the two is much stronger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  151.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Although finance researchers have made some effort to provide more insights into 
the study of syndicated loans, my understanding is that current research in this area is still 
in its infancy. Previous studies did not differentiate information sources or consider the 
structure of loans in much detail. The main contribution of this thesis is that I specifically 
focus on the structure of syndicated loans (i.e., whether it is a term loan or a revolving 
credit facility or a hybrid loan) and examine its influence on stock market reaction to 
announcements of syndicated loans and on earnings announcements. My results provide 
support for prior studies which emphasise the importance of flexibility and negotiability of 
debt securities as well as the financial slack argument. A further contribution is that in this 
thesis I compare the impacts of two sources of information on stock market reaction to loan 
announcements.  
 
Overall, my study confirms that different loan structures, that exhibit different 
degrees of flexibility, do affect the market’s view about borrowing firms both on the 
announcement date of the loan and over the long term. It also confirms that there is an 
association between the short-term announcement effect and the long-term performance of 
borrowing firms, and again the loan structure appears to be the main explanation for this 
association. 
 
  16The main implication of this study is that bank loans and loan structure affect the 
reaction of the stock market upon loan announcements, and this affects the corporate 
financial decisions and hence its capital structure. My results have implications for both the 
capital structure and the role of banks in firm financing. 
 
In addition, if revolving credit loans are what makes bank loans special then it also 
has implications for bank regulatory policy. James and Smith (2000, 52) argue that “if bank 
loans are special, then disruptions to the banking sector can reduce corporate investment 
and general macroeconomic activity.” It follows that differentiating loan types is crucial as 
far as policy making is concerned.  
 
I note a number of limitations in this thesis. The main limitation is that I did not use 
the matched-firm technique as commonly used in the literature (Barber and Lyon, 1997; 
and Barber, Lyon and Tsai, 1999) to measure long-term performance of borrowing firms. 
However, as pointed out by a number of researchers (e.g. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2006; 
and Kothari and Warner, 2006) the matched-firm technique is not without problems and I 
will discuss these issues in the concluding chapter of this thesis.  
 
The second limitation is that since most of the borrowing firms in my sample are 
large firms, there may be a bias in my results. However, I see this as unavoidable since 
most firms receiving syndicated loans are large firms.  
 
  17The final limitation relates to information leakage. If there is information leakage 
then usefulness of my results might be reduced. This is one of the weaknesses of the event 
methodology. That is, pinpointing the exact announcement date of syndicated loans.   
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THESIS 
 
This thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay I seek to answer the research 
questions related to the wealth effect of announcements of syndicated loans. In this essay, I 
review existing literature on bank loans in general and on syndicated loans in particular. I 
also describe my dataset for the whole thesis in this essay. The second essay looks at long-
term performance of borrowing firms and capital structure issues.  I integrate the two lines 
of financial research by merging capital structure issues with the role of banks in reducing 
information asymmetry and providing financial slack. I review existing literature on long-
term performance as well as the three primary capital structure theories, namely, the 
tradeoff theory, the pecking order theory and the market timing theory. In each essay, I 
present the methodology used, the hypotheses tested, as well as the research results for the 
questions raised in each essay.  The two essays are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively. Chapter 4 concludes this thesis and outlines research limitations as well as 
future research directions. Finally, Appendix 1 discusses event study methodology.  
 
  18CHAPTER TWO: STOCK MARKET REACTION TO 
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF SYNDICATED LOANS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The international market for syndicated loans has been growing strongly since the 
early 1990s and totaled almost USD 1 trillion in 1999 alone. As reported in the introductory 
chapter, this figure climbed to USD 2.26 trillion in 2004.
4 Surprisingly, very little research 
has been conducted in this area of finance. Although what follows in this review is a 
chronological presentation of the previous research in the area of bank loans, it should be 
pointed out that in this thesis I will focus on the wealth effects of announcements of bank 
loans (this chapter) and the long-term performance of borrowers (next chapter).  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section two I review the literature on bank 
loans in general and syndicated loans in particular. The third section presents the 
hypotheses. The data description and methodology follow in the fourth section. In the fifth 
section I present the empirical results. The final section concludes the chapter. 
                                                 
4 It should be pointed out that there are differences in the volume of syndicated loans given by different data 
sources. These include those from Loan Pricing Corporation, Euromoney, Shared National Credit Program, 
Bank for International Settlement and Altunbas, Ganadecz and Kara (2006). In this chapter, to maintain 
consistency, we mainly draw our information from Bank for International Settlement and only resort to other 
sources of statistics when necessary. 
  192.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the first part of this section, I first review existing literature related to bank loan 
and financial intermediaries in general. Specifically, I look at why bank loans are 
considered to be special compared with other forms of debt. I also review other issues such 
as adverse selection and moral hazard. In the second part of this section I look at the 
literature on syndication. Finally, I summarise the issues considered in existing literature 
and present the issues considered in this thesis. 
2.2.1. BANK LOANS 
 
According to Leland and Pyle (1977), most modern theories of bank lending assume 
that banks’ relations with borrowers enable them to obtain information not available to 
other providers of funds. They note that all modern theories of financial intermediation are 
“information-based paradigms.” 
 
As with any other business relation, a banking relation between a lender and a 
borrower involves information asymmetry: the borrower is privately informed about its 
own credit risk. In this regard, credit analysis helps the bank to reduce its informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the borrower. A banking relation also involves a moral hazard 
problem. Leland and Pyle (1977) note that when the borrower takes out a loan from the 
bank, it becomes an agent of the bank. This agency problem arises when the borrower takes 
on additional risk to the bank’s detriment. Loan contracts are therefore designed to control 
the borrower’s risk-taking propensity. For this reason, most banks require collateral for a 
  20loan, and a borrower’s willingness to offer collateral is inversely related to its default risk 
on the loan. As such, collateral helps resolve a variety of moral hazard problems.  
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that banks may provide unique information if 
transaction services and other banking services complement information production. 
According to Leland and Pyle (1977) informational asymmetries are particularly 
pronounced in financial markets. Borrowers know their own information better than their 
lenders and entrepreneurs possess inside information about their own projects for which 
they seek financing. Consequently, market value must reflect average project qualities. 
Leland and Pyle (1977, 371) argue that knowing the true characteristics of the borrowers 
would benefit lenders but moral hazard prevents “the direct transfer of information between 
market participants.” They point out that “one cannot expect borrowers to be truthful about 
their characteristics, nor entrepreneurs about their projects, since there may be substantial 
rewards for exaggerating positive qualities.” In addition, verification of these characteristics 
by third parties may be costly to lenders or may even be impossible. Hence, Leland and 
Pyle (1977) reason that financing good quality projects can only take place if information 
can be transferred to lenders. Unfortunately, moral hazard can prevent this transfer of 
information. Nevertheless, if the actions of entrepreneurs can be observed then the transfer 
of information can still take place.  The argument is that an entrepreneur’s willingness to 
invest in his own project is evidence of his confidence about the prospect of the project. In 
other words, it can be seen as a signal of his project’s quality.  
 
  21Leland and Pyle (1977, 382) note that “the traditional models of financial markets 
have difficulties in explaining the existence of financial intermediaries.” They argue that 
even though transaction costs could explain intermediation, their magnitude in many cases 
appears to be insufficient to be the only reason. Leland and Pyle (1977, 383) suggest that 
“information asymmetries may be a primary reason that intermediaries exist.” These 
authors argue that for certain classes of assets (e.g. mortgages or insurance) one can expend 
resources to obtain information about them which is not publicly available. They point out 
that this information can benefit potential lenders and if there are economies of scale then 
one might expect organizations to be established to trade on this valuable information. 
 
Leland and Pyle (1977, 383), however, cite two reasons that might prevent firms 
trying to sell information to investors. The first is “the appropriability of returns by the 
firms.” This problem refers to the case where “purchasers of information might be able to 
share or resell their information to others, without diminishing its usefulness to 
themselves.” For this reason, the firm may be able to “appropriate” only a fraction of the 
total amount that buyers would be willing to pay. The second problem relates to “the 
credibility of that information.” Users of information might not be able to distinguish good 
information from bad. Consequently, “the price of information will reflect its average 
quality.” If entry is easy then there will be firms offering poor quality information and this 
can lead to market failure and the well-known Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons will 
result. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the above two problems can be overcome by an 
intermediary organization which is not only gathering the information but also buying and 
holding assets on the basis of its specialized information. Leland and Pyle (1977, 383) 
  22reason that in this case the problem of appropriability would not arise because “the firm’s 
information is embodied in a private good, the returns from its portfolio.” They point out 
that “while information alone can be resold without diminishing its returns to the reseller, 
claims to the intermediary’s assets cannot be. Thus, a return to the firm’s information 
gathering can be captured through the increased value of its portfolio.”  
 
Fama (1985, 36) differentiates inside debt from outside debt. He defines inside debt 
as “a contract where the debtholder gets access to information from an organisation’s 
decision process not otherwise publicly available.” He argues that bank loans are a form of 
inside debt. As inside debt, bank loans are a way to avoid under-investment problems due 
to information asymmetries. Bank loans may serve as a form of inside debt if banks have 
inside information about the value of the firm’s growth prospects and bank loan rates 
reflect this information. In contrast, outside debt is defined by Fama (1985, 36) as “publicly 
traded debt where the debtholder relies on publicly available information generated by the 
organization or information purchased by the organization (for example, independent audits 
and bond ratings).” 
 
Fama (1985) reports the average yields to maturity on high-grade certificates of 
deposit (CDs), bankers’ acceptances, commercial paper, and Treasury bills for the period 
between 1967 and 1983. Fama (1985, 29) observes that “average yields on high grade CD’s 
and bankers’ acceptances of the same maturity are almost identical.” He also observes that 
“the differences between average yields on CD’s and commercial paper are trivial.” In 
other words, these securities are close substitutes. Fama (1985) points out that banks charge 
  23borrowers interest which is higher than open-market interest rates because of the cost of the 
reserve requirement on CD’s.  Fama (1985, 30) reasons that since CDs provide no apparent 
transaction or liquidity services and the reserve tax on CDs must be borne by bank 
borrowers, “there must be something special about bank loans.” 
 
Fama (1985) suggests that banks are special because they have a comparative cost 
advantage over other financial intermediaries in gathering information and in monitoring 
loans. Fama (1985, 36) argues that “Bank signals are credible since the bank backs its 
opinions with resources, or by declining resources.” In addition, Fama (1985, 37) notes that 
“… many organizations pay periodic monitoring fees for lines of credit from banks even 
though they do not take the resources offered. Indeed, large corporations often purchase 
lines of credit from banks for the sole purpose of providing a signal about outside debt 
(commercial paper) to be issued publicly rather than held by the bank.” 
 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) examine the nature of the information that security 
offerings convey to market participants. They review the literature up to 1986 which offers 
an explanation about market reaction to security offerings. According to this explanation, 
investors infer that the market price exceeds managers’ assessment of share price when any 
offering of common stock or convertible debt security is announced. Conversely, if share 
prices are too low then they will be retired. According to Mikkelson and Partch (1986, 32) 
the basic premise of this explanation is that “information about firm’s earnings prospects, 
investment opportunities or assets in place is unevenly distributed between the firm’s 
managers and investors.” 
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Mikkelson and Partch (1986) use a sample of 360 industrial firms listed on the New 
York and American Stock Exchange and examine the price effect of different types of 
securities. They find a negative and statistically significant announcement effect for both 
common stock (-3.56%) and convertible debt offerings (-1.97%). However, the price effect 
for announcements of straight debt offerings is less pronounced although still negative (-
0.23%). They also find that announcement effects are negative for both private placements 
of debt (-0.57%) and term loans (-0.15%) but not significant. Announcement of a line of 
credit has a small and positive valuation effect (0.89%), significant at the 1% level.  They 
conclude that the structure of the loan agreements is the main determinant of the positive 
share price reaction. In fact, according to DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) were the first to examine returns to borrowers around 
announcements of lines of credit. 
 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) also study share price behaviour after the 
announcement of common stock and convertible debt offerings which are subsequently 
either completed or cancelled. They report that for completed offerings there is a positive 
return between the announcement and issuance and a negative return at the issuance. On the 
other hand, for offerings that are subsequently cancelled, a negative return between the 
announcement and the cancellation is observed and a positive return at the cancellation is 
reported.  
 
  25James (1987) examines the incidence of the reserve requirement tax and the stock 
price response to announcements of bank loans, private placements of debt, and public 
straight debt issues. He studies a sample of 207 financing announcements over the ten-year 
period, 1974-1983. His sample consists of eighty announcements of bank loans, thirty-
seven announcements of private placements, and ninety announcements of public straight 
debt offerings. 
 
James’ (1987) examination extends the research of Fama (1985) on the reserve 
requirement tax. However, James (1987, 482) points out that a problem with Fama’s (1985) 
study is that “the reserve requirement tax could be at least partially offset by a subsidy from 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the form of deposit insurance supplied at less 
than actuarially fair price.” James’ (1987) overcomes this problem by examining the 
behaviour of CD rates around changes in reserve requirements in the absence of offsetting 
changes in deposit insurance prices.                                                                                             
 
James (1987, 483) reasons “without any contemporaneous change in insurance 
costs, an increase in reserve requirement should reduce the yield on CDs in relation to other 
yields if depositors pay the reserve tax.” He observes the average yield on CDs, commercial 
paper, and Treasury bills during the periods in which a 3% reserve requirements was 
effective (January 1977 - November 1978 and July 1980 - December 1984) and the period 
(November 1978 - July 1980) in which a 5% reserve requirement was imposed. He finds 
that the difference in the average spread between CDs and commercial paper or Treasury 
bills is not statistically significant during the two periods. Therefore, he concludes that his 
  26evidence lends support to Fama’s (1985) conclusion that the reserve tax is borne by bank 
borrowers not the CD holders. 
 
On the second issue, James (1987) conducts his study based on the notion 
developed by previous researchers (Kane and Malkiel, 1965; Myers and Majluf, 1984; and 
Fama, 1985) that bank loans are a form of inside debt.  James (1987, 482) reasons that “in 
the context of the Myers and Majluf model (1984), loans by banks (as inside debt) are 
similar to financial slack (internally generated funds).”  Furthermore, since bank loans can 
avoid the information asymmetry problems associated with other forms of debt, it is 
expected that stock price responses associated with announcements of bank loan to be non-
negative.  
 
James (1987) finds that the stock price response to the announcement of new bank 
credit agreements is positive and larger than the stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements or public straight debt offerings. He finds that the 
average prediction error for bank loan agreements is positive (1.93%) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In addition, he also finds no statistically significant difference 
between announcements of bank loan agreements in which immediate borrowing is 
indicated and those in which no immediate borrowing is indicated. In contrast to bank loan 
announcements, he finds negative stock price response for public straight debt (-0.11%).  
 
James (1987) also looks at private placements acquired by insurance companies. He 
reasons that since these placements are also inside debt, a non-negative stock price response 
  27is expected. Surprisingly, he observes that stock price response to these placements is 
negative (-0.91%) and statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, he finds that the 
stock price responses are significantly negative for announcements of private placements (-
2.1%) and straight debt issues (-1.6%) used to repay bank loans. Given the results above, 
James (1987, 483) concludes that “bank loans are unique, but they are not fully consistent 
with the inside-debt argument.” 
 
Pennacchi (1988) presents a theoretical model where banks may improve the returns 
on loans by monitoring borrowers. He notes the increase in loan selling in the US in the 
1980s, in particular, banks’ mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority 
of the Government National Mortgage Association, securitized and then sold to secondary 
market investors. Pennacchi (1988) examines the incentives for banks to sell loans. He 
demonstrates that banks cannot profit by simply holding money-market assets if faced with 
“significant competition” for deposit financing as well as regulatory constraints.   He shows 
that loan sales allow banks to finance loans cheaper than traditional deposit or equity 
issues. He reasons that this is because loan sales can help banks to avoid costs associated 
with reserves and capital requirements. Pennacchi (1988, 393) demonstrates that “a bank’s 
ability to sell loans depends on the buyer’s perception of the seller‘s incentive to monitor.” 
Furthermore, he shows that by designing the loan sales contract in a way that gives the 
bank “a disproportionate share of the gains to monitoring.” a bank can sell a greater 
proportion of the loan and, hence, attain a higher level of bank profits.  As a corollary, if the 
benefits to monitoring are negligible, the bank can sell a loan in its entirety.  
 
  28James and Wier (1988) base their study on James (1987) and provide further 
elaboration of stock market response to security announcements and explore the possibility 
that banks have some unique advantages in providing capital to the market. They reason 
that banks do more than providing transaction services by taking demand deposits. They 
report that financial institutions – mainly commercial banks, provided at least a third of the 
new debt raised by all American industrial corporations over the period from 1977 to 1986. 
James and Wier (1988) discuss the reasons why the market views new security issues 
negatively using the pecking order theory advanced by Myers and Majluf (1984).   
Specifically, investors reason that if management is aiming at maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth then it will try to issue new securities when it believes the firm is overvalued 
relative to its profitability prospect. For this reason firms with genuine investment 
opportunities prefer to use internally generated funds. If these funds are insufficient, bank 
loans appear to be a possible solution to this problem. They observe that for the period of 
their study (1977-1986), inside debt appears to be a major source of financing for smaller 
public corporations as well as privately held firms. On average bank loans represented 
some 46% of all debt financing to US non-financial corporations.  
 
James and Wier (1988) explain the advantages of using inside debt as follows. First, 
inside debt provides a possible solution to the information asymmetry problem encountered 
in all public security offerings. This is so because banks have better information about 
borrowing firms than outsiders and therefore they can price their loans accordingly to 
reflect this information advantage. Second, banks as inside debtholders can effectively 
monitor the debtor with the use of covenants after the debt is issued. James and Wier 
  29(1990) note that renegotiation in response to unexpected developments is also easier with 
only one or several lenders (inside debt) than with numerous investors. In the case of bank 
loans, the lender also possesses the advantage of having an ongoing deposit relationship 
with the borrower to monitor the credit quality of the firm. The fact that management is 
willing to let the firm be subject to frequent, periodic reviews required by lenders is a signal 
of its confidence in the firm’s future. The third advantage of inside debt is that it helps 
firms to maintain confidentiality about their investment opportunities. Finally, inside debt 
help firms avoid the costly issue of new equities. This is particularly true in the case of 
small companies when the size of the issues is not large enough to have the benefits of 
economies of scale enjoyed by large corporations.  
 
In their paper, James and Wier (1988) also raise an interesting question: why do 
banks specialize in shorter maturities and not longer maturities?  They explain that they 
have no good answer to this puzzle. However, they conjecture that perhaps banks are 
reluctant to make long-term loans because of regulatory reasons or they do not want their 
assets and liabilities to be mismatched. Risk differences could also be another reason. They 
note that more than half of companies using bank loans and private placements did not have 
a bond rating. Thus, these companies could have considerable default risk. 
 
James and Wier (1988, 54) conclude their paper by arguing that their evidence 
shows that bank loans are “the most effective form of inside debt” and that in some 
respects, “bank loans are indeed unique.”  
 
  30Lummer and McConnell (1989) argue that banks play an important role as 
transmitters of information in capital markets. They point out that bank loans convey 
information about the value of the borrowing firm but new bank loans per se do not 
communicate information. Banks either produce or have access to information not available 
to others. 
 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) distinguish two perspectives on the way in which 
banks gain access to information not available to other capital market participants. 
According to the first perspective (Benston and Smith (1976), Diamond (1984), and 
Campbell and Kracaw (1980)) banks invest in information gathering technology that gives 
them a competitive advantage in evaluating risky lending opportunities. The bank’s loan 
decision signals the prospective borrower’s creditworthiness. This perspective assumes that 
a firm will enter into a new bank loan agreement only if it currently has no bank financing 
in place or the terms of a new credit agreement are more favourable than its current 
agreement. Thus, one would expect a positive stock price response when new loans are 
announced. 
 
The alternative view is that banks can also gain access to private information about 
their customers over time as a result of an intimate continuing business relation. This view 
can be traced back to Kane and Malkiel (1965) and Black (1975). Fama (1985) argues that 
banks play a unique role in providing funds to business. First, bank debt is classified as 
inside debt. Second, because bank loans typically have a low priority among fixed-payoff 
claims, signals from the credit renewal process are credible and, consequently, reduce the 
  31monitoring costs incurred by the firm’s other claimants. Lummer and McConnell argue that 
the two perspectives on how banks transmit information are not mutually exclusive. Using 
a sample of 728 loan agreements for NYSE- and AMEX-listed companies in the period 
1976-1986, Lummer and McConnell (1989) find an abnormal return of 0.61% for their full 
sample which is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) also divide credit agreements into different 
categories and find that favourably revised credit agreements (259 observations) result in a 
positive abnormal return of 0.87% and the result is also significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. For unfavourably revised credit agreements (22 observations) a negative 
abnormal returns of -3.86% significant at the 1% level is reported.  In addition, they find no 
significant announcement returns for new credit agreements (371 observations). They 
interpret these results as evidence that banks enter new credit agreements with no 
information advantage relative to other outside claimholders. However, as banks continue 
their credit relations with their customers, they gain access to inside information which 
gives them a relative information advantage. 
 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) document that the two-day announcement period 
excess return for bank loan announcements is significantly positive and the stock price 
response to new loan announcements is not significant. Therefore, the positive 
announcement-period return is due almost solely to announcements of revisions to existing 
agreements (mainly for the credit expansions or improvements). 
 
  32Finally, Lummer and McConnell (1989) also show that when a line of credit is 
terminated, a negative signal about the borrower is sent to the market. Thus, borrowers 
have a strong incentive not to discontinue their lines of credit, especially when they use this 
facility as a signaling device. 
 
Diamond (1991) develops a model which involves borrowers shifting from private 
sources to public debt markets as the quality of information about the firm is improving and 
the borrower “develops a reputation in the form of a successful history of debt 
repayments.” When firms require less monitoring, debt becomes more saleable to parties 
lacking idiosyncratic information. He argues that new borrowers without well-established 
reputations would choose to borrow from banks because they have the most to gain from 
bank monitoring. More reputable borrowers would choose the capital markets. 
 
Diamond (1991) also discusses the benefits for borrowing firms of being monitored 
by banks. Diamond (1991, 716) uses his model to predict that “if moral hazard is 
sufficiently widespread then new borrowers will begin their reputation acquisition by being 
monitored and later switch to issuing directly placed debt.” Diamond (1991, 716) concludes 
that “the favourable track record acquired while being monitored will be useful in 
predicting future actions without monitoring. Reputation alone can eventually deal with the 
moral hazard because the better reputation achieved over time implied that adverse 
selection is then less severe.” 
 
  33Calem and Rizzo (1992) study the relationship between capital structure and 
financial performance of 266 public hospitals and non-accredited hospitals in the US and 
find that reliance on bank loans is positively related to profitability. This suggests the 
presence of hidden factors that enhance hospital financial performance. This relation, in 
turn, can only exist if banks have access to special information about credit risk at public 
and non-accredited hospitals. Thus, Calem and Rizzo are also of the view that banks often 
have access to information not available to other lenders.  
 
According to Wansley, Elayan and Collins (1992), the impact of a credit line 
announcement on a borrowing firm’s security returns depends on the extent to which the 
market already has information regarding the firm’s true value. They argue that since the 
level of market information should be related to tangible assets, insider holdings, and other 
signals of quality already in place, announcements should be redundant information for 
those firms with other credible market value signals already in place.   They note that the 
credit announcement only provides information on firm value when it is difficult to 
estimate. Thus, for those firms whose credit quality is not readily apparent or whose value 
is based primarily on growth options rather than assets in place, the announcement of credit 
lines is a valuable indicator of firm qualities.  They study a sample of 614 credit agreements 
in the US for the period from January 1, 1972 through December 31, 1987 and find that the 
excess returns for borrowing firms around the announcement of the credit agreement are 
related to the size of the agreement and to the level of growth options in the firm’s 
investment opportunity set. They also report that as the size of the credit line and the firm’s 
growth options increase, the difference in market announcement effects between new and 
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agreements are not related to the firm’s bond ratings or to its level of insider holdings. 
However, these effects are dampened for firms with relatively large insider holdings. 
 
Merton (1992) argues that since it is costly to establish or replace a banking 
relation, a bank’s ability to sell its services is enhanced if the market perceives them as 
being a higher quality bank. It follows that this perception is reinforced if the bank has a 
large number of strong, high prestige corporate clients. Accordingly, banks will tend to 
“cultivate” clients that add to their reputation. Therefore, large companies can use almost 
any bank they desire. On the part of the borrower, using a high quality bank indicates that it 
considers the bank an excellent signaling device due to its financial strength and reputation. 
 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) use a sample that includes NASDAQ small 
companies and study the relation between firm size and the information content of bank 
loan announcements. They classify a company as small if it has a market value which is 
less than the median value of all the listed companies in the market.  They find that the 
stock market response to new loans is significantly positive for their whole sample. This 
finding is in contrast with that of Lummer and McConnell (1989). They also find that the 
response to renewed loans is even more positive than that to new loans. These responses, 
however, are confined primarily to small firms.  This is because large firms are well 
monitored and have acquired reputation and banks have less comparative advantage in the 
external financing process relative to the capital markets.   For small firms, however, moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems are more severe, because they have shorter 
  35corporate histories, lesser reputations, and less public information is available for investors. 
Hence small firms receive greater benefits from a bank’s screening and monitoring 
services.  
 
Best and Zhang (1993) examine the information content of bank loans by 
addressing two issues. First they recognize that parties other than banks also perform 
evaluation and monitoring roles. Consequently, if these other information sources can 
sufficiently resolve informational asymmetries, bank loan announcements should convey 
little information to the market. However, if these other sources produce “noisy signals”, or 
face a disadvantage relative to banks in information production, then bank loan 
announcements should convey useful information to market participants. Second, they 
examine whether banks expend equal efforts in evaluating all borrowers. They argue that   
banks first use indicators from other sources to screen the borrowers and then decide how 
to allocate investigation resources.  
 
Best and Zhang (1993) reason that banks can create value by evaluating those 
borrowers perceived by the public to have poor earnings prospect. The reason is that these 
firms are the most likely to be undervalued by the market and, hence, unlikely to issue 
public securities. Borrowing from banks in this case would send a signal to the market that 
they are in fact undervalued. Furthermore, this creation of value is greatest when public 
information is noisy and the firm’s credit quality is in doubt. 
 
  36Best and Zhang (1993) use a sample of 491 observations of financial analysts’ 
forecasts during the period 1977-1989 and find that the excess returns for their sample is 
positive (0.32%) and is significant at the 5% level. Best and Zhang (1993) divide their 
sample according to whether financial analysts’ percentage earnings prediction errors are 
high or low, and whether the most recent earnings forecast revisions are positive, 
unchanged, or negative. They find that bank loans convey more information when the 
analysts’ forecast errors are high. Moreover, banks produce little information when the 
most recent earnings forecast revision is positive.  Furthermore, the information content of 
bank loans is most significant when both the analysts’ forecast errors are high and their 
most recent earnings forecast revisions are unchanged or negative. The excess return in the 
former case is 0.60% and is significant at the 1% level whereas that in the latter case is 
0.04% and is insignificant. These results support the notion that banks rely on other 
information resources to determine where to best deploy their evaluation efforts. If the non-
bank indicators are reliable and reflect improving expected performance, banks do little 
further investigation. However, if these indicators are noisy and reflect declining expected 
performance, banks have an incentive to thoroughly scrutinize the borrowers. 
 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) question why we have financial intermediaries. 
They focus on the role of financial intermediaries in providing brokerage and qualitative 
asset transformation services. These services are shown in Figure 2.1 below. According to 
these authors banks traditionally provide virtually all these services. Non-depository 
financial intermediaries tend to specialize more narrowly. Financial intermediaries have a 
cost advantage in providing brokerage services.  This cost advantage arises from two 
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exploit cross-sectional and temporal reusability of information. As for the qualitative asset 
transformation services, financial intermediaries typically transform claims by modifying 
the attributes of these claims. This is also shown in Figure 2.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
       Services provided 
FIGURE  2.1:  Financial  Intermediary        
      -  Transactions  services  (e.g.  cheque-writing,   
          buying/selling  securities  and  safekeeping)   
      -  Financial  advice 
      -  Screening  and certification (e.g. bond  
          r a t i n g s )  
      -  Origination   
      -   I s s u a n c e  
      -   M i s c e l l a n e o u s  
 
       Major Attributes Modified 
 
         - Term to maturity (e.g. bank financing  
assets with longer maturity than liabilities). 
                                                                     - Divisibility (e.g. a mutual fund  
holding assets with larger unit size  
than its liabilities) 
                                                                     - Liquidity (e.g. a bank funding illiquid  
loans with liquid liabilities) 
                   - Credit risk (e.g. a bank monitoring a  
      borrower  to  reduce  default  risk) 
 
 
Brokerage 
Qualitative 
Asset 
Transformation 
 
 
Financial 
Intermediary 
 
Source: Figure 1. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). 
 
  38Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993, 8)  point out that “informational asymmetries are 
the most basic form of transaction costs and thus information-based theories of 
intermediation provide a more fundamental interpretation.” Bhattacharya and Thakor 
(1993, 9) argue that “a bank can communicate proprietary information about borrowers at 
lower cost than can the borrowers individually.” 
 
According to Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993, 3), a number of lessons can be 
learned from the existence of financial intermediaries. Firstly, financial intermediaries can 
reduce transaction costs. Secondly, with informational asymmetries, both depository and 
non-depository financial intermediaries can gain from an increase in size because of lower 
incentive costs per agent. Thirdly, bank loans are special because “they signal quality in a 
way that other forms of credit do not.” Fourthly, banks enhance aggregate investment. 
 
Waheed and Mathur (1993) examine the market reaction to announcements of both 
domestic and foreign lending agreements by US Bank Holding Companies using data for 
the period 1963-1989. Waheed and Mathur (1993, 126) find that “banks, as vehicles for 
information generation about their corporate clients, do not provide any information about 
themselves to market participants when they announce domestic lending agreements.” 
However, banks “do reveal information about themselves to investors when they announce 
their foreign lending agreements.”  They also find that shareholders of US banks experience 
significant abnormal returns of -0.17% when banks announce foreign expansion. Abnormal 
returns are insignificant when the announced mode of expansion is through a representative 
office, are significantly positive for announcements related to branches, and are 
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joint venture or a subsidiary, or through an acquisition. Abnormal returns are significantly 
negative when banks announce expansion into developed countries, and are significantly 
positive when announcements relate to risky developing countries. Post-announcement 
changes in the total variance of returns and in the unsystematic risk of US banks are 
inversely related to abnormal returns. Higher wealth effects are associated with higher 
levels of prior overseas experience.
 
McDonald (1994) differentiates lines of credit from revolving credit agreements. 
According to McDonald (1994, 23), a line of credit is “an understanding, informal or 
formal, between the bank and the firm as to the limit up to which the firms may borrow in a 
given period, usually one year.” And “a revolving credit agreement is a formal arrangement 
between a bank and a usually large firm for a renewable loan commitment. Revolving 
credit agreements may have long durations.” 
 
McDonald (1994) uses a sample of 250 loan commitments announced in The Wall 
Street Journal during the period January 1, 1980 through September 30, 1986, to examine 
stock market reaction to security price of borrowing firms. He finds a positive abnormal 
return of 1.3% during the two-day period prior to announcements of revolving credit 
agreements. He also finds an abnormal return of 0.77% on the announcement date for the 
sample. Both results are significant at the 5% level. McDonald (1994, 27) interprets these 
results as evidence that “the market requires an observable signal from the bank that the 
implied audit of the firm has been completed.” McDonald (1994, 27) reasons that the 
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the case of straight lines of credit when the formalization process is absent, the effect of a 
loan commitment announcement is diminished. The ten-day period prior to the 
announcement shows a significant negative return of 1.7% and the result is significant at 
the 5% level. The abnormal return on the announcement date is 0.5%, but insignificant. He 
argues that this is because straight lines of credit are less observable to investors.   
McDonald (1994) also finds that for his full sample positive abnormal returns of 0.64% and 
0.36% are observed during the two-day period prior to, and on the announcement date, 
respectively. Again, both results are statistically significant at the 5% level. It appears that 
the revolving credit agreements drive the overall results of McDonald’s (1994) study. 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) develop a theoretical model that explains firms’ 
choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. They argue that banks with greater 
reputation are able to convey more information than less reputable banks. They reason that 
the entrepreneur has private information about their probability of financial distress, and if 
this problem is serious then firms would choose to borrow from banks rather than issuing 
publicly traded debt. This is because firms, especially small firms, know that reputable 
banks can provide them with financial flexibility to renegotiate the loan in the event of 
financial distress. They Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994, 475) demonstrate that “banks’ 
desire to acquire a reputation for making the “right” renegotiation versus liquidation 
decision provides them an endogenous incentive to devote a larger amount of resources 
than bondholders toward such evaluations.” 
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on average, have a greater probability of being in financial distress compared to those 
issuing publicly traded debt.” Using firm size as a proxy for the probability of financial 
distress, they infer that smaller firms are likely to use bank loans to fund their projects 
while larger firms issue publicly traded debt. They also infer from their model that in 
equilibrium “the yield on bank loans will be higher than that on publicly traded debt of 
equivalent maturity.” Nonetheless, firms are happy to pay higher interest rates on loans 
from reputable banks in exchange for financial flexibility in the case of financial distress. 
Furthermore, they argue that bank loans will be renegotiated more often than publicly 
traded debt. They reason that banks are prepared to devote more resources to evaluate firms 
in financial distress than holders of publicly traded debts. Finally, Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri’s (1994, 498) model also predicts that “renewals of bank loans will convey more 
favourable information compared to those of other kinds of debt.”  
 
Using data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1987 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances, Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine the effect of firm-lender 
relationships on the availability of credit. They do not find that the loan rate is related to the 
duration of the firm-lender relationship nor with whether the firm obtains deposit accounts 
or informational services from its lender. However, they find that the loan rate increases 
with the number of banks from which the firm borrows and decreases with firm age. They 
also find that the availability of credit, as proxied by the percentage of a firm’s trade credits 
paid late, is negatively related to both the length of the firm’s longest relationship and firm 
age. 
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Berger and Udell (1995) also use the 1988-89 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF) to examine the role of relationship lending in small firm finance. They 
examine price and non-price terms of bank lines of credit extended to small firms. Berger 
and Udell (1995, 351) claim that “the focus on lines of credit allows the examination of a 
type of loan contract in which the bank-borrower relationship is likely to be an important 
mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problems associated with financing 
small enterprises.” Berger and Udell (1995, 353) argue that “the line of credit itself 
represents a formalization of this relationship.” Furthermore, “The bank line of credit (L/C) 
is a particularly important part of relationship lending because it represents a forward 
commitment to provide working capital financing under pre-specified terms” (p.355). They 
also argue that relationships are less important for “transaction-driven” loans (e.g. 
mortgages and motor-vehicle loans). They focus on “relationship-driven” loans and find 
that the loan-rate premium over the lending bank’s prime rate is negatively related to the 
duration of the firm-lender relationship. Berger and Udell (1995, 378) also claim that “the 
use of a continuous measure of the strength of the bank-borrower relationship” (i.e. the 
duration) dominates the “simple binomial proxy of whether the line of credit was a renewal 
versus a new issue as a measure of the relationship’s strength.” Consistent with the 
literature on financial intermediation they argue that their results are evidence of bank’s 
accumulating private information increasingly over the duration of the relationship and use 
this information to refine the terms of the loan contract.  
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relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than other small 
firms. They differentiate firm age from length of relationship. Berger and Udell (1995, 360) 
argue that firm age reflects “information that becomes revealed to the market as a whole” 
(that is, a firm’s public reputation) while the bank-borrower relationship reflects “private 
information revealed through the intermediation process only to the lender through the 
bank-borrower relationship.”  They also point out that firm age is highly correlated with the 
length of firm-lender relationship.  
 
In a study on the effect of the prestige of the investment banker on stock return after 
the issue of seasoned equity, Ellis and Dunkelberg (1995) find that the prestige of the 
investment banker is not an important variable in determining how the market perceives an 
equity issue announcement. However, they find that market’s perception is conditional 
upon whether the announcement transmits a positive- or negative-information signal. They 
argue that if the equity issue is used to finance profitable investment opportunities for the 
firm, then the issue signals positive information. On the other hand if the issue is a 
management’s attempt to reduce the cost of equity when they perceive the stock is being 
temporarily overvalued, then the equity issue announcement signals negative information. 
Using this distinction, they find that for negative announcements the results were similar 
for both prestigious and less prestigious investment bankers. The Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the event window (t=-40,-1) were – 1.67% and – 2.28%, 
respectively, neither of which are significant.  The CAARs for the event period (t=0, +1) 
were –4.15% for negative announcements associated with prestigious bankers versus –
  443.99% for announcements associated with less prestigious bankers. These results are 
significant at the 1% level for both groups. However, the post-announcement period results 
are significant for both groups with CAARs being –3.25% and –2.88%, respectively. Based 
on these results, Ellis and Dunkelberg argue that the prestige of investment banker did not 
impact market perceptions when the announcement was perceived as negative information. 
 
However, Ellis and Dunkelberg find that the prestige of the investment banker had 
greater impact on market perception if the equity issue is perceived as positive. For both 
groups, positive announcements were associated with positive but insignificant CAARs in 
the pre-announcement period (t=-40,-1), but the CAARs for positive announcements 
associated with prestigious investment bankers are larger than the CAARs associated with 
less prestigious investment bankers, 2.57% versus 1.57%. However, for the event period 
(t=0, +1), they were 2.63% and 1.92%, respectively. These results are significant at the 1% 
level for both groups. The authors also find that firms that had announcements associated 
with prestigious investment bankers were able to maintain their pre-announcement and 
event period gains, but firms that had announcements associated with less prestigious 
underwriters were not. During the post-announcement period (t=+2, +40), for 
announcements associated with the prestigious group, the CAARs remained unchanged 
with a slight gain of 0.10% (from 5.20% to 5.30%), but the CAARs for the announcements 
associated with the less prestigious group fell 3.63% (from 3.49% to –0.14%). 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) examine whether the lender’s identity 
influences the market’s reaction to loan announcements. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel  
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public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firms.” For this reason they 
argue that lender identity must have impacted significantly the borrower’s abnormal return. 
They distinguish lenders according to both institutional status and by their credit rating. 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995, 700) reason that “this latter designation permits 
lenders to be categorized according to market perceived differences in their quality.” They 
cite three reasons why a bank’s reputation is important. First, lender credit quality may 
affect borrower returns because both share benefits from their longstanding bank-borrower 
relationship.  Second, borrowers should be able to enjoy higher equity revaluations when 
their bank loan is announced if their banks are effective monitors.  Finally, Billett, Flannery 
and Garfinkel (1995, 704) reason that “higher quality agents more accurately inform the 
capital markets about their customer’s risk and/or value.” Therefore, “those firms seeking a 
credible signal of positive private information will use higher quality lenders.”  
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) use a sample of 626 loan announcements for 
the period 1980-1989 to conduct their study. They find an average one-day abnormal return 
of 0.68% for their whole sample and the result is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
For bank loans, they report an average abnormal return of 0.63% and the result is also 
significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, for non-bank loans they report a mixed result 
depending on the test used. They find an average abnormal return of 1.08% which is 
insignificant when the t-test is used, but is significant when the sign test is used.  Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (1995, 713) also find that “lender identity is a significant 
determinant of the market’s reaction to a loan announcement, even controlling for 
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lender’s credit rating in their regressions. More specifically, they find that given similar 
characteristics of borrowers, the average AAA lender in their sample causes “a 1.9 percent 
greater market revaluation for its borrower than a BAA or lower rated lender would 
generate.” 
 
From the above results, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995, 700) conclude that 
“the borrower returns associated with non-bank loans are positive and statistically 
significant just as the borrower returns associated with bank loans. However, the 
borrower’s abnormal returns increases with the lender’s credit quality.” Thus, “outside 
investors reflect lender identity in their reaction to the announced loan.” 
 
According to Diamond (1996, 65), banks can “centralize costly monitoring and 
avoid the duplication of effort of the monitoring of borrowers by small investors.” He 
argues that “banks monitor debt contracts, and issue unmonitored debt (deposit) contracts.” 
Furthermore, he reasons that “diversification is the financial-engineering technology that 
makes monitoring of deposit contracts unnecessary when monitoring of debt contracts is 
necessary.” For this reason, banks can deliver delegated monitoring. Diamond also 
emphasizes that “debt monitoring, and diversification are the keys to understanding the link 
between financial intermediation and delegated monitoring”.  
 
As with Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Allen and Santomero (1998, 1461) 
acknowledge that “traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and 
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policies and channel funds to firms. Citing the fact that although transaction costs and 
asymmetric information have declined, intermediation has increased, they argue that 
“current theories of intermediation (at the time of their writing, explanation added) are too 
heavily focused on functions of institutions that are no longer crucial in many developed 
financial markets.” Allen and Santomero (1998, 1462) also argue that traditional theories 
“focus on products and services that are of decreasing importance to the intermediaries.”  
They suggest that “the literature’s emphasis on the role of intermediaries as reducing the 
frictions of transaction costs and asymmetric information is too strong.” 
 
Allen and Santomero (1998, 1461) offer a theory of intermediaries that centres on 
two different roles that these firms currently play. Firstly, they can play “the role of 
facilitators of risk transfer and deal with the increasingly complex maze of financial 
instruments and markets.” According to these authors, “risk management has become a key 
area of intermediary activity,” and the current theories offer little explanation for this 
function. Secondly, these firms can facilitate the participation of investors in the financial 
sector. Allen and Santomero (1998, 1462) suggest that “reducing participation costs, which 
are the costs of learning about effectively using markets as well as participating in them on 
a day to day basis, play an important role in understanding the changes that have taken 
place.”  
 
DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999) use a sample of 327 credit agreements 
from Wall Street Journal Index for the period January 1972–December 1987 to study the 
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equity suffers significantly negative abnormal returns upon these announcements. The 
average two-day prediction error is -0.186% with a z-value of -2.013 and the proportion of 
negative returns in their sample is 54%.  They point out that the results of their study are in 
contrast with the positive results found in James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), 
and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992). They also find that their results apply to both 
bank and non-bank lenders. DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999, 66) argue that “given 
that the average lender loses when credit agreements are announced, some or all of the 
borrowers’ gain could be at the expense of the lender.” They reason that if the finding of 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) in relation to favourable revisions of existing credit lines is 
valid across all samples then in this case one would expect abnormal returns around 
expanded credit agreements to be significantly negative while new agreements should show 
no effect. They find that neither prediction holds in their study. Furthermore, they only find 
that the wealth transfer hypothesis is only applied to infrequent lenders who made relatively 
few deals during their sample period and relatively few deals per unit of time. 
 
DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999) also find that loans made by the frequent 
lenders are associated with higher abnormal returns to the borrowers. DeGennaro, Elayan 
and Wansley (1999, 66) conclude that “firms that keep in constant touch with the market 
for these agreements either have or develop a comparative advantage in engineering them.” 
They also signal the need for richer explanations of stock return behaviour around these 
credit announcements. These authors stress that a complete resolution must explain not 
only the borrowers’ abnormal returns, but also the lenders’ abnormal returns.  
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DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999) use the market value of equity to 
distinguish whether lenders made loans to larger or smaller borrowers. They find that 
lenders who made loans to smaller borrowers suffer average losses of 0.354% which is 
significantly differently from zero (z = - 2.24). They also find that lenders making loans to 
larger borrower also lose (-0.111%) but the results are not statistically significant (z = -
0.76).  However, they do not accept these results as evidence of wealth transfers between 
lenders and borrowers. They cite two reasons for this view. First, there is no significant 
difference between excess returns to lenders making loans to large borrowers and returns to 
lenders making loans to small borrowers. Second, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between lender excess returns and borrower excess returns in their sample is insignificant. 
 
DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999) note media announcements are more likely 
for large agreements and hence smaller loans are probably under-represented in their 
sample. For this reason, these authors caution their conclusions do not necessarily apply to 
all banks. Rather they apply to lines of credit that are large enough and newsworthy enough 
to merit media attention.  
 
DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999, 72) also study the abnormal returns to 
lenders based on the number of lenders in the consortium. They argue that “if there are 
many members of the lending group, the announcement in Wall Street Journal is more 
likely to have been anticipated and is less likely to release much information about any 
single lender.” In addition, lenders may reduce default risk by transferring part of the 
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returns. For these reasons DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999, 72) suggest that 
“agreements with many lenders should generate insignificant abnormal returns.” They find 
that on average single lenders in their sample lose 0.362% and the results are significant at 
the 5% level whereas multiple lenders’ losses are insignificant. In short, DeGennaro, 
Elayan and Wansley (1999) find that lenders suffer statistically significant, negative 
abnormal returns upon announcements of bank lines of credit. However, they reject the 
wealth transfer from lenders to borrowers.  
 
Finally, DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999) also examine the borrower returns 
in their study. Using the sample of 215 observations for which borrower returns are 
available, they find abnormal returns are positive (0.53%) and the results are significant at 
the 5% level. 
 
Athavale and Edmister (1999) used a sample of 2,358 pairs of loans from an 
anonymous bank in the United States to study the influence of borrowing relationships on 
the loan rates. They find that the average difference between the predicted loan rate and the 
actual loan rate in the subsequent period to be significantly different from zero, by at least 
12 basis points. They confirm this result by using a dummy variable to identify the 
subsequent-period loans and testing the coefficient of the dummy variable and find the 
results to be significant at the 1% level. They also compare the loan rates for their sample 
with peer group loan rates for both prior- and subsequent period loans. All their tests 
consistently indicate that subsequent-period loans are priced lower than prior-period loans. 
  51They conclude that bank-borrower relationships are important and influence the price of 
bank credit.  
 
James and Smith (2000) examine the characteristics of a sample of loans based on 
Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan data for the period 1987-1997 and find that 84% of 
the loans involve some form of a line of credit, 37% involve term loan and 21% include 
both line of credit and term loans, that is, hybrid loans. They explain a number of 
characteristics that distinguish bank loans from privately placed debt. First, bank loans are 
secured with collateral. Second, bank loans typically carry stringent covenants that require 
borrowers to maintain the financial ratios at certain minimum levels. Third, bank loans tend 
to be short term.
5 James and Smith (2000, 62)  point out the main advantage of obtaining 
revolving lines of credit is that they “allow companies to raise private financing quickly 
when they view themselves to be undervalued by the market or, alternatively, when credit 
risk spreads look unattractive in public markets.”  
 
James and Smith (2000) report that existing literature provides robust evidence of a 
favourable impact of bank loan announcements on borrowers’ stock returns. This is in 
contrast to the insignificant or negative response of investors to the announcement of most 
other forms of securities offerings, such as private placements of debt, straight public debt, 
preferred stock and common stock. James and Smith (2000) review the reasons why the 
identity of a firm’s lender might affect the value of the corporate borrowers. One of these 
                                                 
5 James and Smith (2000) cite the work of Strahan (1999) and report the average maturity of credit lines to be 
42 months and that for term loans to be 69 months. 
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borrowing firms than investors in public debt or equity markets” (54). Given that banks are 
one type of private lender, banks can thus play the role of an information transmitter to the 
market. 
 
James and Smith (2000, 60) also raise an interesting question: “Are the bank loans 
announced in the financial press typical of most firms borrowing from banks?” In other 
words, they argue, “Are the bank loans announced in financial press those that are most 
likely to result in a positive share price reaction?” They offer two explanations as to the 
relevancy of this question. First, unlike public securities offerings, only material bank loan 
agreements need be announced. This is in accordance with guidelines provided by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (in US). Second, bank loans announced in financial 
press tend to be large in dollar term as well as relative to the size of the firm. 
 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) study a sample of 137 firms in Canada and divide 
bank loans into three main categories: new loans, renewals, and restructurings. They further 
classify new loans into three types: new loans with new banks, new loans with the same 
bank, and new loans with unknown banks. Renewals were also subdivided into three 
categories: favourable, unfavourable, and mixed. Following Lummer and McConnell 
(1989), they assessed each renewal based on changes in loan maturity, interest rate, dollar 
value, and protective covenants.  A renewal is considered to be favourable if the maturity is 
extended, the interest rate reduced, the loan amount increased or the protective covenants 
are made less restrictive. If these loan terms move in the opposite direction, then the 
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are favourable and others are unfavourable. Aintablian and Roberts also classify 
restructurings into two categories: loans with prior negative news about the borrowing firm, 
and those with no prior negative news. 
 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) find that announcements of bank loans are associated 
with positive abnormal returns and that these returns are significantly higher than those 
found for announcements of private placements. Specifically, they find that the average 
abnormal return for all bank loans is 1.22% and the result is significant at the 1% level. 
However, syndication weakens the announcement effect because it diminishes a key 
advantage of bank borrowing: the flexibility to renegotiate loan terms. They also find that 
the more intense the monitoring is, the more pronounced will be the announcement effects 
for bank loans. The market will also react favourably when the loans terms of renewals and 
new loans are favourable. 
 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) develop a theory of the optimal number of 
banking relationships which posits that internal problems might prevent relationship banks 
from continuing to fund profitable projects and a firm may thus have to refinance from non-
relationship banks.  However, the latter may refuse to lend due to adverse selection 
problem. That is, non-relationship banks may not know the quality of the project presented 
to them. Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) argue that in these circumstances, the 
probability of an early liquidation of the project is reduced owing to multiple banking 
relationships. They tested their theory by using matched bank-firm data for a sample of 
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model. However, they find that the use of multiple banking relationships appears to be non-
uniform across countries. In the US, a single banking relationship appears to be quite 
prevalent (44.5% of firms) whereas in Italy only 11% of firms have a single banking 
relationship.  
 
According to Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000), a number of reasons can make 
multiple banking more costly. First, dealing with more than one bank may involve 
significant transaction costs for a borrowing firm. Second, screening and monitoring costs 
may be duplicated, or, if banks free ride on others’ efforts, too little screening or monitoring 
may result. Finally, debt renegotiation is likely to be more complex when many creditors 
are involved. There must be some benefits/reasons for firms to choose multiple banking 
relationships. From the lender’s perspective, banks might want to diversify firm-specific 
credit risk.  
 
According to Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000), when relationship banks face 
internal problems such as liquidity risk, multiple banking relationships serves to increase 
the probability that a firm can refinance its project from at least one informed bank, thus 
reducing the likelihood of early liquidation. However, the firm will face an adverse 
selection problem, as non-informed banks will suspect that the project is a lemon. In their 
model, Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) note that for some parameter values, adverse 
selection is so severe that the firm is unable to refinance the project outside of the 
relationship.  On the other hand, when adverse selection is not severe and firms can expect 
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the borrower, and single banking prevails.    
 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) use two proxies to capture bank fragility 
which is defined as the propensity of banks to experience liquidity problems that force them 
to cut back their loan portfolios. The first is a proxy for idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to 
each bank based on observed changes in the ratio of liquid funds to assets. The second 
proxy is a weighted average of the ratio of non-performing loans to assets of each creditor 
bank. The hypothesis is that banks with higher share of non-performing loans are more 
prone to liquidity shocks. 
 
Gorton and Kahn (2000) present a theoretical model of renegotiation between a 
borrower and a bank lender. They note that banks have the ability to mitigate moral hazard 
problems. Gorton and Kahn (2000, 332) argue that “Renegotiation of the contract terms is 
triggered by the arrival of new information that may lead the borrower to add inefficient 
risk to the project (i.e., asset substitution), absent changes in the terms of the loan.” On the 
other hand, they also point out that “There is also the potential for moral hazard on the part 
of the bank since the bank may “hold up” the borrower by (credibly) threatening to 
liquidate the borrower’s project, thereby extracting a higher interest rate.”  They reason that 
the interaction of these two moral hazard problems could give rise to a number of different 
outcomes at renegotiation: “The bank may liquidate the project, raise the interest rate, 
forgive some debt, or stay with the status quo.” However, they show that “in renegotiation 
the bank is not always successful in preventing the firm from taking on additional risk.” 
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“the firm sometimes has an incentive to increase volatility.” For these reasons the bank 
only imperfectly “controls borrower risk-taking.” Hence, they reason, “In equilibrium, the 
variance of the value of the borrowing firm is therefore endogenously time and state 
dependent.”  
 
Gorton and Kahn (2000) point out that both the firm and the creditors cannot 
renegotiate when bonds are issued. The reason is that the borrower is dealing with 
“dispersed lenders” and hence renegotiation is either not possible or very difficult. They 
also look at the issue whether the bank is allowed to ask for the collateral prior to maturity 
of the loan. That is, whether the liquidation option should be provided in the loan contract. 
A consideration related to the liquidation issue involves the specification of the initial 
contract form. They also argue that the outcome of renegotiation has efficiency 
considerations as well, since banks might liquidate some projects and borrowers might add 
more risk to others. Hence, Gorton and Kahn (2000, 333) reason that “the social gain from 
bank loans comes from the enhanced ability to thwart inefficient risk taking and to liquidate 
bad projects.” They also show how the terms of the initial contract can affect the 
renegotiation outcome by “allocating bargaining power between borrower and lender to 
minimize inefficient risk taking.” Finally, they claim that their model “identifies a unique 
role for bank loans that is independent of pricing default risk.” 
 
Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001) provide an interesting case of stock market 
reaction to bank loan announcements in the Canadian market. Andre, Mathieu and Zhang 
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loans and lines of credit) before and after the introduction of the 1988-capital adequacy 
requirements in Canada. They argue that the introduction of 1988-capital ratio reduces 
banks’ level commitment at the issuance of lines of credit to minimise issuance costs of off-
balance sheet items. Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001, 434) provide anecdotal evidence 
that “Canadian banks have changed the basic conditions associated with lines of credit to 
avoid their inclusion in the calculation of the capital ratio” as required by the 1988 
regulation. They use a sample of 122 announcements of new and revised bank credit 
agreements to conduct their study. Consistent with prior studies they find that prior to the 
introduction of the 1988 capital adequacy requirements, market reactions are significantly 
positive at the announcements of bank credit agreements. Andre, Mathieu and Zhang 
(2001, 436) also obtain evidence that “market reaction is stronger when firms obtain loans 
from single banks than from multiple banks.” Furthermore, market reactions are significant 
to announcements of new credit agreements and favourably revised agreements. 
Specifically, they find that the average announcement excess return is positive (2.2%) and 
significant at the 5% level when the credit agreement involves a term loan. The average 
announcement excess return when the credit agreement involves both a term loan and a line 
of credit is also positive (5.24%) and significant at the 1% level. The result for lines of 
credit in their study, however, is not statistically different from zero although it is positive 
(1.59%). Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001, 436) infer that “the market may perceive the 
information content of a commitment to lend differently from the actual lending.” They 
find that they cannot reject the null hypothesis that the market reactions to announcements 
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hypothesis for term loans. The latter result is consistent with their prediction, however.  
 
Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001) also find that for small firms before 1988, the 
average announcement excess returns are 6.63% for lines of credit and -0.04% for term 
loans but these results are not significant. After the introduction of the 1988-capital 
adequacy requirements, however, the average announcements are not significant albeit 
positive (0.06%) for lines of credit, and both positive (4.69%) and significant at the 1% 
level for term loans. For large firms, however, they find no significant results for market 
reaction to announcements of both lines of credit and term loans before 1988. Specifically, 
they find that the average announcement excess return is 2.70% but insignificant for lines 
of credit. The corresponding results for term loans are 2.32% and are also insignificant. 
After 1988, the market reaction to announcements of lines of credit is positive (0.54%) but 
insignificant while announcements of term loans is positive (1.70%) but significant at the 
10% level. Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001, 437) conclude that the introduction of the 
new regulation “has significantly reduced the information content of lines of credit while 
the informativeness of term loans is not affected.”   
 
Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) examine the information content of the 
announcement of a sale of a borrower’s loans by its lending bank. They find a negative 
abnormal return of 4.5% for the five-day event window upon the loan sale announcement 
and the result is significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, this reaction is pronounced for 
sub-par loan (or distressed loan) sales, where the bank’s information advantage is greatest. 
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also significant at the 1% level. They note that this finding is a “mirror image” of the 
established finding that the announcement of new lending relations (or their continuation) 
has a   positive effect on a borrower’s stock returns. Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) also 
find that a large number of their sample firms (42%) file for bankruptcy within three years 
of the date of the first loan sale announcement.  
 
Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) also reason that when lenders sell a bank loan on 
the secondary market they send a signal to the market that the lenders most familiar with 
the borrower are not comfortable with the borrower’s situation. Traders understandably 
suspect that the lender knows something they do not know. This demonstrates the 
uniqueness of bank loans as suggested by James (1987). Also, banks as information 
producers and monitors are regarded as insiders to the borrowing firms (Campbell and 
Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985)). 
 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) present a theoretical model that attempts to 
explain the relation between information and bank credit allocation. They observe that over 
the last two decades, bank activities have been progressively liberalized. Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004, 186) also note that “financial sector reforms have reduced legal barriers to 
entry and enlarged the scope of the activities of banks and other financial intermediation”.  
Using their theoretical framework, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) examine the response 
of the banking system in its allocation of credit to external shocks such as the entry of a 
low-cost competitor. They focus on the role that information plays in shaping bank 
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information advantage competes for borrowers with outside lender that does not have this 
advantage but has a cost advantage in extending loans to borrowers. Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004, 186) derive three main results from their model. First, in markets with 
larger information asymmetries, “the degree of borrower capture” and spreads on bank 
loans are higher. As a result, lending to less creditworthy borrowers becomes a profitable 
business to informed lenders. An inevitable consequence of this state of affairs is that the 
average quality of the borrowers obtained financing from the informed lender is inversely 
related to the lender informational advantage. Second, with greater competition from 
outside lenders, informed banks reallocate their credits “towards sectors where their 
competitors face greater adverse selection problems.” According to the authors, this is the 
so-called “a flight to captivity.” Finally, they show that if “there exist(s) a strong negative 
correlation between borrower quality and degree of information asymmetry” then “an 
increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can lead to a worsening of the 
informed lender’s overall loan portfolio.”  
  
Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) review the Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
research.  Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that changes in the information market have 
provided “hard” information about borrower creditworthiness at a much cheaper cost. This 
change in information market significantly expands the geographical scope of the credit 
market for small business lending. Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) also report 
evidence of the growth of complex internal credit rating systems used by large banks 
(Tracey and Carey, 2000). In addition, sophisticated internal risk management systems 
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under the Basel II agreement (Schuermann, 2004). Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006, 
1196) argue that these changes “may reduce the value of the certification provided by 
commercial bank loans (and, therefore, the reaction to loan announcements).” 
 
Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) use a sample of 1,111 loans comprising 517 
new loans and 94 renewals for period 1980-2003 to examine whether the stock market’s 
positive response to announcements of bank loans still exists given that the banking 
environment and the lending relationship have changed since the early 1990s. They also 
classify whether each loan is a syndicated loan. They find that 66% of the announcements 
(733) are syndicated loans. In terms of daily returns, they find positive abnormal returns for 
the whole sample as well as for new loans and renewals. Specifically, they observe a 
positive return of 0.47% on the announcement date for the whole sample and 0.51% for 
loan renewals. Both results are significant at the 1% level. For new loans the corresponding 
figure is 0.44% and significant at the 5% level.  
 
Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) also observe a positive cumulative abnormal 
return of 0.46% for the two-day (0, +1) window for the entire 24-year sample period. The 
latter result is statistically significant at the 1% level. When they divide their sample into 
three sub-periods, namely, 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-03; they observe some differences 
in the stock market’s reaction to announcements of bank loan. For the 1980-89 period, the 
two-day cumulative abnormal returns for all loans, new loans and renewals are 0.60% 
(significant at the 1% level), 0.30% (insignificant) and 0.93% (significant at the 1% level), 
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and statistically significant at the 5% level. The cumulative abnormal returns for both new 
loans and renewals for the same two-day window although positive (0.53% and 0.50%, 
respectively) are insignificant.  Finally, for the 2000-03 period positive cumulative 
abnormal returns are observed for both all loans (0.13%) and new loans (0.52%) but the 
results are insignificant. For loan renewals the cumulative abnormal return is negative (-
0.08%) and insignificant.  
 
When they examine the abnormal returns for 5-year intervals in their study, Fields, 
Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006, 1201) find that “the reaction to bank loan announcements 
has not been consistently positive over the entire 24-year period, nor has it been consistent 
across new loans and loan renewals.” Specifically, they find that “the response to new loans 
is highly variable in terms of mean abnormal return magnitude from one time period to the 
next, but no statistically significant returns are identified for any 5-year interval.” On the 
other hand, they find that “for renewals the only time period for which positive abnormal 
returns are present is the 1980s, specifically the first half of the 1980s.” 
 
When they use multivariate analysis to explain the market reaction to bank loan 
announcements, however, Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006, 1207) find that “loan 
announcement abnormal returns are smaller for larger firms indicating that there is more 
value or information content for renewal announcements for small firms.” They also find 
that “the stock price performance in the year prior to the announcement is negative and 
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shareholders react more positively to the firm’s ability to renew a loan.”   
 
Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006, 1197) claim that their results are “consistent 
with the argument that structural changes in financial markets, including the adoption of 
various forms of information technology, have reduced the value of bank loan 
relationships.”  Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006, 1201) conclude that “these results 
show that the reaction to bank loan announcements on average has diminished to the point 
of insignificance following the period of positive abnormal returns identified by James 
(1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989).”  However, Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers 
(2006, 1208) caution that “while our evidence is strong that loan announcement returns 
have disappeared in recent years for publicly traded borrowers, we can only speculate as to 
whether the value of bank certification has changes for small privately held borrowers.”  
 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006, 87) review existing literature on the use of collateral in 
loan contracts and report that “collateralisation is believed to be a useful tool in resolving 
problems associated with both asymmetric information and moral hazard in business and 
consumer lending.”  They reason that “since that nature of the bank-borrower relationship 
can be expected to affect the severity of both moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
we can also expect collateral usage to be affected by the nature of this relationship.” They 
also report that collateral can be used to lessen some of the moral hazard and its impact on 
collateral. They investigate how the duration and scope of the bank-borrower relation affect 
bank’s decision to secure line-of-credit versus non-line-of-credit loans. They draw a 
  64distinction between these two types of loans. Chakraborty and Hu (2006, 88) note that 
“unlike non-line-of-credit loans, most line-of-credit loans have credit card like attributes 
that make them a more liquid and flexible form of financing.” On the other hand “Non-
line–of-credit loans are usually one-time, transaction-driven loans.” Using a sample of 
1,632 firms from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) database 
they partition their sample into two sub-samples (one for line-of-credit loans and one for 
non-line-of-credit loans), and find that the likelihood of collateralisation for a line of credit 
decreases with the duration of the bank-borrower relationship. The estimate of this 
coefficient is negative (-0.111) and is significant at the 10% level (t=1.67). For non-line-of-
credit loans, the estimate for the length of the relationship, although positive (0.041) is 
insignificant (t=0.41). They also examine the impact of the scope of the relationship on 
banks’ use of collateral. Chakraborty and Hu (2006, 87) reason that “relationship scope 
may also affect the amount and type of credit-relevant information generated for the bank, 
and this information may be different to that generated by relationship duration.” This is 
because “duration and scope will generally lead to different amounts of “hard” and “soft” 
credit information being generated.”  They find that for non-line-of-credit loans the 
incidence of collateral decreases the scope of the loan. The estimate of the coefficient is 
negative (-0.149) and is significant at the 5% level. However, the scope of the bank-
borrower relationship has no impact on collateral usage in the case of line-of-credit loans 
with a positive coefficient of 0.037 although not significant. One interesting finding from 
this study is that the mechanism through which banks obtain private information depends 
on the type of the loan. They also find that pooling across loan types may dilute the impact 
of both the duration and scope on the terms of a loan. 
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Chakraborty and Hu (2006) report the results for their full sample in their study. 
First, the estimate for the coefficient on the number of financial services used is negative (-
0.088) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the estimate for the 
coefficient on the length of the relationship is negative (-0.087) but is not statistically 
significant. Chakraborty and Hu (2006, 96) offer two explanations for the latter result: 
“First, the duration of the relationship may not capture the lender’s ability to produce 
reliable private information. Second, only for certain kind of loans long business 
associations may be necessary to generate private information.” They also examine the 
effect of other variables that proxy relationship and risk in their study. When the age of the 
firm is incorporated into their analysis, they find that a firm’s age is inversely related to the 
incidence of collateral.  The estimate for this coefficient is negative (-0.133) and is 
significant at the 5% level. They infer that older firms are less likely to pledge collateral 
because they have longer track records and exhibit fewer and less significant information 
problems than younger firms. They also find that collateral pledging is positively related to 
the number of borrowing sources. Specifically, they find that a firm’s probability of 
pledging collateral increases by 2.6% if a firm has one more source of borrowing than the 
sample average. They infer that firms with lower credit ratings borrow from multiple 
sources.  
 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006) also look at the impact of firm size on the relation 
between the duration and scope of the bank-borrower relationship and the use of collateral. 
They find that the estimate for this coefficient is positive (0.096) and is significant at the 
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and is significant. However, the return-on-assets estimate is negative (-0.024) and 
insignificant. 
 
Finally, for their full sample, they find that adding the public information on a 
firm’s creditworthiness does not change the coefficient estimates of the relationship 
variables except the proxy for business delinquency which has a significantly positive 
coefficient.  
 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006, 103) conclude that “Both duration of the relationship 
and the number of bank-provided services affect the decision to secure a loan.” Also, 
“Duration of bank-borrower relationships is more important to securing lines-of-credit 
loans because it generates “soft” information through repeated interactions that are 
particularly valuable to assess the risk of a line-of-credit loan.” They claim that they are the 
first to provide direct evidence that the duration and scope of the bank-borrower 
relationship affect decisions to secure line-of-credit loans differently from non-line-of-
credit loans.  
 
Sufi (2006) examines the factors that determine whether firms use bank lines of 
credit or cash in corporate liquidity management. He distinguishes between firms that 
maintain high cash flow and firms with low cash flow. Sufi (2006) examines the factors 
associated with corporate liquidity management. He explains that the decision of a lender to 
impose many debt covenants in a loan contract is based on the adequacy of cash flows. He 
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reduce the need for a liquidity buffer. Conversely, firms with low expected cash flows will 
find the presence of a liquidity buffer necessary. Rationally, firms prefer to select the most 
flexible type of debt to cover short-term variations in funding needs, and understandably, 
the greater flexibility provided by revolving credit loans should be valued more highly both 
by firms and by the market. Sufi (2006, 31) provides evidence that “lack of access to a line 
of credit is a more statistically powerful measure of financial constraints than traditional 
measures used in the literature.” 
 
In summary, existing literature on bank loans has, in general, shown that: (1) banks 
possess inside information about borrowers which is not available to other market 
participants; (2) borrowers generally enjoy positive abnormal returns to their securities 
around the announcement date of their bank loans; (3) loan structure (i.e., whether the loan 
is a revolving credit or term loan) has significant influence on market price reaction to 
announcements of bank loans; and (4) the magnitude of these abnormal returns varies 
according to various characteristics of the borrowers (e.g. firm size, profitability, and 
growth prospects), the characteristics of lender (e.g. reputation); and those of bank loans 
themselves (new, revised or extended loans). Explanations of the sources of gains to 
borrowers are many, but focus is given to the role that banks play as external monitors and 
the potential comparative advantage banks may have in processing and transmitting 
information. However, I note that some researchers (e.g. Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers, 
2006) have started to question the validity of information content conveyed by bank loans 
given recent changes in the financial markets.  
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In Table 2.1 below I report the findings in the literature regarding stock price 
response to announcements of different corporate events including those for bank loans. It 
is apparent from this table that a bank loan is the only type of security that receives 
significantly positive market reaction. In other words, the market views announcements of 
bank loans favourably compared with other types of security offerings. Notably, 
announcements of common stocks result in the most negative market reaction. Studies by 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Mikkleson and Partch (1986) report significant negative 
abnormal returns for this type of security. Ranking second is stock price response to 
convertible bonds. These announcements also elicit a significant negative response from the 
market. Dann and Mikkleson (1984) report a negative abnormal return of 2.07% whereas 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986) report a negative abnormal return of 1.97%. In contrast to 
other types of security, the stock price response to announcements of bank loans is 
consistently significant with considerable magnitude throughout all studies. Strongest 
support for this result is in studies conducted by Mikkleson and Partch (1986), James 
(1987) and Aintablian and Roberts (2000). Apparently, private and public debts possess 
different characteristics that cause market reaction to be different.  
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loans. 
Type of 
Security 
Offerings 
Researcher(s) Two  Day  Abnormal 
Return
+
Asquith and Mullins (1986)
++ -3.14% (155)  Common Stock 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986)
  -3.56%* (80) 
Linn and Pinegar (1985)
 ++ -0.19% (28)  Preferred Stock 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986)  -0.26 %(14) 
Convertible 
Preferred Stock 
Linn and Pinegar (1985)
 ++ -1.44%* (53) 
Dann and Mikkleson (1984)
 ++ -0.26% (248) 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986)  -0.23% (171) 
Straight Bonds 
James (1987)  -0.11% (90) 
Dann and Mikkleson (1984)
 ++ -2.07%* (73)  Convertible 
Bonds  Mikkleson and Partch (1986)  -1.97%* (33) 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986)  -0.57% (80)  Private 
Placement of 
Debt 
James (1987)  -0.91% (37) 
Mikkleson and Partch (1986) 0.89%*(155)  (LOC) 
-0.15% (61)(TL) 
James (1987)  1.93%* (80) 
Lummer of McConnell (1989)  0.61%* (728)  
Best and Zhang (1993)  0.32%* (491) 
McDonald (1994)  0.64%* (250) 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)
  0.63% * (540) 
DeGennaro, Elayan and Wansley (1999)  0.53%* (215) 
Bank loans: 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000)  1.22%* (122) 
  Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006)  0.46%* (1,111) 
+: Sample size in parentheses. * Indicates significantly different from zero. ++ Derived 
from Smith (1986), James (1987), James and Smith (2000), and Gorton and Winton (2002).  
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findings about bank loans. Also provided in the table are research implications of these 
findings. 
Table 2.2: Summary of literature review on bank loans 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Leland and 
Pyle (1977) 
Financial 
Intermedia-
tion and 
information 
asymmetry 
Financial intermediaries exist 
because of information 
asymmetry. 
Financial intermediaries help 
reduce information 
asymmetry. 
Favourable reaction to 
announcements made 
by financial 
institutions. 
Fama (1985)  Types of debt  Bank loans are inside debts.  Order of financing (i.e. 
pecking order theory) 
Fama (1985) 
and James 
(1987) 
Uniqueness of 
bank loans 
Reserve tax is borne by 
borrowers. 
Bank loans must be 
special. 
Information  
Asymmetry 
Term loans are associated 
with negative announcement 
effect while lines of credit are 
associated with positive and 
significant announcement 
effect. 
 
Structure of loans is the 
main determinant of 
market price reaction. 
 
Mikkleson 
and Partch 
(1986) 
Market timing  Negative reaction to security 
issuance. 
Firms would prefer to 
use bank loans in place 
of security issuance. 
James (1987)  Information 
asymmetry 
and financial 
slack 
Market price action to 
announcements of new bank 
credit agreements is positive. 
Lines of credit provide 
a higher degree of 
financial slack and 
convey a positive 
signal to the market. 
James and 
Wier (1988) 
Pecking order 
theory and 
market timing 
Bank loans – an alternative to 
internally generated funds. 
Firms obtain bank 
loans when their shares 
are underpriced. 
Lummer and 
McConnell 
(1989) 
Types of 
credit 
Favourably revised credit 
agreements are associated 
with positive market reaction. 
Termination of lines of credit 
sends a negative signal to the 
market. 
Loan structure does 
matter. 
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Table 2.2:   Summary of literature review on bank loans (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Diamond 
(1991) 
Bank’s monitoring and 
borrower reputation 
New borrowers acquire 
reputation by being monitored 
by banks. 
Reputable borrowers choose 
the capital market to raise 
funds. 
Borrower’s 
reputation can 
decide the source 
of fund. 
Slovin, 
Johnson and 
Glascock 
(1992) 
Firm size and 
information content of 
bank loans 
Small firms receive greater 
benefits from banks’ screening 
and monitoring services. 
Response to renewed loans is 
more positive than that to new 
loans in the case of small firms. 
 
Firm size is a 
proxy for 
information 
asymmetry 
Best and Zhang 
(1993) 
Information content of 
bank loans 
 
Banks can create value for 
undervalued firms. 
Bank loans convey more 
information when analysts 
forecast errors are high.  
 
Other information 
sources can 
determine the 
content of bank 
loans. 
Bhattacharya 
and Thakor 
(1993) 
The role of financial 
intermediaries 
Banks provide brokerage and 
qualitative asset transformation 
services. 
Unknown borrowers are best 
served by banks. 
Bank loans signal quality in a 
way other forms of credit do 
not. 
Scope of services 
and borrower 
reputation are 
possible reasons 
why firms choose 
bank loans. 
Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri 
(1994) 
Choices of debt  Reputable banks can provide 
financial flexibility to firms – 
especially small firms. 
Lender’s 
reputation is 
associated with 
financial 
flexibility. 
DeGennaro, 
Elayan and 
Wansley 
(1999) 
The impact of line-of-
credit announcements 
on lenders. 
The wealth transfer hypothesis 
is only applied to infrequent 
lenders. 
Lenders who made loans to 
small borrowers suffer 
significant losses. 
Richer 
explanations of 
stock return 
behaviour are 
needed. 
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Table 2.2:   Summary of literature review on bank loans (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
James and 
Smith (2000) 
Uniqueness of  bank 
loans - Bank loans 
versus other types of 
debt 
The flexibility offered by line 
of credit makes bank loans 
much more attractive to 
borrowers compared to other 
types of debt.  
Bank loans announced in 
financial press tend to be large 
Bank loans have characteristics 
(shorter maturity, stringent 
covenants, and collateral) 
which can help banks improve 
their ability to monitor 
“informationally-intensive” 
loans.  
The stock price reaction to 
loan announcements is most 
positive when companies that 
normally find it advantageous 
to borrow in public markets 
instead announce a bank loan. 
 
-Loan structure 
can provide 
financial 
flexibility. 
-Announcements 
in financial press 
can be biased. 
- Bank loans are 
special. 
Detragiache, 
Garella and 
Guiso (2000) 
Multiple banking 
relationship 
Debt renegotiation is more 
complex when many creditors 
are involved. 
Multiple banking relationships 
can improve the chance of 
firms being refinanced. 
Renegotiability 
can be influenced 
by number of 
banking 
relationships.  
Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) 
Investment upturns and 
downturns and lender 
selection. 
Publicly traded and privately- 
held debt have advantages that 
dominate in different situation. 
Distinction 
between 
investment 
upturns and 
downturns can 
explain how firms 
choose lender. 
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Table 2.2:   Summary of literature review on bank loans (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Gorton and Kahn 
(2000) 
Renegotiation of 
bank loans 
Renegotiation of the contract 
terms is triggered by the arrival 
of new information. 
Borrowers might engage in 
asset substitution and banks 
might hold up the borrower by 
threatening to liquidate the 
firm. 
Renegotiability 
depends on the 
nature of new 
information. 
Aintablian and 
Roberts (2000) 
Categories of loans 
and market response 
to loan 
announcements. 
Renewals of loans and new 
loans to existing customers 
trigger more positive 
announcement effects than do 
new loans in general. 
The capability to 
restructure loans 
can be important. 
Dahiya, Puri and 
Saunders (2003) 
Information content 
of bank loan sales 
Market price reaction to stock 
of borrower upon the loan sale 
announcement is negative. 
This is evidence of uniqueness 
of bank loans. 
Bank loan sale 
can be a 
compounding 
factor. 
Fields, Fraser, 
Berry and Byers 
(2006) 
Bank loan 
relationships 
Bank loan relationships matter 
less in recent years. 
Longitudinal 
studies should be 
conducted 
Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006) 
Bank-borrower 
relationship and the 
use of collaterals. 
The likelihood and 
collaterisation for a line of 
credit decreases with the 
duration of bank-borrower 
relationship. 
Scope of the bank-borrower 
relationship does not impact on 
collateral usage in the case of 
line of credit. 
 
Duration and 
scope of bank-
borrower 
relationship can 
impact on bank 
loan 
announcement 
effect. 
Sufi (2006)  Bank lines of credit 
and corporate 
liquidity management 
Lack of access to a line of 
credit is a more statistically 
powerful measure of financial 
constraints than traditional 
measures used in the literature. 
Loan structure is 
important. 
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2.2.2. SYNDICATED LOANS 
 
Simons (1993) distinguishes between loan syndications and loan sales. The latter is 
the case where a single bank makes the loan and subsequently sells portions of it to other 
banks. Loan sales could be either in the form of “participations” or “assignments.”  In the 
case of participations, there exists a contract between the original lender and the loan buyer.  
This contract has nothing to do with the contract between the original lender and the 
borrower. The latter might not even be aware of its existence. In the case of assignments, 
however, the contract between the borrower and the loan purchaser will replace that 
between the original lender and the buyer. In contrast to both types of loan sales, loan 
syndication is a contract between the borrower and every member of the syndicate. Simons 
(1993) labels syndications and loan sales as “secondary intermediation” in the sense that 
they add an extra step to simple financial intermediation between the borrower and other 
financial institutions. According to Simons (1993), secondary intermediation allows banks 
to reduce their exposure to any one borrower as well as reducing undesirable concentration. 
That is, banks diversify geographically and industrially. Notwithstanding, secondary 
intermediation also results in additional risk for participating banks.  This is because buyers 
of loans rely on the loan documentation provided by the sellers to conduct credit 
evaluation. In other words they might not be fully informed. Simons (1993) points out that 
this risk is highest in the case of participations because the buyer relies exclusively on the 
information provided by the seller. 
 
  75Simons (1993) uses a sample of 4,332 credits from the 1991 Shared National Credit 
data set to test the relative importance of various factors in determining syndication and the 
proportion of loans that is syndicated. She examines the motives for syndications and the 
exploitation of syndicate members by the agent bank. She points out that “to the extent that 
lead banks may behave opportunistically and withhold unfavourable information from 
participating banks, the latter may be misled into making loans that are riskier than they had 
thought.”  Simons (1993) uses examiner loan classifications as a proxy for the riskiness of 
loans and finds little evidence in support of opportunistic behaviour of agent banks. In fact, 
the largest proportion (47%) retained by lead banks was of “Loss” loans. This could be the 
result of competition and the tendency for participating banks to join in high-quality 
syndicated loans only, which leaves the agent bank holding the lower quality loans. Bank 
regulation, in the form of capital requirements (as measured by the capital-to-asset ratio) 
and lending limits
6 (as measured by the loan-to-capital ratio), however, was found to play a 
significant role in syndication. She finds that the capital position of the agent bank is a 
major factor affecting syndication activity and suggests that diversification is the primary 
motive for syndication. Specifically, Simons (1993) finds that the coefficient for the 
capital-to-asset ratio is positive and highly significant in all regressions of her study. Thus, 
the higher the agent bank’s capital the greater the proportion of the loan the bank will 
retain. On the other hand, agent banks that are more capital-constrained are more likely to 
retain smaller loan shares. The loan-to-capital ratio, however, shows an ambiguous effect. 
Overall, Simons (1993) reports that on average, the agent bank holds just a little over one-
                                                 
6 US Federal law prohibited banks from lending to any one borrower an amount exceeding 15 percent of the 
bank’s capital during the period of Simons’ (1993) study. 
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greater shares of real estate loans, which were typically more risky than other types of 
loans. The coefficient for the real estate variable is positive and significant at 1 percent 
level for all regressions.  
 
In a study that contains information on 12,000 facilities involving some 1,700 
lenders, Dennis and Mullineaux (1994) examine the influence of a number of loan 
attributes on the probability of loan syndication.  These attributes include loan’s size, its 
maturity, the borrower’s credit standing, the reputation of the lead bank, and the status of 
the loan with respect to collateral. Dennis and Mullineaux report the results for these 
attributes as follows: (1) loan size has positive impact on both the probability of 
syndication and on the proportion sold; (2) maturity is insignificant in explaining loan 
syndication behaviour; (3) the borrower’s credit rating is positively related to the 
probability of syndication; (4) the reputation of the lead  bank can affect the extent to which 
a particular loan can be syndicated, but not the likelihood of syndication;  (5) collateral 
influences the probability, but does not affect the amount syndicated. 
 
Dennis and Mullineaux (1994) also contend that the market for syndicated loans 
involves both adverse selection and moral hazard. In the former case, the lead bank may 
possess information unavailable to other syndicate participants. It might formulate and 
manipulate information beyond financial statement data to serve its own interests. This 
information asymmetry complicates transactions and can cause market failure. Loan 
syndications might also suffer from moral hazard. The lead bank might have little incentive 
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especially in the event of a whole loan sale. It is interesting to note that the syndicate 
participants have no recourse against the lead bank if the borrower defaults. 
 
Armitage (1995) studies the stock market response to syndicated loan 
announcements during the period 1988-1991 in the UK. He uses a sample of 574 
announcements reported in International Financing Review (IFR), Euroweek and the 
Financial Times. He divides these announcements into three categories. The first category 
includes loans for general purpose and refinance. The second category is loans for 
acquisitions. Finally, the third category is to fund management buy-outs or buy-ins. He also 
classifies loan announcements as positive news, negative news, mixed news or increased 
facilities. Positive news include oversubscription, increase in amount or term, and reduction 
in pricing. Negative news includes reduction in amount or term, an unexpectedly large 
increase in pricing, a requirement for stricter covenants, poor progress in syndication, and 
cancellation. Mixed news is a combination of both positive news and negative news. 
 
In his study, Armitage (1995) reasons that inside information has value in (1) firstly, 
reducing problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard; (2) enabling debt to be 
priced more accurately; and (3) facilitating negotiations with borrowers in financial 
distress. He argues that although banks are able to obtain a great deal of information about 
the small borrowers, it is much more doubtful that they can do the same in the case of large 
companies. Furthermore, he reasons that banks learn about their customers through time as 
a natural outgrowth of their business interactions and not immediately. Therefore, if there is 
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be observed around announcements of revisions to, not initiations of, such agreements. As 
with previous researchers, he reasons that a firm’s decision to commit to periodic 
evaluations can provide a positive signal of management’s assessment of the firm’s 
earnings prospects.  
 
Armitage (1995) finds that for the shortest event window of his study (-1,0), the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are negative (-0.34%) but insignificant for 
all categories of loan announcements combined. CAARs are also negative (-0.39%) but 
insignificant for all categories excluding negative announcements and those relating to 
management buy-outs and buy-ins. He also finds that increased facilities and positive news 
elicit positive response from the market. The CAARs for increased facilities are 0.73% and 
is significant at the 5% level. For negative and mixed news, he finds that the responses are 
negative and insignificant.  
 
When he examines the five day event window (-2,+2), he finds that the CAARs for 
the combined categories are positive (0.09%) but still insignificant. The refinance category 
elicits a more negative response (-0.42%) and is significant at the 5% level. The increased 
facilities has a smaller CAAR (0.64%) and becomes insignificant but the CAAR for 
positive news is now larger  and  is significant at the 5% level. The result for negative 
news, however, switches from negative to positive. Armitage (1995) offers no explanation 
for this change. He also reports that for the longer event window (0, +9) the response to 
positive news is much larger (1.32%) and is significant at the 1% level. Armitage (1995, 
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slightly wider event window, most CAARs remain insignificantly different from zero.”  
 
Overall, he finds much less response to announcements of syndicated loans in the 
UK than in the US, especially for smaller companies. Armitage (1995, 459) concludes that 
his evidence suggests that in the UK “banks are not perceived as having inside information 
about quoted borrowers which affects their valuation.” Using anecdotal evidence he also 
concludes that their results “cast doubt on explanations for the continued presence of banks 
in large scale corporate lending which rest on information advantage.” 
 
Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) examine the stock market reaction to 
syndicated loan announcements on the market value of lending banks. They study a sample 
of 774 syndicated loan announcements for the period between 1966 and 1999.  They 
examine whether the type of borrower, the use of funds and the time period in which the 
loan is made influence the stock market reaction to syndicated loan announcements. For the 
type of borrower, they divide their sample into three groups: the less-developed countries 
(LDCs), the non-US OECD countries and US corporations. As for the use of funds, they 
distinguish between loans for leveraged acquisitions and managerial buyouts (LBOs) and 
loans to LDCs.  Finally they divide the period of their study into three sub-periods: the first 
period is from 1966 to October 1979; the second period from October 1979 to August 
1982; and the final period from August 1982 to 1989. 
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positive) market reactions to announcements of syndicated loans can result due to the 
following reasons: (1) the loans were mispriced; (2) the positive reaction is a return to 
liquidity; (3) the loans reveal information about growth opportunities for borrowers; and (4) 
managerial goals are inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
 
Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) find that overall during the period of their 
study (1966-1989) the stock market reaction to lender value on announcements of 
syndicated loans is negative (-0.026%) for the two-day window. Loans to Latin American 
LDC borrowers elicit considerable negative reaction (-0.29%) and are significant at the 5% 
level. They reason that these responses could be due to non-share-price maximization 
pursued by management who could be under political pressure at the time. An additional 
reason advanced by the authors is that there might be a lack of market control in banking. 
Likewise, the market reaction to announcements of syndicated loans to sovereign borrowers 
is also negative (-0.16%) and is significant as the 5% level. They infer these results as being 
consistent with their hypothesis that either loans are mispriced or growth opportunities are 
reduced. As Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) expected, loans to non-US OECD 
borrowers elicit positive market reaction but are insignificant. Loans to US corporate 
borrowers gave an abnormal return of 0.08% over the two-day event window and the result 
is also insignificant.  The results over the seven-day window for US borrowers, however, 
are positive (0.41%) and significant at the 10% level.  
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Latin American LDC lending in the first sub-period of 1966 to 1979 is significantly 
negative (-0.40%) at the 5% level with 60.3% of the returns negative.  However, loans to 
these countries during the period October 1979-August 1982 result in a negative response 
and are insignificant.  
 
As for the purposes of loans, Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) find that loans 
used for take-over activity result in positive (1.64%) reaction from the market over the 
seven-day window and are significant at the 5% level. This is also true with loans used to 
replace or renew existing lines of credit with a CAR of 1.94%. This is consistent with the 
findings of Lummer and McConnell (1989) reported earlier. Megginson, Poulsen and 
Sinkey (1995) also report that loans used for other purposes are insignificantly negative or 
positive. 
 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) also find a large market response to new contract 
terms in a troubled debt situation.  They find that the estimated abnormal return is 4.64 % 
and is significant at the 1% level. Preece and Mullineaux (1996, 585) define a restructured 
agreement as one in which “the borrower is known to be in distress and the lenders agree to 
revive the loan agreement.” They argue that so long as new loans represent the 
establishment of new customer relations for banks, the market may regard them as more 
valuable than loan renewals to the banking firm because these loans indicate growth 
potential for the borrowing firms. 
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less contractual flexibility than loans by single lenders because of potential hold-out 
problems in the event of renegotiation. They reason that if the capacity to restructure loans 
is a source of value to borrowing firms, the size of the market reaction to loan 
announcements should be a declining function of the number of lending banks in the 
syndicate. They also argue that due to syndicate partners having different incentives to 
renegotiate, the larger the number of lenders in a syndicate, the more costly are efforts to 
renegotiate the loan. The difference in incentives of lenders to renegotiate are based on 
factors such as: the value of their overall relation to the borrower; their lending policies; the 
relative size of their exposure; their equity capital or loan-loss reserve position, and their 
perceptions of the regulator’s response to altering loan contract terms. Hence, to the extent 
that the market’s positive reaction to bank loan announcements is driven strictly by 
monitoring considerations, they anticipate a positive relation between the size of the 
observed abnormal return and the number of banks in the lending syndicate. Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996) also argue that the size of a lending syndicate is a proxy for the 
availability of public information about the firm. 
 
According to Preece and Mullineaux (1996, 586), since a syndicated loan is 
“shopped to potential participants, news of the impending loan may become available to the 
market prior to the announcement date.” This implies that abnormal returns might occur 
before the announcement date. They investigate the prospect of information leakage by 
examining abnormal returns (cumulative and single day) over the prior period –11 to –2 (-
11,-2 window) for each syndicate group. They find that all cumulative abnormal returns 
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single day abnormal returns for extra-large syndicates on days –7 and –3.  
 
Mosebach (1999) studies a sample of 239 announcements of lines of credit in the 
US during the period 1993-1996 and finds that there is a positive and significant market 
reaction to borrower’s stock when the market becomes aware a line of credit is granted. The 
abnormal return is 0.4% and is significant at the 5% level. In addition, Mosebach shows 
that the announcement of a line of credit can potentially produce two signals to the market.  
The first signal is sent from the borrower that they are using the bank because they consider 
it strong and reliable. The second signal is about the bank’s future financial position. This is 
indicated in several ways, all of which lead to a positive reaction.  These include: (1) a 
positive departure from competitive equilibrium in the area of lines of credit; (2) potential 
increased future lending activity due to the bank’s ability to maintain its competitiveness 
and influential position in the allocation of credit; and (3) it signals the bank’s confidence 
in their ability to fund any future obligations resulting from the exercise of lines of credit. 
 
Mosebach (1999, 1709) defines a line of credit as “a commitment by a bank to loan 
money at some time in the future.” When a bank grants a line of credit, it is contractually 
obligated to lend funds upon demand. Mosebach lists three main reasons why companies 
use lines of credit. First, they use lines of credit for operational reasons. Second, lines of 
credit are a good faith gesture to show ability to pay for some specific transactions. Finally, 
companies obtain lines of credit to signal to the market. These signals can be used to reduce 
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company’s financial condition. 
 
Mosebach (1999) uses the reaction of the borrower’s stock to identify the exact date 
the market becomes aware a line of credit is granted. He uses this date as a one-day event 
window in his study and argues that this will further increase the power of the market 
reaction tests. Mosebach argues that a strong borrower uses the best signaling device 
available. Large companies that use large lines of credit as signals, therefore, use the most 
reputable banks available. The market interprets the use of the bank by a strong, high 
prestige borrower as an indication of the bank’s strength. Bankers consider it a positive 
signal when a large borrower uses their bank to obtain a line of credit. In addition to this 
signal, Mosebach argues that granting a line of credit sends a primary signal to the market 
about the financial condition of the bank. 
 
In an efficient market, the market will only react when a line of credit is issued if 
new information is conveyed. A change in the market’s expectations of future cash flows is 
a necessary condition for an identifiable market reaction to any event. Mosebach (1999, 
1712) argues that “granting lines of credit is an ongoing function of banks and is 
anticipated by the market.” These expectations are reflected in the price of the bank’s stock 
and no market reaction should be expected. However, there is no a priori reason to believe 
the market is able to anticipate a new and very large line of credit. Therefore, large lines of 
credit are capable of changing the market’s expectation and providing new information. 
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especially for large, high prestige clients, shows the market that not only is the bank 
maintaining its competitiveness, but also, it is currently, and will be in the future, a 
significant participant in the allocation of credit.  Additionally, it signals to the market that 
the bank is confident in its ability to honor any future financial obligation stemming from 
the exercise of the line of credit. All of these signals lead to positive abnormal returns for 
bank stocks. Large lines of credit are usually underwritten by more than one bank. One or 
more banks act as lead or co-lead banks and form a syndicate with other participating banks 
to fund the line. In most instances, the lead bank or banks have an ongoing relation with the 
borrower. Therefore, even though the line of credit itself may be a new transaction, a strong 
signal is sent to the market due to the existing relation. 
 
Following Boot and Thakor (2000), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) note that 
syndicated loans can be viewed as a mix of “relationship loans” and “transaction loans.” In 
a relationship loan there is information specific to the borrower and the bank while 
transaction loans are considered to be similar to debt sold in the capital markets. They point 
out that syndicated loans have elements of both kinds of financing. Specifically, in a 
relationship context, the lead bank screens and monitors the borrower and in a capital-
market setting the agent bank sells or underwrites some or all of the loan to participating 
banks. Dennis and Mullineaux (200, 406) consider “a loan fully syndicated to a large 
number of participants is a functionally similar transaction to capital market finance.” 
Dennis and Mullineaux (200, 405) note that “bank loans tend to be relatively short-term, 
involve extensive covenants, and are frequently renegotiated.” On the other hand, “the 
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are almost never restructured.”  
 
Denis and Mullineaux (2000) examine two issues in their study: First they examine 
the factors that influence a bank or non-bank’s decision to syndicate a loan. Second, they 
identify the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold in the event of syndication.  
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) screen data from a private database compiled by the Loan 
Pricing Corporation which contains information on approximately 30,000 loan facilities 
involving some 2,500 lenders over the period 1987-95. They select all non-private 
placements, fully confirmed loan transactions where they could identify the agent bank’s 
share or the percentage of the loan syndicated. They obtained a final sample of 3,410 loan 
transactions of which 1,526 were syndicated. 
 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) point out that in loan syndication, there are also 
potential agency problems between the borrower and participating lenders and between the 
agent banks and the other members of the syndicate. For example, an agent bank may 
possess “idiosyncratic information” not available to other participating banks such as 
judgments concerning management expertise and borrower’s adaptability to changing 
market conditions. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000, 411) argue that “as agency problems 
become more relevant in either context, a commercial loan should be less likely to be 
syndicated.” In addition, they reason that “if there is significant potential for the lead/agent 
bank to exploit the syndicate members, then keeping loan maturity short could serve to 
minimize such a prospect.” They argue that if the loan term is short, then the loan would 
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application for renewals will be greater which in turn “triggers more frequent monitoring of 
both the borrower and the agent by the syndicate members.” They find that the coefficient 
of the loan’s maturity is positive and significant at the 1% level for all specifications in 
their model. They infer that longer maturity enhances the syndication prospect of a loan. On 
the other hand, they argue, consideration of duplicative monitoring costs or potential rent 
extractions suggests that “lengthening a loan’s maturity would enhance its syndication 
potential.” Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) also suggest that the presence of collateral could, 
in principle, increase or reduce a loan’s syndication potential. However, they are more 
inclined to the latter argument. They also find that moral hazard is not a dominant factor 
affecting the decision to syndicate a loan. 
 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) show that the characteristics of the borrower, the 
managing agent, and the loan contract itself are relevant to both decisions to syndicate and 
the proportion of the syndicated loan to be sold. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000, 411) argue 
that “loans to rated companies and/or listed firms are more likely to be syndicated since 
these borrowers involve more transparent information.” They also report that as 
information about a borrower becomes more transparent (good credit ratings or listing on a 
stock exchange), a loan is more likely to be syndicated and in larger proportion.  
 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) also find that as the syndicate managing agent 
becomes more “reputable,” the inherent agency problems of syndication will be attenuated.  
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000, 413) argue that “a bank that has established transaction-
  88specific assets (reputation) should have lower costs in syndicating loans than banks that 
have eschewed such investments.” Finally, they show that the presence of a credit rating is 
more economically significant than the mere fact that the borrower’s stock does trade on an 
exchange. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000, 417) claim that their findings are “highly 
significant and consistent with the hypothesis that increased transparency of information 
facilitates the sale of debt contracts.” 
 
Esty and Megginson (2003) suggest that, in theory, bank loans can improve 
corporate governance in three ways. First, bankers monitor borrower performance and if 
necessary they can intervene in “an effective and timely manner” when borrowers are not 
performing. Second, concentrated debt ownership can lower re-contracting costs in the 
event of default. Finally, banks can make any attempt to pursue voluntary, or strategic, 
default more difficult by making it more costly to restructure loans. The latter can be done 
by including more participating banks in the syndicate. 
 
Using a sample of 495 syndicated loan tranches made between 1986 and 2000 to 
borrowers in 61 different countries, Esty and Megginson (2003) find that there exists a 
significant relation between legal risk and syndicate concentration. Specifically, in 
countries where creditor rights are not well protected or law enforcement is weak one 
should see less concentrated ownership structures. They argue that banks act as monitors 
and providers of low cost re-contracting in environments where they have legal rights and 
can rely on the mechanism of law enforcement to protect their investment. Understandably, 
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can achieve this goal by increasing syndicate size and decreasing concentration.   
 
Carletti (2004) formulates a model that attempts to explain why in many countries 
even relatively small firms borrow from more than one bank. She notes that modern 
theories of financial intermediation relate the benefits of multiple-bank lending to the 
inefficiencies affecting exclusive bank-borrower relationships, namely the hold-up and the 
soft-budget-constraint problems. The former problem arises when a relationship bank uses 
the superior private information it has about the firm to extract rents, thus distorting 
entrepreneurial incentives and causing inefficient investment choices. Carletti (2004) 
reports existing literature theory which contends that in this context, borrowing from 
multiple banks can restore competition among banks and, consequently, improve 
entrepreneurial incentives. Concerning the soft-budget-constraint problem, Carletti (2004) 
cites the work of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) who argue that a relationship bank may 
refinance unprofitable projects and thus reduce entrepreneurial incentives to prevent 
default.  Carletti (2004) notes that the theories mentioned above predict that firms 
borrowing from multiple banks should represent better risks and should pay lower loan 
rates than firms borrowing from a single bank.  
 
In her model, Carletti (2004) analyses a firm’s choice between borrowing from a 
single bank and two banks in a context where the number of banks influences both the level 
of monitoring and the loan rates. She shows that the number of banks affects monitoring 
and loan rates in various ways. Specifically, a bank monitors more when it is the sole lender 
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banks does not necessarily imply a higher cost of financing for the borrowing firm. Carletti 
(2004, 81) also shows that if there are diseconomies of scale in monitoring, two bank 
lending is cheaper than single-bank lending whenever “the technological effect of the 
convex monitoring cost function dominates the duplication of effort and the sharing of 
monitoring benefits.” According to Carletti (2004), the firm’s choice between single-bank 
and two-bank lending depends on how both monitoring and loan rates differ in the two 
scenarios. She shows that the optimal choice is the one that balances the benefit of 
monitoring in terms of higher expected financial return of the project against its drawbacks 
in terms of lower expected private return and higher total monitoring costs. In addition, the 
attractiveness of two-bank lending is increasing in the cost of monitoring, the private 
benefit, and the firm’s expected profitability. Carletti (2004, 81) claims that the results of 
her model provide “a theoretical rationale for the empirical observation that increasing the 
number of banks tends to lower firms’ quality, while either increasing or decreasing the 
cost of financing.” 
 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) use a sample of 1,491 transactions of syndicated loans 
in the period 1987-1995 to analyse the factors that influence syndicate size and its 
composition. They reason that since in any lending syndicate the lead bank will hold a 
portion of the loan in its portfolio, the bank must be concerned with the post-loan 
monitoring efforts and resale activities of other participating banks in the syndicate. 
Furthermore, Lee and Mullineaux (2004, 108) argue that “the structure of a syndicate will 
be an issue particularly if the borrower becomes financially distressed, as any resolution 
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“prospects for agreement will depend on the size and composition of the syndicate.”  
 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) model syndicate size and concentration as a function of 
information asymmetry, credit risk, loan characteristics, agency costs and a number of 
control variables. They use the number of lenders and the Hirshman-Herfindahl index as 
proxies for syndicate size and concentration, respectively. They examine the respective 
roles of aforementioned variables in determining the size and the degree of concentration of 
the syndicate. Lee and Mullineaux (2004, 108) reason that “syndicate participants holding 
large and similar loan portions have stronger incentives to monitor, while members holding 
small and dissimilar stakes may engage in free riding or become hold outs in the event of 
renegotiation.”  
 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) find that syndicates are significantly larger when 
lenders have more information about the borrower. Conversely, syndicates tend to be more 
concentrated when not much information about the borrower is known to lenders. They also 
find that syndicate size increases significantly and becomes more diffuse as the maturities 
of loans are longer. Lee and Mullineaux (2004, 109) infer that this results because “longer-
term loans are more readily syndicated than short-term loans.” In addition, arrangers are 
more tolerant towards free riding as loan term lengthens. They also find that syndicates are 
smaller and more concentrated when the loan is collateralized. Consequently, Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004, 120) argue, lead banks “can motivate participating banks to monitor and 
negotiate in good faith in the event of financial distress.” They also find that increases in 
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imposed on loan resale.  They infer that participants prefer to have smaller shares of these 
less liquid loans. In relation to the reputation of lender, they find that reputable lead banks 
form larger and less concentrated syndicates. They infer that their results are inconsistent 
with the finding of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) in that reputation is the primary 
mechanism for controlling agency problems within the lending group. Finally, they find 
that syndicates become more diffuse with larger loan sizes. 
 
  Sufi (2007) uses a sample of 12,672 syndicated loan deals to 4,687 US non-
financial firms from 1992 to 2003 to examine how information asymmetry affects financing 
arrangements and what lenders can do to reduce problems associated with information 
asymmetry. Sufi (2007) employs a theoretical framework which is based on well-known 
models of agency and moral hazard (e.g. Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997)). According to these models “firms with limited public information require due 
diligence and monitoring by an informed lender before uninformed lenders invest in the 
firm.”  Sufi’s (2007) findings are consistent with this theoretical framework. Specifically, 
he finds that syndicated loans to firms without publicly available SEC filings are 11% more 
concentrated and the proportion of the loan held by the lead bank is 10% more than would 
otherwise be the case. One interesting finding reported by Sufi (2007, 631) is that 
“borrowers with little or no credit reputation obtained syndicated loans that are similar to 
sole-lender bank loans,” in which case the lead arranger retains a larger share of the loan 
and the number of participants in the syndicate is small. On the other hand, “reputable 
borrowers obtain syndicated loans that are similar to public debt” in which case the lead 
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He also finds information asymmetry can influence the syndicate structure among firms 
with publicly available SEC filings. Sufi (2007) also finds that both borrower and bank 
reputation can mitigate problems associated with information asymmetry. More 
specifically, as the borrower becomes more “known” in the market, problems of 
information asymmetry are reduced. The reputation of the lead bank can also reduce these 
problems. Interestingly, Sufi (2007) also reports that only the top 1% most reputable lead 
banks can completely offset the effect of information asymmetry. Finally, Sufi (2007) finds 
that when the borrower has no publicly available SEC filings or credit rating, participant 
lenders are “closer” to the borrower in terms of previous relationship and in terms of 
geographical proximity. 
 
In summary, syndicated loans bear many features of the general bank loan. In 
particular information asymmetry problems still exist. The stock market reaction to 
syndicated loans also depends on the loan structure (revolving credit, term loan), the 
characteristics of borrowers (credit rating, types of borrower) as well as those of the 
syndicated loan itself (loan size, flexibility, re-negotiability). It appears that syndicated 
loans that convey positive signals in one form or another are highly valued by the market. 
Table 2.3 gives a summary of the main papers and their findings reviewed in this section. 
 
 
 
 
  94Table 2.3: Summary of literature review of syndicated loans  
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Denis and 
Mullineaux 
(1994) 
Determinants 
of loan 
syndication 
Loan size, borrower’s credit 
rating and collateral are 
positively related to the 
probability of loan syndication. 
Loan 
characteristics 
and borrower 
characteristics 
might have 
influence on 
announcement 
effect and long-
term 
performance of 
borrower. 
Armitage (1995)  Nature of 
news and 
inside 
information 
Increased facilities and positive 
news elicit positive and 
significant response from the 
market. 
In UK banks are not perceived as 
having inside information about 
quoted borrowers which affects 
their valuation. 
-Nature of news 
can affect firm 
value. 
- Cross-countries 
examination of 
issues might be 
necessary in 
certain cases 
Megginson, 
Poulsen and 
Sinkey (1995) 
Announce- 
ments of 
syndicated 
loans and 
market value 
of lenders. 
Types of 
borrower. 
Non-share-price maximisation or 
mispriced loans can elicit 
negative market reaction.  
Lending to sovereign borrowers 
in less developed countries elicit 
negative market reaction. 
 
- Shareholders’ 
wealth 
maximisation 
should be the 
ultimate goal of 
firms. 
 
- Cross-countries 
studies are 
needed. 
Preece and 
Mullineaux 
(1996) 
The role of 
lending 
syndicates 
Loans issued by large syndicates 
possess less contractual 
flexibility than those issued by 
single lenders. 
The larger the syndicates are the 
more costly are efforts to 
renegotiate the loan. 
The size of 
syndicate is 
associated with 
financial 
flexibility and 
cost of 
renegotiation. 
Mosebach (1999)  Announce-
ments of lines 
of credit in 
Canada  
Market reaction to borrower’s 
stock is significantly positive on 
announcements of lines of credit. 
Lines of credit can be used as 
positive signals to market. 
Loan structure  
can make a 
difference to 
announcement 
effects. 
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Table 2.3:  Summary of literature review on syndicated loans (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Denis and 
Mullineaux 
(2000) 
Relationship 
loans versus 
transaction 
loans 
Determinants 
of loan 
syndication 
Relationship loans are more 
likely to exist between agent 
bank and borrower. 
Moral hazard is not a dominant 
factor of loan syndication. 
Information transparency, 
managing agent’s reputation and 
investment rating are positively 
related to loan syndication. 
Determinants of 
loan syndication 
might be related 
to wealth effects 
of loan 
announcements. 
Lee and 
Mullineaux 
(2004) 
Determinants 
of syndicate 
size and 
composition 
Syndicates are larger when 
lenders have more information 
about borrowers and when 
maturity of loans are longer 
Reputable banks form larger and 
less concentrated syndicates. 
Degree of 
concentration 
and syndicate 
size can 
influence market 
price reaction to 
borrower’s stock.
Allen, Guo and 
Weintrop (2004) 
Secondary 
syndicated 
loan market 
and 
information 
content of 
earnings 
No evidence of any price 
movements in the secondary 
loan market at the time of the 
release of the quarterly earnings 
announcement.  
There are significant price 
movements in the secondary 
loan market around the time of 
monthly covenant reports to 
members of the syndicate. 
Prior information 
about firms 
influences stock 
price reaction to 
announcements 
of earnings. 
Sufi (2007)  Information 
asymmetry 
and financing 
arrangements 
Borrowers with little or no credit 
reputation obtained syndicated 
loans that are similar to sole-
lender bank loans. 
Unknown firms 
prefer single 
lender-borrower 
relationship. 
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In this essay, I examine five questions concerning syndicated loans. First, I look at 
the issue whether the stock market reacts to announcements of syndicated loans. As 
discussed in the literature review on bank loans (James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 
1989; Best and Zhang, 1993; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 1995; and James and Smith, 
2000) the market does react to announcements of bank loans. The only question is whether 
those reactions are sufficiently significant to move the market for borrower shares. Hence, I 
formulate the following null hypothesis: 
 
H 2.1: The stock market’s reaction to borrower share prices on announcements of 
syndicated loans is not significant. 
 
The second issue I examine is whether the ease of renegotiation will depend on the 
structure of the credit agreement. It is argued in existing literature that revolving credit 
agreements tend to be less restrictive and, hence, easier to renegotiate than term loans. So, I 
expect the market to value revolving credit agreements more favourably than term loans.  
 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) examine the 
nature of credit agreements.  Their studies report statistically significant excess returns for 
common stocks of firms announcing either a new or favourably revised revolving credit 
  97agreement.  Both studies arrive at the conclusion that the structure of the loan agreements is 
the main determinant of the positive share price reaction. 
 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) examine Canadian bank loans and find that 
announcements of bank loans are associated with positive abnormal returns. However, 
syndication weakens the announcement effect because it diminishes a key advantage of 
bank borrowing, the flexibility to renegotiate loan terms. In other words, syndication results 
in lower excess returns than non-syndicated loans. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) also find 
that single-bank loans provide more contractual flexibility than syndicated loans. These 
studies confirm that the market values flexibility of loan terms. 
 
Revolving credit loans are agreements that give the borrowing firm the option as to 
when and how much to borrow given the firm’s assessment of its own future growth 
prospects. This flexibility of revolving credit, however, is offered at a cost. It is generally 
more expensive than short-term bank loans. Basically, the loan is similar to a put option. In 
this case, the price of the put guarantees access to the banks' money at a fixed spread above 
a benchmark rate. The borrowing firm has the right but not the obligation to exercise the 
put. If the firm is optimistic about its future, then it will exercise the option and pay for the 
cost of the option which includes the commitment fee and the interest on the loan. If not, 
then it just has to pay the commitment fee. Thus, revolving credit loans give the borrower 
increased flexibility in making financing and investment decisions.  Not surprisingly, this 
feature has made revolving credit agreements more popular than straight term loans. 
 
  98On the other hand, when a firm applies for term loans it has specific need for cash 
flows.  Generally, term loans are structured to allow borrowers to repay the borrowed 
money in equal amounts over the period of the loan. At maturity, the firm should have paid 
off the amount owed to the bank. However, firms might opt for other payment options such 
as paying smaller amount periodically and then make a larger balloon payment or even a 
single balloon payment at maturity.  Sometimes the rate of interest is fixed for the term of 
the loan, but in practice it is often set as a spread over a benchmark rate such as the US 
prime rate or LIBOR.
7  Most term loans are collateralized with assets such as mortgages, 
cash accounts and patents/trademarks.  It is noteworthy that the existing bank-borrower 
relationship also has an influence on the ability of firms to renegotiate the term and 
condition of the loan prior to maturity. However, this practice might be difficult in the case 
of syndicated loans because it takes time to renegotiate with all banks in the syndicate. It is 
the responsibility of the agent bank to carry out this renegotiation. Based on the above 
discussion, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H 2.2: The market does not value loan structures differently. 
 
The third question I examine concerns the relevance of the source of information to 
borrower share price response. I examine this question by comparing the share price 
response to syndication announcements to two different sources of information. 
Specifically, I compare the share price response to announcements that appear in the 
                                                 
7 LIBOR: London Interbank Offer Rate. 
  99financial press (Dow Jones Interactive Index (DJII)) with those only available from a 
commercial information provider (IFR news).  
 
One common source of information that has been used in existing literature is the 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Researchers use WSJ to identify the announcement date for 
event studies.  It is well recognised by the profession that not all loans are announced in the 
financial press. It is more than likely that only quality loans or “material” loans are 
announced in the WSJ. Both borrowers and lenders would be happy to send positive signals 
to the market rather than negative information. Thus, using only the financial press 
announcement date might cause both a loan reporting bias and an information noise bias. 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) find that favourably revised loans are more likely to be 
reported in the financial press than unfavourably revised loans or loans that are allowed to 
expire.   
 
One can also argue that announcements published in the financial press, such as 
WSJ, will be more transparent and more readily available than those  associated with less 
well-known and/or more costly sources of information.  Best and Zhang (1993) contend 
that banks apply differential effort in reducing information asymmetry depending on 
borrower characteristics and existing information. They suggest that the information banks 
produce is useful only if limited public information is available, or if the indicators from 
other sources are noisy.  
 
  100Mosebach (1999) argues that it is announcements in commercial sources that drive 
the market, not WSJ announcements.  He uses information from a commercially available 
service (Loan Pricing Corporation’s Gold Sheets) to identify loan announcement dates that 
were not reported in the WSJ.  He finds support for the argument that borrower returns 
react to commercially available announcements.  However, in his study, commercially 
available announcements were not compared with announcements that are published in the 
financial press.  So, it is interesting to examine how the market responds to different 
sources of information. In this essay, I make this comparison. Hence, I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H 2.3: There is no difference in the share price responses to different sources of 
information. 
 
The fourth question relates to the issue of whether there is any difference in share 
price reaction to single or multiple announcements of syndicated loans. By definition, 
syndicated loans are credit agreements negotiated by a lead bank with participation by a 
number of other banks. Hence, syndicated loans create a multi-bank and borrower 
relationship. In practice, large loans are usually underwritten by more than one bank. In 
most instances, the lead bank or banks have an ongoing relationship with the borrower. Of 
course, firms can also have another form of multi-bank relationships when they acquire 
funding from several banks over time. However, the latter relationship is not my focus in 
this essay. 
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asymmetry from the bank’s perspective. The borrower has private information about its 
own credit risk and growth prospects. Also, a moral hazard problem exists in the form of 
possible asset substitution on the part of the borrower. On the other hand, a single bank 
relationship might create an "information monopoly" which could be detrimental to the 
borrower (Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)).   This problem results because the cost of 
switching banks may be greater than the payment of the monopoly loan rate. This view is 
also supported by Houston and James (1996) who assert that borrowing from a single bank 
gives that bank an information monopoly that can adversely affect the borrowers' 
investment incentives. Obviously, one solution to this problem is for the borrower to have 
multi-bank relationships. Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) contend that firms 
maintain multiple bank relationships to diversify the risk that their bank may have 
insufficient funds.  Syndication allows a multi-bank relationship in a single loan context.  It 
would be much more difficult for a syndicate to extract the monopoly interest rate.  It 
should be pointed out at this point that firms might have multiple announcements with a 
single bank or a single announcement with multiple banks. So, multiple announcements do 
not necessarily involve multiple banks. Given my discussion above, I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H 2.4: There is no difference in share price reactions to the number of 
announcements in syndications. 
 
  102Finally, I look at the issue of information leakage. This might be an important factor 
in determining share price reaction. I examine this issue by considering different event 
window lengths. If the shorter event window (-1, +1) results in significant CAARs and the 
longer event window (-2, +2) results do not, then there is little or no leakage.  Conversely, 
if the longer event window (-2, +2) produces significant results and the shorter window 
does not, then I know there is information leakage. 
 
Armitage (1995) examines syndicated loan announcements in the UK.  He observes 
that market responses to syndicated loan announcements are not as significant as those in 
the US.  He also observes that market responses occur over several days instead of on the 
announcement day.  It appears that “leakage” may occur for acquisition loans and that 
responses to good news are spread over a number of days mostly following the 
announcement.  I formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H 2.5: There is no information leakage prior to announcements of syndicated 
loans.  
 
In the next section, I present the data and the methodology used in this study.  
 
 
 
  1032.4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
I use the following sources of information to obtain data for my study. First, I use 
International Financing Review (IFR) Platinum database, a commercial-based information 
product of Thomson Financial Publishing. The IFR database provides complete information 
on international and global syndicated loans since 1983. Information is updated on a daily 
basis and is obtained from various sources. These include information published by 
Reuters, proprietary surveys produced by all major investment banks, and even private 
discussions with banks.  Secondly, I use the Dow Jones Interactive Index (DJII) to 
manually cross check IFR syndication announcements. DJII is an online service that offers 
current and historical articles published in numerous international news publications.
8  I 
use "sold", "launched", "issued", or "priced" to designate the announcement date.  I 
manually screen the IFR database and identify 5,465 syndication announcements in the US 
over the period 1995-2000.  In order to be included in the sample, the borrower must have 
the necessary returns on the CRSP database.  The CRSP requirement results in 2,061 
syndication announcements made up of 1,551 revolving credit agreements, 387 term loans, 
and 123 hybrid loans.  I test market responses to alternative information sources by 
differentiating loans announced in IFR and those announced in DJII. I found 379 revolving 
credit agreements, 94 term loans, and 48 hybrid loan agreements announced in DJII. To test 
                                                 
8 In order to reduce search time we confined our search to a select group of publications that consistently 
reported the transactions. These were: the Wall Street Journal, the Capital Markets Report (a Dow Jones 
Publication), Dow Jones News Service articles, and Euroweek. 
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multiple announcements, I classify term loans and revolving credit loans according to the 
number of announcements. For term loans, I identify 363 single announcements and 24 
multiple announcements while for revolving credit agreements there were 1,327 single and 
227 multiple announcements, respectively.      
 
Table 2.4 below shows the characteristics of the loans in my dataset. It can be seen 
from this table that revolving credit accounts for a large proportion of my dataset. The 
average loan size of revolving credit (USD 355.76 million) is largest followed by term 
loans (USD 268.32 million) and hybrid loans (USD 155.37 million). Nevertheless, the 
average loan spread of revolving credit is lower than for term loans and hybrid loans. The 
average number of lenders for revolving credit is the same as that for the whole sample 
while that for term loans is slightly higher and slightly lower for hybrid loans.  
 
Table 2.4: Syndicated loans characteristics for US companies (1995-2000) 
Loan Type 
 
 
Number 
of loans 
 
Proportion 
of 
total loan 
Average loan 
amount 
USD million 
 
Average 
loan 
Spread 
a 
(%) 
Average 
number 
of 
lenders 
Average 
Maturity
in  
years 
 
Revolving 
credit 3,931  0.72  355.76  1.44  3.85  7.61 
                  
Term loan  1,181  0.22  268.32  2.15  3.94  9.14 
                  
Hybrid loan  353  0.06  155.37  2.06  3.65  5.07 
                  
Total 5,465    1.00         
Source: IFR Platinum Database Thomson Financial. 
(a): The benchmark rate is LIBOR. 
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is interesting to consider why the average loan spread for revolving credit loans is lower 
than those for term loans and hybrid loans. One might argue that when firms enter a 
revolving credit contract, they may or may not use the funds committed by the lender.  
 
2.4.2. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this essay, I use Eventus (version 7). This is a specialised software designed for 
event studies that allows the extraction of data from CRSP and generates abnormal returns 
for selected event windows. I use the market model with equal weighting in this essay.  
I define the event of interest in this study as the announcement of a syndicated loan. 
To measure the stock market reaction to announcements of syndicated loans, I use the 
market model to estimate abnormal returns around the announcement of a syndicated loan 
agreement. Day 0 is taken to be the event date. I estimate the normal performance of the 
securities using an estimation period of 255 days that ends 46 days before the event date (as 
shown by period T0, T1 in Figure 2.2 below).  I examine three-day (-1, +1) and five-day (-2, 
+2) event windows (T1, T2). These figures denote the number of days prior to and after the 
event date, respectively. I consider stock market reaction over the long-term (T2, T3 ) in 
Chapter Three. The methodology assumes that the event is exogenous with respect to the 
change in market value of the security.  
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Figure 2.2: Time line for announcements of syndicated loans. 
 
    Estimation                             event window                         post-event       
    window          window 
 
 
 
 
   To                                   T1             0               T2                  T3  
If the market reaction is favourable, I expect a positive abnormal return (AR) for the 
borrower’s stock. The latter is defined as the difference between the actual ex post return of 
the security over the event window and the normal return of the security over the estimation 
period.  The normal return is defined as the return that would be expected if the event did 
not take place. In event studies, expected return is generated by applying a chosen model 
(e.g. market model) over the estimation period. Thus, the abnormal return over the event 
window can be thought of as a measure of the impact of the event on the value of the firm.  
 
To test the significance of these abnormal returns I use both a parametric test (the 
Patell test) and a non-parametric test (the generalised Z-test). The details of the event study 
methodology used in this essay are more fully described in Appendix 1. 
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In Panel A of Table 2.5 below, I present borrower share price responses (CAARs) 
for all syndication announcements for the five-day (-2, +2) and three-day (-1, +1) event 
windows.   As can be seen from Panel A, the CAARs for all syndications are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for both event windows, suggesting the market views syndicated 
loans favourably. These results are consistent with previous studies (Preece and 
Mullineaux, 1996; Mosebach, 1999). My results confirm that the market reactions to 
borrower share price are significant. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that the market 
reactions to borrower share prices upon announcements of syndicated loans are not 
significant. 
 
Prior papers, however, do not partition the data to reflect loan type. Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996) find that the ability to renegotiate a loan agreement is an important 
feature of a loan agreement.  I argue that the type of loan is important because it influences 
whether future renegotiation is possible.  Panel A also presents the announcements for the 
three different loan types. Revolving credit agreements drive the overall results. The 
decision made by the borrower as to which type of loan the firm should select is valued 
accordingly by the market. Term loans are not significant under either the five-day or three-
day event window, while the hybrid loan results are only significant within the three-day 
event window. Although they do not partition bank loans into different types, Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994) highlight the importance of financial flexibility offered by bank loans. 
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Table 2.5:  Share price response to syndication:  excess returns for borrowers 
CAAR 
(%) 
 
z - value 
CAAR 
(%) 
 
z - value 
Type of  
Announcement 
 
Obs 
Event window [-2,+2]  Event window [-1,+1] 
Panel A: All announcements 
All  Syndications  2061 0.39 3.22*** 0.28 2.58*** 
All Revolving Credit  1551 0.47  2.99***  0.29  2.05** 
All Term Loans  387  0.02  0.88  0.00  0.70 
All Hybrid Loans  123  0.48  0.98  1.07  2.04** 
        
Panel B: Revolving credit agreements 
IFR Revolving Credit - All  1172 0.40  2.36***  0.18  1.16 
IFR Revolving Credit - Single  999  0.34  2.07**  0.16  0.98 
IFR Revolving Credit - Multiple  173  0.75  1.17  0.29  0.66 
DJII Revolving Credit - All  379  0.72  1.71**  0.67  2.37*** 
DJII Revolving Credit - Single  325  0.61  1.13  0.86  2.37*** 
DJII Revolving Credit - Multiple  54  1.37  1.77**  -0.49  -0.45 
        
Panel C: Term loans 
IFR Term Loans - All  293  0.19  0.95  0.16  0.78 
IFR Term Loans - Single  277  0.15  0.89  0.10  0.57 
IFR Term Loans - Multiple  16  1.00  0.38  1.35  0.97 
DJII Term Loans - All  94  -0.70  -1.10  -1.05  -2.97*** 
DJII Term Loans - Single  86  -0.75  -1.10  -1.24  -3.17*** 
DJII Term Loans - Multiple  8  -0.12  -0.16  1.05  0.20 
        
Panel D: Hybrid Loans 
IFR Hybrid Loans - All  74  1.36  1.55*  1.68  2.46*** 
DJII Hybrid Loans - All  48  -0.81  -0.66  0.16  0.03 
         
Panel E: Single versus multiple announcements 
Revolving Credit Single  1327 0.41  2.60***  0.23  1.61* 
Revolving Credit Multiple  227  0.82  1.55*  0.61  1.46* 
Term  Loan  Single  363  -0.03 0.82 -0.03 -0.55 
Term  Loans  Multiple  24  0.84 0.34 0.73 0.67 
        
*, **, and ***denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and the 0.01 level, respectively 
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accommodated by bank loans.  Preece and Mullineaux (1996) show that as the number of 
lenders in the syndicate increases, the market reaction is less pronounced. They argue that 
renegotiation flexibility is related to the number of lenders and the market values this 
flexibility. Given that the revolving credit agreements and hybrid loans are more flexible 
than term loans, the statistically significant positive CAARs associated with these loan 
types provide evidence that financial flexibility is valued by the market. Thus, based on 
these results I reject the hypothesis that loan type does not have significant impact on the 
ease of renegotiation and that the market does not value different loan types differently. 
 
Panel B shows the effect of different information sources on revolving credit 
agreements. The five-day window reveals that the overall IFR and Dow Jones 
announcements are both positive and significant. For the IFR announcements, I observe a 
0.40% CAAR for all revolving credit announcements and the results are significant at the 
1% level. For the DJII, the abnormal returns are even higher, showing a 0.72% and these 
are also significant at the 5% level. The IFR results are consistent with the findings of 
Mosebach (1999).  It is also worth noting that the IFR results are driven by the single 
announcement data while the Dow Jones results are driven by the multiple announcements. 
It is interesting to know what caused these responses to be different. One possible 
explanation for this difference is that the announcements made by IFR are less transparent 
than those made by DJII. Investors might have viewed single announcements made by IFR 
as much more significant than multiple announcements. On the other hand, investors might 
  110argue that DJII announcements are more transparent and, therefore, investors would view 
multiple announcements differently.  
 
The three-day event window tells a different story. Panel B shows that only the 
Dow Jones announcements are significant and these are driven by the single 
announcements. Thus, my results suggest that the source of revolving credit 
announcements can influence borrower share price reaction.  Mosebach (1999) argues that 
the financial press provides redundant information and my results are not inconsistent with 
his findings. However, he based his argument on the results of the five-day event window 
only. When I use the three-day event window, I find that announcements reported by the 
financial press are not redundant signals and the market does react to this source of 
information.  
 
The partitions presented in Panel C show market response to term loans is less 
pronounced compared to that  for the revolving credit agreements. Furthermore, none of 
these responses is significant over the five-day window. In addition, the three-day event 
window also reveals that term loans announced in the financial press are viewed negatively. 
Apparently, if only IFR announcements are used, the significance would have remained 
unknown. Thus, the borrower’s share price does respond differently to the sources of the 
announcement and the width of the event window can make a difference. Here again, if I 
compare the market response to the Dow Jones announcements in the three-day window for 
term loans and those for revolving credit loans I can perceive how the market values 
different loan types. Thus, unlike Mosebach (1999), I can say that both dedicated 
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price reaction. 
 
Next, comparison of Panels B and C for the three-day IFR event window 
announcements reveals that the CAARs for both the revolving credit and the term loan 
announcements are not significant. It is tempting to infer that neither type of announcement 
is newsworthy. However, the Dow Jones announcements reveal the revolving credit 
announcements are viewed favourably while the term loans are viewed negatively and these 
results are significant at the 1% level. One would have arrived at different conclusions if 
DJII announcements were not examined. These results confirm that the source of the 
announcement information is an important factor in the market response. 
 
Panel D also shows the importance of the information source.  However, in contrast 
to the results of term loans and revolving credit agreements, the results of the hybrid loan 
show that the announcements from the dedicated information provider, IFR, are 
significantly positive in both event windows while the Dow Jones announcements are 
insignificant.  The IFR results again provide support for Mosebach’s (1999) argument that 
financial press announcements may be redundant.  In this case, the event window is not an 
issue.  Thus, overall my evidence shows that there are differences between the share price 
responses to different sources of information. I therefore reject the third hypothesis.  
 
Panel E focuses on the single and multiple announcement issue.  Consistent with 
Panel A results, it can be seen that both single and multiple revolving credit announcements 
  112are statistically significant while the number of announcements for term loans does not 
make any difference.  Thus, it is the type of loan that provides information to the market, 
not the number of announcements. Therefore, I do not reject the hypothesis that there is no 
difference in share prices reaction to the number of announcements in syndications. 
 
Finally, regarding information leakages Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that the stock 
market reaction to borrower share prices are significant for both three-day and five-day 
event windows for the whole sample and for revolving credit loans. I thus infer that leakage 
did not occur prior to the announcement date.
9  Therefore, I do not reject the hypothesis 
that there is no information leakage. 
 
Exhibits 2.1 and 2.2 present the partitioning scheme for the five-day and three-day 
event windows, respectively.  The data set consists of 2,061 loan observations. In each 
partition, I present the CAARs and the level of significance along with the number of 
observations. The syndications are sequentially partitioned on credit agreement structure, 
information source, and announcement types. The credit structure shows the three types of 
loan structures considered in this study; revolving credit with 1,551 observations; term 
loans with 387 observations; and hybrid loans with 123 observations.  Exhibit 1 clearly 
shows that revolving credit agreements provide the most significant positive share price 
responses. As for information source, a similar conclusion can be reached. For revolving 
                                                 
9 However, when the (-10, 0) event window was examined, we do find some evidence of leakage associated 
with the revolving credit announcements reported in the financial press. 
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credits, both sources of information are significant. However, in the case of term loans, 
neither of the sources is significant. The hybrid loans show that the commercial source is 
significant whereas information obtained from the financial press (DJII) exhibits a mixed 
result. Both of these results are confirmed in Exhibit 2 which also highlights the difference 
between information sources.  This is particularly evident when I examine the significantly 
negative CAARs associated with the Dow Jones announcements of term loans for the three-
day event window. 
 
 Exhibit 2.1  
Share price response to syndication:  Excess returns and level of significance for the (-2, +2) event window.  Number of observations in parentheses. 
 
           All Syndications 
0.39*** 
(2,061) 
             
                             
                             
                             
      All Term Loans (TL) 
 
 
0.02 ns 
(387) 
  Single  TL 
-0.03 ns 
(363) 
Multiple TL 
0.84 ns 
(24) 
    All Revolving Credit 
(RC) 
 
0.47*** 
(1,551) 
 Single  RC 
0.41*** 
(1,327) 
Multiple RC 
0.82* 
(227) 
 Hybrid 
Multiples 
 
0.48 ns 
(123) 
 
                             
                             
                             
 IFR 
0.19 ns 
(293) 
    DJ 
-0.70 ns 
(94) 
    IFR 
0.40*** 
(1,172) 
    D   J
0.72** 
(379) 
      
                             
                             
                             
Multiple 
1.00 ns 
(16) 
  Single 
0.15 ns 
(277) 
 Multiple 
-0.12 ns 
(8) 
 Single 
-0.75 ns 
(86) 
 Multiple 
0.75 ns 
(173) 
 Single 
0.34** 
(999) 
 Multiple 
1.37** 
(54) 
 Single 
0.61 ns 
(325) 
 IFR 
1.36 * 
(74) 
 DJ 
-0.81 ns 
(48) 
 
DJ has both Dow Jones and IFR dates while IFR has no Dow Jones announcements 
*, **,  and *** represent the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels of significance, respectively. 
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Exhibit 2.2  
Share price response to syndication:  Excess returns and level of significance for the (-1, +1) event window.  Number of observations in parentheses. 
 
           All Syndications 
0.28*** 
(2,061) 
             
                               
                               
                               
      All Term Loans (TL) 
 
 
0.00 ns 
(387) 
  Single  TL 
-0.03 ns 
(363) 
Multiple TL 
0.73 ns 
(24) 
    All Revolving Credit 
(RC) 
 
0.29** 
(1,551) 
 Single  RC 
0.23* 
(1,327) 
Multiple RC 
0.61* 
(227) 
 Hybrid 
Multiples 
 
1.07 ** 
(123) 
 
                               
                               
                               
 IFR 
0.16 ns 
(293) 
    DJ 
-1.05*** 
(94) 
     IFR 
0.18 ns 
(1,172) 
    D   J
0.67*** 
(379) 
      
                               
                               
                               
Multiple 
1.35 ns 
(16) 
  Single 
0.10 ns 
(277) 
 Multiple 
1.05 ns 
(8) 
 Single 
-1.24*** 
(86) 
 Multiple 
0.29 ns 
(173) 
 Single 
0.16 ns 
(999) 
 Multiple 
-0.49 ns 
(54) 
 Single 
0.86*** 
(325) 
 IFR 
1.68*** 
(74) 
 DJ 
0.16 ns 
(48) 
 
DJ has both Dow Jones and IFR dates while IFR has no Dow Jones announcements 
*, **,  and *** represent the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 2.6. SUMMARY 
 
In this essay I reviewed the existing literature on bank loans. Banks continue to play 
an important role in the financial markets. They deliver “functional” services which are not 
available from non-bank intermediaries. The general consensus in the literature is that 
banks, in the process of screening and monitoring their borrowers, acquire private 
information not available to other market participants. While the moral hazard problem is 
present in any principal-agent relationship, the bank-borrower relationship mitigates the 
problem.   
 
In general, the market reacts favourably to announcements of bank loans. 
Announcements of bank loans in general and those of syndicated loans in particular elicit 
positive market reaction. The characteristics of borrowers, lenders and loans impact market 
reaction to announcements of bank and syndicated loans. A “good” lender-borrower 
relationship tends to benefit both borrower and lender. Both the borrower and the lender 
signal their financial credentials to the market.  
 
Syndicated loans are defined as loans extended to borrowers by more than two 
lenders. Despite the rapid development of this market in the 1990s, I find that syndication 
research is limited. According to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), information variables, 
agency variables, loan characteristics and agent characteristics influence the syndication 
process. Finally, the bank-borrower relationship was reported to have some influence on the 
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(1995), Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000)). 
 
Empirically, I examined the impact of syndication loan announcements and find 
significantly positive wealth effects for the borrowing firms. In addition, I consider a 
number of issues raised in existing literature. I consider whether loan type is an important 
determinant of market response by partitioning my dataset into revolving credit agreements, 
term loans and hybrid loans. I find that the overall results are driven by revolving credit 
agreements. In addition, I examine whether the source of syndication announcements plays 
an important role in establishing the wealth effects for the borrowers.  I find that for the 
three-day event window, (-1, +1), announcements reported in the financial press are 
significantly positive for revolving credit announcements and significantly negative for 
term loan announcements.  In contrast, announcements only available from IFR appear to 
have negligible impact on shareholder wealth.  In addition, single announcements in 
financial press are more newsworthy than multiple announcements in the same source. For 
the five-day window (-2, +2), term loan announcements are not significant regardless of the 
source of information.  In contrast, I find that single revolving credit announcements in IFR 
are significant and multiple revolving credit announcements in DJII are also significant.  
Thus, it is apparent that the market values the financial flexibility provided by revolving 
credit loans whether there are single or multiple announcements. The sources of 
information are complementary. My study is unique in that it uses two sources of 
information whilst previous studies use either financial press or a commercial database.   
  118CHAPTER THREE: LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF 
BORROWING FIRMS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE ISSUES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this essay I first review existing literature on long-term performance following 
some major corporate events and then look at long-term performance of borrowing firms 
following bank loans. Since I plan to integrate the two lines of financial research by 
merging capital structure issues with the role of banks in reducing information asymmetry 
and providing financial slack, I also review the three primary capital structure theories, 
namely, the tradeoff theory, the pecking order theory and market timing theory.  The 
reasons for integrating these two lines of research are: (1) bank loans are considered to be 
one form of inside debt (Fama, 1985), (2) previous research has not considered the impact 
of loan types on the value of the borrowing firms; and (3) as an extension of the market 
timing theory, I argue that the characteristics of a particular type of debt may have 
embedded options that allow managers to behave opportunistically. Specifically, I argue 
that revolving credit loans allow more flexibility in the renegotiation of magnitude, 
maturity, and pricing than do term loans, and, hence, facilitate market timing by firms. 
Firms are economic agents that minimize the cost of production or financing. It follows that 
if firms are not forced to issue equity or debt because of special circumstances, then it may 
be rational for firms to time the market.  
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3.2.1. LITERATURE ON LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS FOLLOWING NON-
BANK CORPORATE EVENTS 
 
It is well-documented that the market reacts to economic and corporate news. 
Market reaction could be in the form of announcement effects or measured by firms’ long-
term performance. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) argue that complete investigation 
of the wealth effects of external financing requires attention to both long-run returns as well 
as to announcement effects. Studies on announcement effect and long-term performance 
following corporate events are abundant in existing literature. 
 
In the area of long-term performance following corporate events, there have been 
numerous studies with respect of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), straight and convertible 
bonds, preferred stocks, private placements, acquisitions, mergers and repurchases. 
However, for long-term performance of borrowing firms following bank loans, Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) is the only paper in this area. In this section I will review the 
literature on some major corporate events. 
 
3.2.1.1. Seasoned equity offerings.  
 
Denis and Sarin (2001) use a sample of 1,213 seasoned equity offerings drawn from 
the Global Corporate Financings database of Securities Data Corporation. They examine 
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equity offerings (SEOs). They find significant negative stock price reaction to post-SEO 
earnings announcements with an average of -0.21%. Furthermore, they find that these 
abnormal stock price reactions are “reliably negative” within the smallest quartile of equity 
issuers.  Denis and Sarin (2001, 169) reason that for small firms these findings are 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis; that is, “firms issue equity when the market 
overestimates the firm’s future earnings performance.” 
 
According to Brous, Datar and Kini (2001, 141) the main reason for the post-issue 
long-run return underperformance of seasoned equity offering firms is that “investors have 
optimistic expectations regarding future earnings and that the underperformance is just a 
correction of these explanations over time.” Using a sample of 1,475 SEOs from the 
Security Data Corporation’s New Issues Database and Compustat for the period 1977-1990, 
they measure the long-run stock performance of these firms by using the matched-firm buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) technique. They subdivide their data into three sub-
samples based on the benchmark used: (i) size matched; (ii) a size and the market-to-book 
ratio (M/B) matched; and (iii) size, standard industrial classification (SIC) and M/B 
matched. They report that the mean three-year raw holding period returns are 43.08%, 
38.46% and 36.93% for their three sub-samples of issuing firms. The corresponding figures 
for the five-year period are 73.79%, 63.85% and 61.43%, respectively. However, the long-
run benchmark-adjusted holding period returns tell a different story. The benchmark-
adjusted three-year holding period returns for the three sub-samples are -29.14%, -9.26% 
and -12.36%. The corresponding figures for the five year period are -47.91%, -21.51% and 
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level. 
 
In addition to long-run stock return performance, Brous, Datar and Kini (2001, 149) 
also examine investors’ reaction to quarterly earnings announcements following seasoned 
equity offerings to test the optimistic expectations hypothesis. They reason that “earnings 
announcements convey a significant amount of information that is used by investors to 
adjust their future expectations of firm performance.” Therefore, in addition to examining 
the raw and benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement period returns, they also focus on 
testing whether “there is an “unusual” amount of negative information conveyed over the 
earnings announcement windows.” For each quarter they calculate the difference between 
“the N-day benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement period return” and “the N-day 
benchmark-adjusted non-earnings announcement period return.” They call this difference 
“the N-day performance-adjusted earnings announcement period returns.”  This difference, 
they argue, can be attributed to the additional information conveyed through the earnings 
announcement.  
 
Brous, Datar and Kini (2001) find that for all three sub-samples, the three-day raw 
earnings announcement period returns for the three- and five-year post-issue periods are 
insignificantly different form zero. Using benchmark-adjusted returns, they find that for the 
size and size-SIC-and-M/B benchmark sample of issuing firms, the mean and median three-
day announcement period returns are insignificantly different from zero for both the three-
year and five-year periods. For the size and M/B benchmark sub-sample, the mean and 
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insignificantly different from zero. However, the mean earnings announcement period 
return for the five year period is -0.159% and significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, the 
median figure is insignificantly different from zero. The earnings announcement period 
return is much lower when the size benchmark rather than the size and M/B benchmarks 
are used.  
 
Finally, Brous, Datar and Kini (2001, 153) reason that “given that we had earlier 
documented significantly negative long run abnormal returns using our benchmarking 
techniques, it stands to reason that the expected benchmark-adjusted rate of return over any 
three-day period is also negative.” Therefore, they use performance-adjusted returns to 
correct for the expected negative return, thereby allowing them to test whether there is an 
unusual amount of information conveyed by earnings announcements. They find that for all 
three benchmarks, the mean and median three-day performance-adjusted returns are 
insignificantly different from zero for both post-issue periods. Brous, Datar and Kini (2001, 
153) infer that “the quarterly earnings announcements do not, on average, convey 
unfavourable information, thereby suggesting that investors’ expectations about future 
earnings are not overly optimistic.” 
 
Based on their results Brous, Datar and Kini (2001, 167) conclude that 
“unfavourable information is not conveyed by post-issue earnings announcements and, 
therefore, raises doubt about the existence of optimistic expectations by market participants 
at the time of an equity offering.”   
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returns following security sales one can test a managers’ ability to time the market. 
According to Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2004) if informed insiders attempt to profit by 
selling overvalued equity and the market does not know this negative information around 
the time the sale is announced, then post-announcement long-run abnormal stock returns 
should be negative. They examine the registered secondary equity offerings from 1980 to 
1996 which consist of 424 pure secondary offers, and using the matched-firm BHAR 
technique they find that the mean 3- and 5-year abnormal returns are 5.93%  and 1.99 %, 
but not significant. However, their results change dramatically when their sample are 
separated into sales by insiders and non-insiders. They find that when the seller is an 
insider, the average 3-year abnormal buy-and-hold is – 15.66% and the 5-year abnormal 
return average is -33.33% and both are significant at the 5% level. They, therefore, 
conclude that their findings support the windows of opportunity hypothesis. They also 
report that for the non-insider sub-sample, long-run performance is generally positive but 
not significant. Thus, their findings are consistent with “non-insiders selling for non-
opportunistic reasons.” 
 
Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2004) also find that their results support Loughran and 
Ritter’s (1997) “anchoring argument.” According to this argument, if the operating and 
stock performance of firms prior to issuing is positive then investors might be too 
optimistic about the prospects of issuing firms. However, if these past trends do not 
continue then operating performance would revert to a mean, on average, and long-run 
negative abnormal returns should result because investors are disappointed.  
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Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) use a sample of 44,986 different types of security 
offerings over the period 1980-2000. They match firms based on the book-to-market ratio 
to measure abnormal returns. They report that for industrial issuers, the five-year difference 
in the buy-and-hold returns of issuers and matched-firms ranges from  -52.9% for preferred 
equity placements to -13.2% for private placements of debt. For   SEOs the corresponding 
figure is -29.7%.  The buy-and-hold abnormal return difference for straight debt issues are -
17.0% while that for convertible debt is 40.4%. All these results are statistically significant 
at the 1% level and were obtained using the equal-weighting method. When Eckbo, Masulis 
and Norli (2006) use value-weighting method to measure buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
however, they find that none of the buy-and-hold differences are statistically significant at 
the 1% level except for straight debt issues.  Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) note that 
there is no evidence of under-performance and some evidence of significant over-
performance relative to the matched firms for security issuers operating in the finance 
industry. Furthermore, value weighting has no impact on the performance measure for these 
firms. 
 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) also use the Fama-French model to generate 
portfolio returns.  They find that the alphas are significant and negative for private 
placements of equity and for private placements of straight debt. They also contend that the 
negative underperformance following straight debt issues is puzzling because debt has a 
low adverse selection problem and it also reflects management’s optimistic belief about a 
firm’s future growth prospects.  
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1997) and a turnover factor (Eckbo and Norli, 2005), Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) find 
that all alpha estimates are insignificant across all security types. Assuming the added 
factors are indeed priced risk factors, they conclude that no evidence is found against the 
null hypothesis of zero post-issue abnormal performance. 
 
3.2.1.2. Straight and convertible debt offerings. 
 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) examine the long-term performance of stocks 
following both straight and convertible debt offerings.  Using a sample of 392 straight debt 
issuers over the period from 1975 to 1989, they find that the median sample firm under-
performs a matched firm of similar size and book-to-market ratio by almost 19% in the five 
years following the debt offering. For their sample of 400 convertible debt issuers, they also 
find that the median firm underperforms its matched counterpart by almost 20% in the five 
years following the convertible debt offering. The mean holding-period return for the 
sample firms is 37% less than the matched firms.  
 
They also find that the post-issue under-performance of straight debt issuers is more 
pronounced with smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-listed firms. For the largest straight debt 
issuers, they find no evidence of under-performance. When controlling for risk differences 
by matching firms on the basis of size and the book-to-market ratio, Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1999, 47) note that “it is possible that size and book-to-market ratio do not 
adequately capture the risk difference between issuers and matched non-issuers.” They cite 
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long-run event studies. According to Fama (1998), generally the magnitude of abnormal 
returns in these studies is not robust when alternative specifications of expected returns or 
alternative subsets of the data are used. 
 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) address this problem using two approaches. In 
the first approach, they measure long-run performance using averages of short-run 
abnormal returns rather than long-run buy-and-hold returns. They do this in two ways – 
they use the ‘rolling portfolio’ approach of Fama (1998) and the three-factor regression 
approach recommended by Fama and French (1993).  Using equally weighted portfolios, 
they find that both methods yield results consistent with buy-and-hold evidence that firms 
experience significant under-performance following both straight and convertible debt 
offerings. In the second approach and in the context of buy-and-hold returns, they examine 
two alternative benchmarks of expected returns: individual matched firms based on 
industry and firm size; and the reference portfolio benchmark. They find evidence of 
significant underperformance following both straight and convertible debt offerings. They 
claim that even though they are unable to disentangle the market under-reaction from the 
bad model problem, they do present strong evidence that their results are robust to a 
number of specifications and methodologies. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999, 46) 
conclude that “firms that are overvalued are likely to issue securities of any type, and those 
debt offerings, like equity offerings, are a signal that the firm is overvalued.”  
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Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) use a sample of 619 publicly traded firms 
during the 1980-1996 period to examine the long-run performance following private 
placements.  Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002, 2596) seek to explain the fact that 
“while announcements of public issues, on average, are associated with negative stock-
price effects, private issues are associated with positive stock-price effects.”   
 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) find that firms that issue equity privately 
appear to significantly underperform relative to several benchmarks over the three-year 
period following the offering even though they experience a positive stock-price reaction at 
the announcement. They adopt two approaches to measure long-run abnormal stock-price 
performance following private placements of equity. First, they follow the benchmark 
performance approach used by Barber and Lyon (1997) and use an “appropriately selected 
single control firm” for each sample firm. To overcome the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence in returns inherent in this method as pointed out by Fama (1998), Hertzel, 
Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) also estimate abnormal returns using the calendar time 
portfolio approach which was introduced by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974).  
 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) find stock-price performance is 
abnormally low following positive announcement period returns. They report that in the 
three-year period following private equity issue announcements the mean raw buy-and-hold 
abnormal return is only 0.2%. However, when compared with matched firms based on a 
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23.8%. They conclude that “investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms that 
issue equity, regardless of the method of issuance.”  
 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) interpret their results in terms of the 
under-reaction hypothesis which predicts continued positive stock-price performance 
following the announcement. They also interpret their results in terms of “windows of 
opportunity” framework which reasons that investor’s over-optimism associated with the 
windows of opportunity predicting long-run post-announcement under-performance. Given 
the positive mean stock-price reaction at the announcement and their evidence of negative 
post-announcement abnormal stock-price performance, they interpret that their results are 
not consistent with the under-reaction hypothesis. Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) 
also test whether the announcement period return is a constant fraction of the long-run 
return. In other words, they test whether a firm’s announcement period abnormal return is 
positively correlated with its long-run abnormal return. They find that the correlations 
between these returns are small in absolute magnitude and most of them are negative.   
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002, 2607) note that there is “no behavioral theory that 
can explain why investors would systematically react in the wrong direction to an 
announcement.” 
 
In terms of windows of opportunity theory, Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees 
(2002) offer a possible explanation. That is managers may be too optimistic about the 
firm’s prospects and investors (including the private placement investors) who are looking 
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questions about the nature of private placement discounts. They argue that their evidence of 
post-announcement underperformance raises an alternative possibility that private 
placement discounts reflect “informed investors’ assessment of true (lower) firm value.” 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002, 2613).argue that this possibility is “particularly 
troubling for the efficient market view” since in their study the discounts are known on the 
announcement date of the issue. 
 
3.2.2. OTHER NON-BANK-LOAN CORPORATE EVENTS. 
 
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) investigate the long-term performance of Japanese 
security-issuing firms using a sample comprising 888 equity offerings and 1,329 
convertible bond offerings. They examine whether long-term performance following these 
corporate events can be explained by the underreaction hypothesis.  According to this 
hypothesis the market impounds only part of the information content in the share price at 
the announcement of a corporate event. Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) reason that if the 
market fails to impound information in stock prices quickly then it is not efficient, and 
short-window event studies provide biased estimates of the shareholder wealth effect of 
corporate events. They report that in the US, the evidence shows that equity and convertible 
debt issues are bad news for the issuing firms. Thus, if the market under-reacts to the 
announcement of such issues, they should be followed by poor abnormal performance. 
However, this is not the case in Japan where the stock price reactions are significantly 
positive following announcements of equity and convertible debt issues. Thus, according to 
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not under-perform firms that do not. 
 
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) also examine private issues. They reason that such 
offerings make it possible for management to convey private information to the buyers of 
the newly issued securities. They cite the work of Hertzel and Smith (1993) who argue that 
private information explains why announcements of private equity sales have a significant 
positive average abnormal return in the US. Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) report that private 
issues in Japan also have positive announcement returns. They reason that these 
announcements do not appear to occur as a response of management to a temporary 
overvaluation of a firm’s equity. These authors’ findings of negative long-term abnormal 
returns following private issues are inconsistent with the over-reaction hypothesis which 
states that negative long-term abnormal returns following equity issues occur because of a 
temporary over-valuation corrected by the market over time. 
 
 Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) find that major investments are followed by 
significant equity long-run under-performance and suggest that financing decisions do 
affect these long-run returns. In particular, they report that the extent of underperformance 
is greater for internal investments compared to that for acquisitions, and for any debt-
financed investment. They interpret this result as a challenge to “conventional wisdom” that 
debt serves as “a discipline device” or new equity issues trigger “active monitors” by 
outsiders.  
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associated with significant under-performance. In contrast, they find that all categories of 
externally-financed internal investments and most externally-financed acquisitions give rise 
to negative mean abnormal returns. Their results are robust for both equal-weighting and 
value-weighting methods. 
 
Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 19) interpret their results as indicating that 
“financing (debt versus equity) and investment (built versus acquired) choices have 
important interaction effects that influence firm value.” Furthermore, “large investments 
per se do not generate poor performance.”  They conclude that large investment outlays are 
followed by poor stock returns and that internally-funded projects do not elicit inferior 
long-run performance.  
 
In the next section, I review long-term performance of borrowing firms following 
bank loans.  
 
3.2.3. LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BORROWERS FOLLOWING 
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BANK LOANS 
 
One form of debt financing is bank loans and prior research (James, 1987) indicates 
that bank loans are unique.  Fama (1985) argues that bank loans are inside debt and 
suggests that small firms without access to external debt may find the contracting costs of 
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worthiness and that reduces the costs associated with other forms of financing. James 
(1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (1993), and Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (1995) focus on the share price response to the announcement of bank loans.  
They report that bank loan announcements favourably impact the borrowers’ equity value.   
 
In the area of long-run performance of firms following announcements of bank 
loans, however, exiting literature is limited. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) is the 
only paper that examines the long-run performance of firms following loan announcements.  
 
   Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) use the data set collected in Billett, Flannery, 
and Garfinkel (1995) which contains 1,468 announced loan agreements between non-
financial borrowers and banks or nonbank lenders during the calendar years 1980 through 
1989. They augment this sample using all loans contained in the Loan Pricing Corporation 
(LPC) database for the period 1988-2000. Their final sample contains a total of 10,619 
loans from 1980-2000. 
 
Reviewing existing literature, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 734) note: 
“Although the short-run valuation effects of security issuances are consistent with the 
existing theory of asymmetrically informed outside investors, recent work on the long-run 
performance following security issuance has raised doubts about interpreting event study 
outcomes.” They report that during the subsequent three to five years, the issuing firms' 
share prices under-perform the relevant benchmarks by 4% to 10% per year. They argue 
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the implications of public security issuances.” 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) argue that bank loan financing can be a major 
event for borrowing firms. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 734) point out that “While 
long-term performance following public security issuance has been thoroughly examined, 
the long-run performance of firms following private debt agreements is relatively 
unexplored. Yet private debt constitutes a very important source of credit for the economy. 
Bank loans provide approximately 30% of all US non-financial corporations’ outstanding 
liabilities.” 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) examine the uniqueness of bank loans from a 
long-run perspective. Specifically, they examine long-run stock returns, operating 
performance, and earnings announcement abnormal returns over the three years following 
the loan announcement. 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) report the concern that major equity 
financing events such as IPOs and SEOs can contaminate the sample under study and lead 
researchers to infer inappropriately that loan announcements are causing long-run 
underperformance. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006), however, find no evidence that 
IPOs and SEOs contaminate the long-run underperformance of borrowing firms in the case 
of bank loans. 
 
  134Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 734) argue that “measurement of long-run 
abnormal returns has been a contentious topic in the finance literature.” They use a variety 
of techniques to measure long-run abnormal returns, including BHARs, Fama-French 
“alphas”, and calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs).  Using these techniques, Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 734) find “economically and statistically significant 
underperformance in the wake of bank loans.” They find that although the initial response 
is positive, firm performance over the subsequent three years is negative. They select peer 
firms on the basis of size and book-to-market ratio, size and industry, or size and 
momentum. They find that loan announcing firms underperformed their style-matched 
counterparts. Both the mean (-32.7%) and median (-10.3%) three-year BHARs are 
significantly negative at the 1% level. Furthermore, they find that this underperformance is 
not concentrated in any one of the three post-loan years. Using the Fama-French three-
factor model, they show that in all three years following the loan announcement, the 
underperformance ranges between 3.2% and 3.5% per year with over 95% confidence. 
They find that firms announcing private lending agreements substantially under-perform 
over the long run, just as equity and public debt issuers do. In the five years following a 
loan announcement, the mean (median) buy-and-hold abnormal returns for their sample of 
loan announcing firms is –53.29% (-33.67%). This finding is in contrast with initial 
positive announcement effects documented in existing literature.  Comparing their results 
with those of Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) who report an insignificant  mean BHAR 
of -14.3% for straight bond issues during the five years after the issue, Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006) conclude that from a peer-adjusted long-run return perspective, loan 
announcers are similar to SEO and public debt issuers in their future underperformance. 
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When Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) evaluate operating performance of 
borrowers in the post-loan period, they find that bank borrowers were performing poorly in 
the year prior to the loan announcement and this poor performance continues in the 
subsequent three years. Specifically, using size and book-to-market matched peers for five 
years surrounding the loan announcements, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) report 
that borrowers exhibit significantly negative peer-adjusted operating performance 
(operating income before depreciation to total assets) during the interval (0, +1). They 
argue that this indicates that “borrowers under-perform peers on an operating basis in the 
year of the loan and the year following” (745). In other years (-1, +2, and +3), they report 
median peer-adjusted operating performance is negative but insignificant. In addition, when 
they measure operating performance using net income, they find more pronounced 
evidence of negative performance. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 746) document 
that “Peer-adjusted NI/SALES and NI/TA are negative in every year from the fiscal year 
preceding the loan through the third fiscal year following it.” They conclude that “Taken 
together, these results suggest that the negative long-term returns are due, at least in part, to 
poor operating performance.” 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) also examine the market reaction to quarterly 
earnings announcements over the three-year post-announcement period. They reason that to 
the extent that the market learns from earnings news, one would expect to see evidence of 
the long-run performance in the short-term event window around earnings announcements. 
Using the standard deviation of a time series of abnormal returns to quarterly earnings 
  136announcements to measure information asymmetry, they document two findings. First, 
compared to a set of control firms, bank borrowers exhibit more volatile responses to their 
earnings announcements. Second, they also find that earnings announcement returns are 
significantly more volatile post-loan than pre-loan. This is in contrast with what should be 
expected in existing literature. According to the literature because banks mitigate 
asymmetric information problems, one would expect less volatile price reactions to 
earnings announcement in the post-loan era. Their results show the opposite. Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 735) conclude that “bank loans do not reduce information 
asymmetries.” 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) claim their results also contribute to the 
general literature on the theory of market efficiency. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 
736) argue:  “Not only do bank loans exhibit positive average announcement effects 
followed by negative average long-run returns, but the subset of bank loans with strictly 
positive announcement returns is also followed by significantly negative long-run returns.” 
They claim this is the first robust evidence of reversal of the announcement returns in the 
long run.  
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) argue that if bank loans are truly special then 
more research is needed to ascertain the source of this “specialness.” Based on their 
findings, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006, 736) conclude “Apparently, the market is 
not only initially wrong about the magnitude of the loan’s effect on firm value, it’s wrong 
about the direction of the effect in many cases as well.” Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 
  137(2006, 744) also conclude that “bank loans do not appear to be nearly so “special” as 
previously thought.” These conclusions are certainly challenges to the existing literature on 
bank loans and market efficiency, which requires further study and testing. 
 
3.2.4. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW ON LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
FOLLOWING CORPORATE EVENTS. 
 
 
In summary, the evidence is widespread that firms that announce corporate events 
tend to have abnormal performance compared to non-event-announcing firms. Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2006) find that the long-run abnormal performance depends on the 
methodology and the weighting scheme used.  The literature reports a negative long-run 
abnormal performance for SEO-issuing firms. The leading explanation is that the long-run 
underperformance is just a correction of optimistic expectations regarding future earnings 
as perceived by the investors. Brous, Datar and Kini (2001), however, find that this is not 
the case and that investors are not disappointed by earnings announcements following 
SEOs. 
 
Firms that issue straight and convertible debt also experience long-run 
underperformance compared to firms matched on size and book-to-market.  However, there 
is evidence that the post-issue underperformance of straight debt issuers is concentrated 
among small firms. In Japan, Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) report evidence of 
overperformance following equity offerings and convertible bond offerings.   
  138Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) find bank loan borrowers suffer negative 
performance in the subsequent three and five years. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) 
remark that it is surprising that long-term performance following security issuance is 
generally negative.  
 
Table 3.1 below gives a summary of the main papers reviewed in this section and 
their main findings. 
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Table 3.1:   Summary of literature review on long-term performance following 
corporate events. 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or arguments  Research  
Implication 
Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 
(1999) 
Long-term 
performance 
following 
straight debt 
and convertible 
debt issues for 
period 1975-
1989. 
Straight debt issuers 
underperformed size and book-to-
market matched firms by 19% and 
the corresponding figure for 
convertible debt is 20% in the 
subsequent five years 
Firms that are overvalued are 
likely to issue securities of any 
type. 
Long-term 
performance 
is dependent 
on the type of 
debt. 
The validity 
of the 
pecking order 
theory is 
questionable. 
Kang, Kim and 
Stulz (1999) 
Long-term 
performance of 
Japanese 
security-issuing 
firms. 
Stock price reactions are 
significantly positive following 
announcements of equity and 
convertible debt issues. 
The performance of firms issuing 
equity privately is not different 
from that of firms issuing equity 
publicly. 
Cross-
country 
examination 
of security 
issuance 
might shed 
further light 
on 
determinants 
of security 
issuance. 
Denis and Sarin 
(2001) 
Stock price 
reaction to 
earnings 
announcements 
following 
SEOs. 
Significant negative stock price 
reaction following SEOs (-0.21%). 
Comparison 
with other 
security 
issuances is 
necessary. 
Hertzel, 
Lemmon, Linck 
and Rees (2002) 
Long-run 
performance 
following 
private 
placements 
(1980-1996). 
Issuing firms underperformed 
matched firms by 23.8% in 
subsequent three years.  
Investors are overoptimistic about 
the prospects of firms that issue 
equity, regardless of the method of 
issuance. 
Investor 
behaviour 
might 
influence 
long-term 
performance  
Clarke, Dunbar 
and Kahle (2004) 
Market timing 
and long-run 
performance 
 There is evidence of market 
timing. 
Firms might 
market time 
over the long 
run. 
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Table 3.1:   Summary of literature review on long-term performance following 
corporate events (contd.). 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or arguments  Research  
Implication 
Elsas, Flannery 
and Garfinkel 
(2006) 
Major 
investments, 
firm financing 
and long-run 
performance 
Major investments are followed by 
significant equity under-
performance. The extent of 
underperformance is greater for 
built investments compared to that 
for acquisitions and for any debt-
financed investment. 
Investment size 
might 
influence the 
order of 
security 
issuance. 
Eckbo, Masulis 
and Norli (2006) 
Security 
offerings and 
long-term 
performance. 
Using equal weighting, under-
performance for industrial issuers 
in the subsequent five years are: 
52.9% for preferred equity 
placements; 13.2% for private 
placements of debt;  18% for 
IPOs; and 29.7% for SEOs. All 
significant at 1% level. 
Value weighting has no impact on 
the performance measure of 
issuing firms. 
Different 
weighting 
systems might 
lead to 
different 
results. 
Billett, Flannery 
and Garfinkel 
(2006). 
Long-term 
performance 
following 
announcements 
of bank loans 
Loan announcing firms under-
performed style-matched firms in 
the subsequent three years.  
Operating performance of 
borrowers was poor in the year 
prior to loan announcement and in 
the subsequent three years. 
Bank loans do not reduce 
information asymmetry. 
Loan announcements are 
misinterpreted by the market, both 
in the magnitude of their effect on 
firm value and the direction of it. 
Bank loans do not appear to be 
special. 
If Billett, 
Flannery and 
Garfinkel’s 
(2006) findings 
are valid then 
the whole 
literature on 
bank loans is 
questionable.  
Are bank loans 
associated with 
negative 
earnings 
announcement?
Information 
asymmetry 
(Transparency) 
following 
announcements 
of bank loans 
needs further 
research. 
  141Table 3.2 below summarises stock price response to announcements of corporate 
events over long term.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of stock price response over the long-term following 
announcements of corporate events. 
   Period used  Long-term 
Study  for calculation  abnormal returns 
   (year)   (%)  
Seasoned equity offerings       
        
   Loughran and Ritter (1995)  5   -8.00 
   Spiess and Affleck_Graves (1995)  5   -30.00 
   Denis and Sarin (2001)  5   -0.21 
   Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006)  5  -29.70 
    
 Straight and convertible debt       
    
    Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999)  
     (straigth debt)  5   -19.00 
    Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999)  
     (convertible debt)  5   -20.00 
     Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006)  
     (straight debt)  5  -17.00 
    Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006)  
    (convertible debt)  5  40.40 
    
Bank loans    
    
   Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel    
   (2006)  3  and 5  -32.70 and - 53.29  
 
In the next section, I review the capital structure issues and discuss the relevance of these 
issues to my study. 
 
 
  1423.2.5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE ISSUES 
 
An issue that has received substantial attention in the financial literature relates to 
the effect of financing decisions on the value of equity.  As mentioned earlier in the 
introduction section, in this essay I integrate the two lines of financial research by merging 
capital structure issues with the role of banks in reducing information asymmetry and 
providing financial slack. For this reason, in this section I review the three main capital 
structure theories. 
 
3.2.5.1. Trade-Off Theory 
 
Trade-off theory evolved from the original Modigliani and Miller (1958) article that 
was based on a number of restrictive assumptions. These include no transaction costs, no 
taxes or inflation, interest rates are the same for both borrowers and lenders, and there is no 
dependency between financing and investment decisions. According to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), given these assumptions capital structure is not important. That is, a firm’s 
value depends on the value of its assets and cannot be changed by changing the firm’s 
capital structure.  As the stringent assumptions were relaxed, however, firms consider 
whether to adjust to an optimal capital structure.
10 This issue arises because certain factors 
such as taxes favour debt financing and others such as financial distress favour equity.  
Generally, researchers would retain the assumptions of symmetric information and market 
                                                 
10 Huang and Ritter (2005) report evidence in literature (for example Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) and 
Graham (2003)) that the statutory corporate tax rate may have a major influence on the financing decisions of 
US firms. 
  143efficiency.  The problem of asset substitution is also considered in the due process because 
it can disadvantage bondholders vis-à-vis shareholders.  It is well-known that companies 
with debt outstanding can substitute higher-risk for lower-risk investments. On the other 
hand, too much free cash flow can lead to agency issues between managers and 
shareholders. 
 
In the trade-off theory, the optimal debt-equity ratios or the optimal capital structure 
is determined by trading off the benefits of debt with the costs (Krauss and Litzenberger, 
1973). According to this theory, debt allows firms to deduct interest expense from its tax 
liability. This is the primary benefit of debt. As for the costs of debt, Miller (1977) lists the 
primary costs of debt as those associated with financial distress and the personal tax that 
bondholders have to pay on the income they receive.  According to Myers (1984), if firms 
follow the trade-off theory then they set a target leverage ratio and gradually move towards 
the target. Firms determine the target by balancing debt tax shields against costs of 
bankruptcy. 
 
Banerjee, Heshmati and Whilborg (2000) attempt to empirically determine the 
factors that affect the optimal debt levels by distinguishing between the observed debt 
ratios and estimates of the implied optimal levels. Banerjee, Heshmati and Whilborg (2000, 
1) claim that by doing so they are able to “capture the dynamics of capital structure 
adjustments.” They find that tangibility of assets, size of the firm, and expected growth 
affect optimal leverage positively, while profitability and the variability of operating profits 
have a negative influence on optimal leverage. They also show that firms’ observed 
  144leverage is frequently different from their target leverage and bigger firms take longer to 
adjust their leverage levels. 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct a survey of 392 CFOs of companies operating 
in the US and Canada. According to this survey, the corporate tax advantage is considered 
to be moderately important in the company’s capital structure decision. However, the tax 
advantage is most important for large, regulated, and dividend-paying firms. The survey 
also shows that out of eleven debt policy factors, financial flexibility is the most important 
factor.  Graham and Harvey (2001), however, find no significant evidence that firms 
directly consider personal taxes when making their debt or equity decisions. Graham and 
Harvey (2001, 211) infer that “firms are unlikely to target investors in certain tax 
clienteles.” In relation to the optimal or target debt-equity ratio, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
report mixed support for the trade-off theory. In their survey, they report that large firms 
are more likely to have target debt ratios. Of the large firms, 55% have at least somewhat 
strict target ratios. The corresponding figure for small firms is only 36%. As for deviations 
from the target debt ratio, they also find that firms do not rebalance in response to market 
equity movements. They report that few firms state that changes in the price of equity 
affects their debt policy.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that firms do not adjust their capital structure 
toward an optimal structure because either the adjustment costs are too large or the penalty 
for deviating from the optimal structure is too small to make the adjustment within a 10-
year span worthwhile.    
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Ju, Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2005, 279) develop a dynamic model of 
optimal capital structure which contains a number of features designed to capture “key 
elements of the capital structure decision.” These include “contingent claim valuation of tax 
shields, a bankruptcy boundary on firm value below which firms default, and a target 
capital structure at which the firm refinances its debt at maturity.”  
 
Ju, Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach’s (2005) model does not predict that firms are 
under-levered. Using a sample of 5,519 firms for the period 2001-2004, they find that the 
predicted ratio of debt to total capital in their model is 15.29% compared with 22.62% for 
the median firm in the Compustat database in 2000. Therefore, they conclude that firms 
tend not to use too little leverage in practice. They also find that the costs are relatively 
small for a firm whose capital structure deviates from optimal. 
 
Huang and Ritter (2005) also examine whether firms quickly adjust towards target 
leverage. According to Huang and Ritter (2005, 4) “if firms adjust quickly, then market 
timing will have only short-lived effects on capital structure, even if it is an important 
motivation in securities issuance decisions.”  They point out that the issue of adjustment 
towards target leverage is perhaps ‘the most important issue in capital structure research 
today.” They find that firms only slowly adjust toward their optimal capital structure after 
firm fixed effects have been controlled and the short time dimension bias has been 
corrected. They interpret this as supporting evidence for the market timing theory. They 
  146also find no evidence that firms with lower adjustment costs adjust faster than firms with 
higher adjustment costs. 
 
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006) examine the evolution of the cross-sectional 
distribution of leverage ratios for a sample of firms over a twenty year period (1983-2003) 
and find that firms tend to maintain their leverage ratios over this period. In other words, 
their capital structures are stable over time. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006, 2) reason 
that “given the importance of firm specific heterogeneity in leverage, as well as other 
aspects of the firm (e.g. investment and production), parameter estimates ignoring firm 
specific effects are suspect.” They find that the cross-sectional differences in leverage ratios 
were explained largely (90%) by firm fixed effects whereas determinants previously 
identified in the literature (e.g., size, market-to-book, and industry) explain less than 10% 
of these differences. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006, 30) find that “firms tend to 
maintain their leverage ratios in relatively narrow bands by rebalancing their capital 
structures with their debt policy and, to a lesser extent, their equity policy.” Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2006, 30) find that “capital structure is best characterized by a 
dynamic tradeoff strategy with costly adjustment.” Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006, 
30) conclude that their findings “are not consistent with the market timing, the pecking 
order, or equity price inertia theories as explanations for cross-section of capital structure” 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that non-financial firms identified and pursued a 
target capital structure during the period 1966-2001. When they estimate the speed of 
adjustment toward target leverage with a partial adjustment model, Flannery and Rangan 
  147(2006, 471) find that “the typical firm converges toward its long-run target at a rate of more 
than 30% per year.” They show their results are robust across size classes and time periods. 
They also find that although share price fluctuations can have a short-term impact on 
market debt ratios, these transitory effects are offset within a few years by firms’ efforts to 
reach a target capital structure. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2006, 3) use the term “static trade-off theory” to refer to the 
hypothesis that “bankruptcy and taxes are the key factors that determine leverage within a 
static model.” They draw a distinction between the static trade-off theory and the target 
adjustment hypothesis. According to the latter hypothesis, firms adjust their leverages 
towards a target so that deviations from the target are gradually eliminated. Frank and 
Goyal (2006) report “The target adjustment hypothesis receives much clearer empirical 
support than does either the static trade-off theory or the pecking order theory.”  
 
Frank and Goyal (2006, 3) point out that “In the static trade-off theory it is the 
desire to limit tax payments that motivates a firm to use debt financing.” More 
interestingly, they also indicate that “Corporate income taxes are only about a century old. 
Debt financing was common long before the introduction of corporate income taxes.” 
Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2006, 4) argue “it is actually quite difficult to match the 
observed leverage ratios in particular decades with the corporate income taxes in those 
decades.” 
 
  148Frank and Goyal (2006, 18) also note that “much of the work on dynamic trade-off 
models is fairly recent…” and “has already fundamentally altered our understanding of 
mean reversion, the role of profits, the role of retained earnings, and path dependence. As a 
result, the trade-off class of models now appears much more promising than it did even just 
a few years ago.” 
 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) note that the existing literature on capital structure 
suggests that firms have a target debt ratio.  The target is determined by the trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of debt versus equity. They examine how cash flows, 
investment expenditures, and stock price histories affect capital structure choices and the 
extent to which the effect of these history variables are subsequently reversed. Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) focus on a number of history variables that proxy a number of determinants 
of change in capital structure of firms.  These include past profitability, financial deficits, 
past stock returns, market timing, leverage deficit and change in target. To examine long-
term (five and ten year) effects of these variables on the capital structure of firms, they 
regress change in debt ratios on these variables. In addition, they examine how changes in 
capital structure caused by these variables are subsequently reversed. Kayhan and Titman 
(2007, 3) believe that these regressions provide “additional insights on the extent to which 
deviations from a firm’s target capital structure influences future financing choices and 
complement the partial adjustment regressions that attempt to estimate the speed with 
which deviations between actual and target debt ratios are subsequently closed.” 
 
  149Kayhan and Titman (2007) use a sample of 54,328 firm-year observations for firms 
between 1960 and 2003. They use a two-step procedure to estimate the determinants of 
changes in the debt ratio. In the first step, they construct a proxy for the target leverage 
ratio as the predicted value from a regression of debt ratios on tradeoff variables used in 
prior cross-sectional studies (e.g., Shyam and Myers (1999) and  Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman (2001)). They use this target leverage proxy to construct a leverage deficit variable 
which is the difference between the target leverage ratio and the leverage ratio at the 
beginning of the period. In the second step, they estimate a regression of changes in the 
debt ratio on the leverage deficit, changes in the leverage ratio, and the history variables 
that proxy the determinants mentioned above.  Kayhan and Titman (2007, 13) find that “the 
financial deficit, stock returns, and the leverage deficit have important effects on changes in 
the debt ratios, while the effects of the other variables are relatively minor.” More 
specifically, they observe that “a one standard deviation increase in stock returns decreases 
book leverage by 3.98% and market leverage by 14.29%. In addition, a one standard 
deviation increase in the leverage deficit decreases book leverage by 7.26% and market 
leverage by 6.63%.” They find that “firms are also responsive to changes in their target 
debt ratios; a 1% increase in the standard deviation of the change in the target leads to a 
1.85% increase in the book debt ratio and a 3.33% increase in the market debt ratio.” 
 
In summary, firms view external funds as less desirable because of information 
asymmetry inherent in public markets. There exists some evidence that firms do adjust 
toward an optimal capital structure. However, this action depends on the costs of such an 
adjustment relative to the associated benefits. A number of other factors can also affect 
  150firms’ decisions whether to make the adjustment. These include firms’ profitability, value 
of tax shield, tangibility of assets, firm size and expected growth. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) find that non-financial firms identified and pursued a target capital structure.   
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006, 30) find that “firms tend to maintain their leverage 
ratios in relatively narrow bands by rebalancing their capital structures with their debt 
policy and, to a lesser extent, their equity policy.” Frank and Goyal (2006) discuss static 
versus dynamic trade-off models. As pointed out by Huang and Ritter (2005) the issue of 
adjustment towards target leverage is ‘the most important issue in capital structure research 
today.” Table 3.3 below summarises the literature on the trade-off theory.
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Table 3.3:   Summary of literature review on Trade-Off theory 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Myers (1984) 
and Myers and 
Majluf (1984).  
Trade-off 
theory and 
Pecking order 
theory 
External funds are less 
desirable because they are 
undervalued from the 
perspective of information 
asymmetry. 
Firms prefer to use external 
funds in the following order: 
debt, convertible securities and 
equity. 
Information 
asymmetry is the 
cause of firm’s 
preference in 
choosing security 
instruments. 
Banerjee, 
Heshmati and 
Whilborg (2000) 
The dynamics 
of capital 
structure 
adjustments 
Tangibility of assets, firm size 
and expect growth affect 
optimal leverage positively. 
Profitability have negative 
influence on optimal leverage 
Firm’s 
characteristics 
can explain the 
adjustment 
toward optimal 
leverage. 
Graham and 
Harvey (2001) 
Capital 
structure 
theories and 
firm’s practices. 
Firms use their financial 
flexibility to make future 
expansions and acquisitions. 
 
-  Any financing 
decision that 
enhances 
financial 
flexibility will be 
valued by firms 
and the market. 
Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) 
Market timing 
and optimal 
capital structure 
Leverage is strongly negatively 
related to the market-to-book 
ratio. 
Capital structure is the 
cumulative outcome of 
attempts to time the equity 
market. 
Firms do not adjust their 
capital structure toward an 
optimal structure 
Capital structure 
is likely to be 
associated with 
market timing 
activities by 
firms. 
Ju Parrino, 
Poteshman and 
Weisbach (2005) 
Key elements of 
capital structure 
decisions 
Firms do not tend to use too 
little leverage in practice. 
The costs are relatively small 
for a firm whose capital 
structure deviates from its 
optimal capital structure. 
The use of 
leverage depends 
on firm’s 
operations rather 
than the 
adjustment of 
leverage per se. 
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TABLE 3.3:   Summary of literature review on Trade-Off theory (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Huang and Ritter 
(2005) 
Market timing 
theory of capital 
structure 
If firms adjust quickly toward 
a target capital structure, then 
market timing will have only 
short-lived effects on capital 
structure, even if it is an 
important motivation in 
securities issuance decisions. 
 
The issue of 
adjustment 
towards target 
leverage should 
be considered in 
capital structure 
research today. 
Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) 
Partial 
adjustment and 
target capital 
structure 
The typical firm converges 
toward its long-run target at a 
rate of more than 30% per 
year. 
If firms do adjust 
toward an 
optimal capital 
structure, partial 
adjustment 
appears to be 
more likely than 
complete 
adjustment?  
Frank and Goyal 
(2006) and 
Lemmon, 
Roberts, and 
Zender (2006) 
Trade-off and 
pecking theories 
of debt. 
Leverage 
stationarity over 
time.  
The target adjustment 
hypothesis has clearer 
empirical support than the 
static trade-off theory or the 
pecking order theory. 
Standard versions of trade-off 
and pecking order theory are 
not adequate. 
Leverage is stationary over the 
long run. 
Relative merits 
of theories of 
capital structure 
can be tested and 
compared. 
Stationarity of 
leverage implies 
optimal capital 
structure? 
Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) 
Effect of history 
variables on 
capital structure 
choices (1960-
2003) 
The relation between  leverage 
and financial deficit is weak 
and the relation can be 
reversed for firms with high 
market-to-book ratios. 
Financial deficit has a stronger 
effect on capital structure 
when it is positive than when it 
is negative. 
Effects of history 
variables on 
firm’s capital 
structure should 
be considered. 
 
 
 
  1533.2.5.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 
In addition to the trade-off theory, there are alternative explanations of capital 
structure based on asymmetric information. The most well-known alternative is the 
pecking-order model of financing hierarchy. According to this model, firms do not target a 
specific debt ratio and use external financing only when they are short of internal funds. 
The reason for this choice is based on the notion of information asymmetry. According to 
the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Myers, 1984), external funds are 
less desirable because they are undervalued from the perspective of information 
asymmetry.  Therefore, firms would prefer to use external funds in the following order: 
debt, convertible securities and as a last resort, equity. In their work, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) assume that firms try to maintain financial slack to avoid the use of external 
financing. Thus, if firms value financial flexibility then this is consistent with the pecking-
order theory.  
 
Reviewing the existing literature, Rajan (1992, 1367) argues that “while the benefits 
of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not.” He argues that while 
informed banks can prevent firm’s projects from “going awry”, they can also take 
advantage of their position to gain more bargaining power over the firm’s profits and he 
argues this is part of the cost of this credit.  In response to this undesirable situation, firms 
make choices of borrowing sources and the choice of priority of debt claims to “optimally 
circumscribe the powers of banks.” 
 
  154Rajan (1992) presents a model in which the cost of bank debt is endogenous. This is 
in sharp contrast with much of existing literature which assumes the costs of bank debt to 
be exogenous. He considers an owner-managed firm with a “project idea”. In relation to 
bank loans, he considers a short-term and a long-term contract. Rajan (1992, 1368) defines 
the short-term contract as one where “the bank requires repayment of the loan after the state 
is realized.” The long-term contract is one where “the bank can require repayment only 
when the project is completed.” Rajan (1992) points out both the benefit and cost of a bank 
debt in the case of a short-term contract. The benefit is that since the bank is an informed 
lender it can prevent the owner from continuing a negative NPV venture by demanding 
payment. The cost is the bank can also demand repayment when continuation of the project 
is efficient. This means that the borrowing firm has to share its profit with the bank and 
consequently the owner of the firm exerts lower effort than optimal and a lower return from 
the project will result.  On the other hand, in the case of long-term bank contracts, the bank 
can no longer extract part of the profit from the firm. A new problem arises in this case 
because the bank cannot demand repayment when continuation of the project is inefficient.  
Consequently, the owner has less incentive to avoid undesirable states (i.e. negative NPV 
states).  
 
Rajan (1992, 1369) also argues that in contrast to banks, “arm’s length lenders have 
no control over the owner’s continuation decision.” Furthermore, a contract with an arm’s 
length investor gives the owner greater incentive to exert effort than both short-term and 
long-term bank contracts. He, therefore, concludes that “the welfare effect of borrowing 
from a bank rather than arm’s length sources is ambiguous; the benefit of being bank-
  155controlled has to be weighed against the costs of distortions in the owner’s incentives to 
exert efforts.”  
 
Rajan (1992, 1370) also shows that “changes in priority alter the inside bank’s 
control and thus influence the owner’s incentives to exert effort.” In addition, the allocation 
of priority of the debt claims and the amount of borrowing from different sources can 
change the bank’s ability to extract rents as well as its ability to control the firm. 
 
  Rajan’s (1992) model predicts that firms with high-quality projects will issue 
public debt, while medium-quality firms will borrow from banks. In the case of low-quality 
firms, his model predicts that arm’s length debt would dominate bank debt because the 
costs of bank monitoring outweigh the benefits. Rajan (1992) also suggests that bank loans 
with shorter maturity would induce more positive announcement effects than bank loans 
with longer maturity.   
 
Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) present a theory of choice of liquid assets when 
outside finance is costly. Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998, 336) reason that “The existence 
of capital market imperfections provides a rationale for significant and predictable amounts 
of excess liquid asset holdings by firms. In particular, if external financing is costly, then 
investment in liquid assets is an optimal response to having to seek costly external 
financing to fund future production needs.” 
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1994 and measure liquidity by using the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book 
value of assets. For their sample, this ratio is 8.1%. They use growth opportunities, cash 
flow volatility, debt ratio, cash flow, and bankruptcy risk explanatory variables. They find 
that although investing in liquidity is costly because liquid assets earn a low rate of return, 
firms may still hold a positive amount of liquid assets given uncertain future internal funds 
and costly external financing. Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998, 355)  find support for their 
model’s prediction that “the optimal investment in liquidity is increasing in the cost of 
external financing, the variance of future cash flows, and the return on future investment 
opportunities, while it is decreasing in the return differential between physical assets and 
liquid assets.”  
 
Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) also note that firms may establish lines of credit 
with banks or commercial paper programs as an alternative to investing in liquid assets. 
Thus, I can infer that firms undertake revolving credit loans in anticipation of future 
investment opportunities. 
 
According to James and Smith (2000) bank loans have characteristics which can 
help banks improve their ability to monitor “informationally-intensive” loans. First, most 
bank loans are collateralised. Second, bank loans typically have stringent covenants that 
require borrowers to maintain a set of financial ratios above a certain minimum. Another 
characteristic of bank loans is that they tend to be short-term. James and Smith (2000) also 
point out that the flexibility offered by lines of credit makes bank loans much more 
  157attractive to borrowers compared to other types of debt. Finally, James and Smith (2000, 
60) report that “the stock price reaction to loan announcements is most positive when 
companies that normally find it advantageous to borrow in public markets instead announce 
a bank loan.”  
 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) examine how firms choose their lenders. They use two 
datasets obtained from Compustat, Moody’s manuals, and Compact Disclosure which 
result in a sample with a total of 5,845 companies. They develop a model based on a simple 
insight that publicly traded and privately held debts have advantages that dominate in 
different situations. They argue that the advantage of privately held debt is that it allows for 
less damaging intervention in distress. Publicly traded obligations, on the other hand, offer 
the security directly to arm’s length investors and hence, they argue, it is especially 
valuable when a firm is less likely to default and the service of an intermediary is less 
needed.  
 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) show that large, profitable companies, with a high 
proportion of tangible assets, and high and stable cash flows tap credit markets directly. On 
the other hand, a firm with poorer prospects is more likely to need the intermediary’s 
reorganization skills. They also show that during investment downturns determinants of 
lender selection are much more critical and that the way firms enter and exit capital markets 
exhibits substantial asymmetries. An additional result is that once a firm has entered the 
markets for publicly traded debt, it will stay there even after their financial situations have 
changed (i.e., after their attributes have fallen well below the original entry level). Finally, 
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“reorganisational skills” but a higher opportunity cost of capital than bondholders. 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find weak evidence for the ‘underinvestment problem’ 
argument. However, they find that growth firms are more likely to be concerned with the 
underinvestment problem than the non-growth firms. Graham and Harvey (2001) report 
that among 38% of firms that seriously considered issuing common equity, earnings 
dilution is the most important factor affecting their decision. The concern is particularly 
pronounced among large, dividend–paying firms. Graham and Harvey (2001) also report 
the work of Graham (2000) who finds that firms use their financial flexibility to make 
future expansions and acquisitions. This is also true after expansion. However, Graham and 
Harvey (2001, 218) indicate that “the importance of flexibility in the survey responses is 
not related to informational asymmetry (size or dividend payout) or growth options in the 
manner suggested by the pecking-order theory.”  Finally, they find that firms are reluctant 
to issue common stock when they perceive it is undervalued. Thus, their findings support 
the pecking-order theory. 
 
Using a sample of 500 non-financial US firms with data extracted from the 
Compustat and CRSP files (NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ) for the 1980-1993 period, 
Hadlock and James (2002) examine whether adverse selection problems influence a firm’s 
choice between new bank debt, public debt, or common stock. They also look at the costs 
and benefits of inside debt.  Hadlock and James (2002, 1383) report that existing theories 
suggest that “a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt 
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bank debt financing as including low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and in the 
case of financial distress, ease of renegotiation. On the other hand, bank debt financing is 
not without potential costs.  
 
Hadlock and James (2002) classify potential costs of borrowing from banks into 
agency costs, monitoring costs, financial distress costs, information monopoly costs, and 
transaction costs. However, according to Hadlock and James (2002, 1384), “a firm’s 
financing choice will depend not on the absolute magnitude of these costs, but rather on the 
magnitude of these costs relative to the firm’s other potential financing choices.” They use 
the term “relative contracting costs” to refer to “the aggregate size of these costs relative to 
public securities.” 
 
Hadlock and James (2002, 1384) reason that “firms tend to sell common stock, and, 
to a lesser extent, risky public debt, when their securities are overvalued by outsiders (i.e. 
the public).” Conversely, they argue that “firms that are undervalued by the public markets 
will be more likely to choose bank debt.” They point out that banks can accurately price a 
firm’s claims and hence alleviate adverse selection problems through “the information 
benefit of bank financing.”  
 
Hadlock and James (2002, 1384) assess the empirical validity of the hypothesis that 
“banks have the ability to accurately price a firm’s claims, thus inducing a preference for 
firms that are undervalued by the market to choose bank finance.” They explain that their 
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common stock, and to a lesser extent risky public debt, when their securities are overvalued 
by outsiders. If bank loans are considered as inside debt then “similar reasoning would 
suggest that firms that are undervalued by the public markets will be more likely to choose 
bank debt.” 
 
Hadlock and James (2002) find that firms which exhibit small pre-announcement 
stock price runups and high stock volatility are more likely to announce new bank loans. 
These findings appear to be consistent with the presence of an information benefit to bank 
debt finance. This is because these firms are the most likely to be undervalued. On the other 
hand, they find that the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank loans to information 
problems for firms that have public debt outstanding is not entirely explained by under-
valuation variables. Hadlock and James (2002, 1415) argue that because the contracting 
costs of bank debt finance are relatively high for these firms, “it takes a high degree of 
undervaluation in the public securities markets for the firm to cross the threshold where the 
information benefits of bank debt finance outweigh the relative contracting costs.” 
 
Hadlock and James (2002, 1415) conclude that their findings support the notion that 
“banks help alleviate adverse selection problems in the public capital markets” and these 
problems explain “the incremental financing choice to use bank debt more than they 
explain a firm’s overall use of bank debt at any point in time.”  
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maintaining liquid assets will be important for firms faced with growth opportunities whose 
expected returns fluctuate over time. Liquid asset holdings, however, has some 
unfavourable effects. Among these is the asset substitution problem as identified by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Anderson (2002) points out that if levered equity holders intend to 
engage in risky investments then they can only do so if the firm has sufficient liquid assets 
to allow this transformation to take place. 
 
Fama and French (2002) indicate that the more profitable firms use less debt for 
given investment opportunities and that firms with greater investment opportunities will 
tend to borrow more for a given profitability.  From a tradeoff model perspective, agency 
costs associated with greater free cash flow motivates firms to use more debt, while the 
possibility of financial distress causes firms to use more equity.  Furthermore, they point 
out that the pecking order model assumes that debt is used to cover short-term variations in 
earnings, dividends and investments.  An extension of their logic would be to assume that 
the debt used to cover the short-term variations would be the most flexible type of debt 
available.   
 
Denis and Mihov (2003) use a sample of 1,560 new debt financings in period 1995-
1996 to examine the choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. Their 
sample consists of 530 public debt issues, 740 bank loans and 290 private debt placements. 
They argue that incremental debt choices are likely to be linked with prior financing 
decisions.  Denis and Mihov (2003, 5) find that “firms with public debt outstanding are 
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not established (emphasis added) good credit reputation choose bank debt.” They report 
that bank debt appears to be the dominant choice for firms that have no debt or public debt 
outstanding.  Specifically, 72% of firms that currently have no debt choose bank loans and 
over 50% of the firms that have no public debt outstanding choose bank debt. Conversely, 
firm that have public debt outstanding are more likely to choose public debt. Denis and 
Mihov (2003) report 63% of these firms choose public debt as their financing choice. 
 
Using the firm’s existing mix of debt claims as the control variable, Denis and 
Mihov (2003) find that the main determinant of the choice of debt instrument is the credit 
quality of the issuing firm. They find that the quality of credit rating is highest for public 
debt borrowers, followed by bank debt borrowers and ranking last are non-bank private 
debt borrowers. They report that the median firm that issues public debt has a BBB debt 
rating while the median private or bank borrower is not rated. In addition, the highest rating 
for public debt borrowers is AAA. The corresponding ratings for bank debt borrower and 
non-bank private debt borrowers are AA and A, respectively. Denis and Mihov (2003, 18) 
also report that “54% of public issuers have an investment-grade rating, while only 5% of 
the bank borrowers and fewer than 2% of the non-bank private borrowers do, all 
significantly different at 1%.”  
 
Denis and Mihov (2003) also discuss the differences between bank and non-bank 
private debt. More specifically, they look at the differences between these two types of debt 
in terms of regulatory requirements, maturity, placement structure, and the concentration 
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complements bank debt and public debt. Furthermore, non-bank private loans exhibit 
substantially different characteristics from bank loans. Denis and Mihov (2003, 5) argue 
that “non-bank private debt is particularly well suited to serving the needs of debt issuers 
with poor credit quality.” This finding implies that bank loans are signals that the borrowers 
must have possessed a minimum of credit quality. 
 
Denis and Mihov (2003) also point out the importance of bank loan and non-bank 
private debt relative to public debt. They report that the median ratio of the amount 
borrowed to total assets is lowest for public debt (9%) and highest for bank debt (37%), 
with non-bank private debt (26%) in between. Denis and Mihov (2003, 6) conclude that 
“firms with higher levels of asymmetric information, and a higher probability of default, 
will issue private debt before public debt.” 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) test the pecking order theory by relating firms’ financing 
deficits with the type of financing used. They indicate that financing deficits should be 
financed by debt if the pecking order theory holds, but find that financing deficits are more 
closely related to equity issues. They also indicate that the effectiveness of the pecking 
order theory to explain firms’ capital structure is firm-specific. That is, they report large 
firms with long operating histories are more likely to follow the pecking order theory. 
Small high-growth firms have greater information asymmetry and would be expected to use 
more debt in their capital structure. However, contrary to pecking order predictions, firms 
use more equity.  Frank and Goyal also point out that preference should be given to lower 
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to the long-term public debt market. The maturity of bank debt is negotiable and bank debt 
can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, thus lowering information costs.   
 
Fama and French (2005) look at both the tradeoff theory and the pecking order 
theory in explaining capital structure. They show that firms issue/repurchase equity more 
frequently than the pecking order theory would suggest through a number of alternative 
processes. Methods for issuing new shares include frequent and relatively small issues to 
employees, and infrequent, but larger issues due to stock-financed mergers and seasoned 
equity offerings. They suggest information asymmetry is “modest” for issues to employees, 
rights issues and direct purchase plans. They report that though repurchase of shares is less 
frequent, approximately 20% of the firms in their sample retired equity each year. Fama 
and French (2005) indicate that the issue/repurchase activities are not consistent with the 
pecking order theory.  
 
Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) distinguish between built investments (i.e. 
capital expenditure) and investments “acquired” from outside the firm (i.e. acquisitions). 
They use a sample of 1,558 large investments made by 1,185 firms over the period 1989-
1999 to study firm financing decisions and their long-term performance. They find that 
major investments are mostly funded by external finance and that new debt provides at least 
half the required funds in the investment year. About 15-20% of typical investment is 
financed by equity issues and most of the remainder by internal funds. Large firms tend to 
finance with debt and internal funds over equity. In addition, large investments tend to be 
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investments firms aim at moving toward a target leverage ratio. They also report that firms 
use retained earnings and new equity issues to pay down debt and infer their results are 
consistent with the pecking order theory. However, they also find that financing proportions 
vary with firm size with smaller firms relying more on external equity funds. This result 
does not lend support for the pecking order theory of capital structure. 
 
More recently Frank and Goyal (2006, 4) point out that “it is the financing deficit 
that drives debt issues. Empirically, however, other factors appear more important.” They 
argue that “the standard versions of both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory 
appear to be inadequate.” According to Frank and Goyal (2006), enhancements of these 
two models have been brought forward by proponents of both theories. For the trade-off 
approach, the proponents focus mainly on developing dynamic structural trade-off models. 
Proponents of the pecking order theory focus on the development of a satisfactory notion of 
‘debt capacity’ and on more complex adverse selection models. Frank and Goyal (2006, 4) 
note that “As a substantive matter, there is clear evidence that bankruptcy costs and direct 
transaction cost play at least some role and that leverage is stationary over the long run.” 
They argue that “There is room for reasonable differences of opinion regarding the relative 
importance of many factors including taxation, adverse selection, and various agency 
conflicts.” 
 
Liu (2006) studies a sample of 3,399 firm-year observations of 961 US companies 
for the period 1996-2000 to examine the effects of different loan types of private debt on 
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The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that “firms with more private debt will 
hold less cash and invest more.” It also predicts that “firms borrowing from banks will 
maintain a lower cash balance and invest more than firms borrowing from nonblank 
financial intermediaries.” According to Liu (2006, 300) the moral hazard hypothesis 
predicts that “firms with more private debt will engage in less asset substitution. Firms with 
more private debt will have lower asset risk than firms with less private debt, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, if firms with more private debt invest in fewer negative NPV projects 
than other firms, their investment will be less as well.” 
 
Liu (2006) classifies private debt as bank debt, non-bank private debt, and unused 
lines of credit.  Furthermore, bank debt includes revolving and non-revolving loans, and 
term loans outstanding. Non-bank private debts, on the other hand, are loans granted by 
non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, 
and other financing firms). Liu (2006, 295) claims his paper contributes to the finance 
literature in two ways. First, it examines “the implications of monitoring by financial 
intermediaries by analyzing the effects of private financing on firm decisions.” Second, it 
studies “the use of lines of credit – an important type of private debt that the finance 
literature has overlooked.” Liu (2006, 312) concludes that “depending on type, private 
borrowing mitigates either information asymmetry or asset substitution problem, or both.” 
And that “both outstanding bank loans and unused bank lines of credit increase investment 
through the reduction of information asymmetry, while non-bank private debt does not.”  
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is likely to be the marginal source of financing, firms with high financial deficits are likely 
to increase their debt ratios.” Kayhan and Titman (2007) find that the relation between 
leverage and financial deficit
11 is relatively weak and this relation is reduced and can be 
reversed for firms with relatively high market-to-book ratios.  They also find that the 
financial deficit has a stronger effect on capital structure when it is positive than when it is 
negative. Furthermore, they also find that firms that raised capital in years when their 
stocks are highly priced tend to reduce their debt ratios.   
 
In summary, firms in the process of maximizing shareholders’ wealth have to make 
financing decisions that help them to achieve their ultimate goal. Whether firms use public 
or private debt depends on a number of factors. These include financial flexibility/slack 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Hadlock and James, 2002); 
project quality (Rajan, 1992); loan type (James and Smith, 2000); characteristics of 
borrowers (Denis and Mihov, 2003; and Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2006); firms’ 
profitability (Fama and French, 2002); investment opportunities, (Fama and French, 2002);  
and the degree of information asymmetry (Denis and Mihov, 2003; Liu, 2006).  
 
In addition, within the private debt category, the loan structure and whether it is a 
bank or non-bank debt must be considered (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998); re-
negotiability is another important determinant when firm make their financing decision 
                                                 
11 Kayhan and Titman (2007) define financial deficit as the net amount of debt and equity the firm issues or 
repurchases in a given year.  
  168(James and Smith, 2000).  I now summarise the literature on pecking order theory in Table 
3.4 below. 
 
TABLE 3.4:   Summary of literature review on Pecking Order theory. 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Myers and 
Majluf (1984) 
Pecking order 
theory 
Firms maintain financial slack 
to avoid using external 
financing.  
Any financing 
decision that 
allows firms to 
enhance firms’ 
ability to 
maintain 
financial slack is 
valued by firms 
and market. 
Rajan (1992)  The choice 
between 
informed and 
arm’s length 
debt. 
High-quality projects will issue 
public debt, while medium-
quality firms will borrow from 
banks. Low-quality firms 
would choose public debt.  
 
Quality of the 
firm can 
influence the 
firm’s financing 
decision. 
Kim, Mauer and 
Sherman (1998) 
The 
determinants of 
corporate 
liquidity 
The basic motivation for 
holding liquid assets is the 
creation of financial slack 
which will allow firm insiders 
to pursue future attractive 
investment opportunities when 
they arise. 
Firms may establish lines of 
credit with banks or 
commercial paper programs as 
an alternative to investing in 
liquid assets. 
Financial slack 
affects firm 
future investment 
and hence 
financing 
decisions. 
Loan structure is 
important in 
providing 
financial slack. 
James and Smith 
(2000) 
Are banks still 
special 
Flexibility offered by lines of 
credit makes bank loans more 
attractive relative to other 
types of debt. 
Firms prefer 
lines of credit to 
other types of 
debt. 
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TABLE 3.4:   Summary of literature review on Pecking Order theory (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) 
Investment 
upturns and 
downturns and 
lender selection.
Publicly traded and privately- 
held debt have advantages that 
dominate in different situation. 
Distinction 
between 
investment 
upturns and 
downturns can 
explain how 
firms choose 
lender. 
Hadlock and 
James (2002) 
Benefits and 
costs of bank 
loans 
Market reaction to bank loans 
is more positive for firms that 
are more likely to be 
undervalued by the public 
markets. 
Firms that are undervalued by 
the public markets choose 
bank debt. 
The extent of 
undervaluation 
can help explain 
why firms 
choose bank 
loans. 
Fama and French 
(2002) 
Testing trade-
off and pecking 
order 
predictions. 
The more profitable firms use 
less debt for given investment 
opportunities and firms with 
greater investment 
opportunities tend to borrow 
for a given profitability. 
Investment 
opportunities are 
related to 
financing 
decisions and 
hence capital 
structure. 
Frank and Goyal 
(2003) 
Pecking order 
theory. 
Net equity issues track the 
financing deficit more closely 
than do net debt issues. 
 
Pecking order 
theory is not 
valid. 
Denis and Mihov 
(2003) 
Choices of debt  Firms with higher levels of 
asymmetric information, and a 
higher probability of default, 
will issue private debt before 
public debt 
Risk of default 
and asymmetric 
information 
should be taken 
into account 
when examine 
pecking order 
theory. 
Fama and French 
(2005) 
Pecking order 
theory 
The issue/purchase activities 
are not consistent with the 
pecking order theory. 
More research 
needed to test the 
validity of 
pecking order 
theory 
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TABLE 3.4:   Summary of literature review on Pecking Order theory (contd.) 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Elsas, Flannery 
and Garfinkel 
(2006) 
Major 
investments, 
firm financing 
and long-run 
performance 
Large firms tend to finance 
with debt and internal funds 
over equity.  
Large investments tend to be 
financed with more debt and 
less equity.   
Firm size and 
investment size 
might influence 
the order of 
security 
issuance. 
Liu (2006)  Sources of debt 
and firms’ 
financing 
decisions 
Outstanding bank loans and 
unused bank lines of credit 
increase investment through 
the reduction of information 
asymmetry, while non-bank 
private debt does not 
Bank debts are 
preferred by 
firms relative to 
non-bank private 
debt. 
Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) 
Effect of history 
variables on 
capital structure 
choices. 
Firms with high financial 
deficits are likely to increase 
their debt ratios. 
Relation between 
financial deficit 
and leverage  
should be 
considered in 
firms’ financing 
decision. 
 
 
In view of the pecking order theory presented in the previous section, it would be 
interesting to see how firms choose their lenders in practice. In theory unknown borrowers 
are best served by banks that are able to screen and monitor them most effectively. On the 
other hand, established, profitable and reputable firms can access the capital market directly 
and use bank loans when their shares are undervalued or when they have substantial growth 
opportunities which cannot be funded by internal sources. The source of debt preferred by 
which firms and under what circumstances is an important empirical issue. Table 3.5 below 
summarises the types of borrower and their choices of debt financing.   
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Bank loans  Capital market  Other non-bank private 
debts. 
Small firms without access 
to external debt (Fama, 
1985). 
Established credit 
reputation (Diamond, 
1991). 
Poorest performers, lowest 
credit rating and highest ex-
ante probability of default. 
(Denis and Mihov, 2003). 
Poor prospect for future 
profits (Rajan, 1992). 
Good prospects for future 
profits (Rajan, 1992). 
Small and young (Liu, 
2006). 
High credit risk (Berlin and 
Mester, 1992). 
Low credit risk (Berlin and 
Mester, 1992). 
 
New borrowers or small 
firms without established 
credit reputation (Diamond, 
1991; and Slovin et al., 
1992). 
Established and large firms 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1994). 
 
Financially distressed firms 
and small firms 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1994). 
Large, profitable firms,   
high proportion of tangible 
assets. and high and stable 
cash flows tap credit 
markets directly (Cantillo 
and Wright, 2000). 
 
Large borrowers choose 
more reputable banks 
(Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel,1995). 
Large and profitable firms 
choose public debt (Denis 
and Mihov, 20003). 
 
Poor prospect firms 
(Cantillo and Wright 
(2000). 
  
Firms which exhibit small 
pre-announcement stock 
price run-ups and high stock 
volatility choose bank loans 
(Hadlock and James, 2002). 
  
Firms with medium credit 
quality (Denis and Mihov, 
2003). 
  
Large, old and reputable 
firms choose bank loans 
(Liu, 2006). 
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be seen that during the period 1970-1996, bank loans account for a significant proportion 
(40.2%) to total external debt incurred by these businesses which was followed by bonds 
(35.5%). Stocks account for a small proportion of the total external financing (9.2%) 
whereas non-bank loans ranked third and accounted for 15.1%.  For the longer period 1970-
2000, Mishkin and Eakins (2005) show that the relative importance of the sources of 
external funding has changed significantly with non-bank loans accounting for a much 
greater proportion (38%) of the total external funding for non-financial businesses whereas 
bank loans decreased significantly. This may be a result of the entry of more institutional 
investors (e.g., insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.) into the financial markets. The 
proportions accounted for by bond and stock remained essentially stationary. 
 
Table 3.6: Sources of external funding for non-financial businesses in the US. 
Source of debt  1970-1996 Average* 
(%) 
1970-2000** 
(%) 
Stock 9.2  11 
Bond 35.5  32 
Bank loans  40.2  18 
Non-bank loans  15.1  38 
Source: *Mishkin (2006); **Mishkin and Eakins (2005)  
 
3.2.5.3 Market Timing Theory 
 
According to market timing theory, firms issue securities depending on the relative 
costs of equity and debt from time to time. That is, firms issue equity when its cost is low 
relative to debt and conversely firms issue debt otherwise. The theory also states that the 
  173observed capital structure at any date is the outcome of previous securities issuance 
decisions and these decisions have a long lasting impact on the capital structure of the firm. 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that chief financial officers try to time the equity 
market and that a majority indicated the valuation of the stock is an essential factor in 
deciding when to issue common stock. Equity is issued (repurchased) when the cost of 
equity is “irrationally low (high)”. Accordingly, if market timing is successful, share price 
is enhanced and subsequent long-run stock returns will be favourable. If this scenario holds, 
observed capital structures reflect the success, or failure, of past market timing efforts.   
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) review existing literature on the market timing theory 
and find that this theory is supported by evidence in four kinds of studies. The first kind of 
study considers actual financing decisions by firms (e.g., Jung, Kim, and Stulz, 1996; 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001). The second examines long-run stock returns 
following corporate finance decisions (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) and Fama (1998)), while the third examines earnings forecasts and 
realizations around equity issues (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Denis and Sarin 
(2001)). Finally, there are surveys of market timing behaviour of managers. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) remark that surveys are the most effective and convincing type.   
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) present a market timing model to explain observed 
capital structures. They regress leverage on an “external finance weighted-average market-
to-book ratio” and find that leverage is strongly negatively related to the market-to-book 
  174ratio. They also find that firms with low leverage are those that raised funds when their 
market valuations are high. Conversely, those with high leverage are those that raise funds 
when their equities are low. Their results support the market timing theory. Hence, Baker 
and Wurgler (2002, 29) conclude that “capital structure is the cumulative outcome of 
attempts to time the equity market.”  They show firms that practice market timing in their 
financing decisions exhibit positive long-run returns. In addition, they indicate that 
financing decisions are influenced by forecast earnings that are optimistically interpreted by 
the market.   
 
Schultz (2003) examines a phenomenon that he refers to as “pseudo market timing.” 
According to Schultz (2003, 484), the premise of the pseudo market timing hypothesis is 
that “the more firms can receive for their equity, the more likely they are to issue stock 
even if the market is efficient and managers have no timing ability.” Using simulations with 
parameters estimated from historical data, Schultz (2003) shows that this hypothesis can 
explain the poor event-time performance of stocks that have recently issued equity. He also 
suggests that to avoid biases from pseudo market timing and cross-sectional dependence in 
event-time, researchers should use calendar-time returns rather than event-time returns. 
 
Huang and Ritter (2005) test the market timing model by examining the patterns of 
external financing decisions over time. They use the cost of equity and the cost of debt to 
determine whether firms issue securities consistent with the relative costs of the sources of 
funds. Consistent with the market timing theory, they find that during the period 1963-
2001, US firms use external equity financing when the cost of equity relative to other 
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statistically significant.” Specifically, they find that an increase in the implied risk premium 
by 1% would result in approximately of a 3% change in the financing deficit funded with 
net debt. Finally, Huang and Ritter (2005) use a multinomial logit model to estimate 
whether a firm issues securities and what security they should issue. They find that the 
implied equity risk premium is the most important explanatory variable in the decision to 
issue equity even after controlling for growth opportunities. 
 
Using 56,259 firm-years to examine the corporate financing behaviour for the 
period 1983-2002 in US, Hovakimian (2006, 241) finds a number of interesting results. 
First, he finds “no evidence of significant equity market timing for debt issues and debt 
reductions.” Second, while his results are consistent with market timing of equity issues 
“the effects of equity transactions on capital structure are small and transitory, implying 
that equity transaction timing is unlikely to be responsible for significant long lasting 
effects of market-to-book ratios on leverage.” Third, “the pattems of changes in the market-
to-book and debt ratios around a number of transactions (e.g., debt reductions) are such that 
these transactions may induce a positive rather than a negative relation between market-to-
book ratios and leverage.” In addition, the external finance weighted average market-to-
book ratio affects firms’ current financing and investment decisions. This is because the 
former variable contains information about future growth opportunities of those firms. Also 
the negative effect of market-to-book ratio on leverage is mainly a cross-sectional not a 
time-series phenomenon. These findings do not support the market timing theory. 
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maturity structure of their debt issues. According to Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006, 
1736), the underlying hypothesis of successful market timing is that “corporate managers 
strategically shift between long-term and short-term…” Therefore, Butler, Grullon and 
Weston (2006, 1736) argue that “if managers can successfully predict future excess long-
term bond returns, then the maturity of new debt issues today should be related to future 
excess long-term bond returns.” According to these authors, this result provides “evidence 
of successful forward-looking timing.” That is, when managers predict that future excess 
long-term bond returns will be relatively low then they issue more long-term debt relative 
to short-term debt.  Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) offer an alternative explanation of 
this result which is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. They argue that “a 
structural shift in the time series of excess long-term bond returns can create illusion of 
successful forward-looking timing.” They find evidence of a structural break in 1982 
around a significant change in US monetary and fiscal policy. As a result, this break can 
create “the false appearance of successful forward-looking timing.” Butler, Grullon and 
Weston (2006, 1733) conjecture “the correlation between the long-term share (the 
predictor) and the structural break is driven by managers’ reaction to the break.” In fact, 
they find that if they condition on the structural shift, “the correlation between the long-
term share and future excess returns disappears.”  
 
Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) also examine the successful market timing 
hypothesis using firm-level data. They find no evidence of correlation between net long-
term debt issues and future excess bond returns. In particular, they find that in any 
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while the other half are net short-term issuers, regardless of whether long-term excess bond 
returns are high or low. 
 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) discuss models of rational market pricing, non-
rational agents and pseudo timing. Within the context of the first class of models, Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2006) cite the work of Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) who provide an 
adverse selection argument where firms choose between issuing debt and equity across 
business cycle expansions and contractions. In this model, firms receive “non-deferrable 
profitable investment opportunities” and these must be financed by issuing debt or equity 
securities. If a firm issues debt, investors will demand protective covenants or a price 
discount for anticipated asset substitution risk. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that 
firms with undervalued equity will only issue equity when the dilution cost for doing so is 
less than or equal to the debt issuance cost. According to Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), 
corporate investment opportunities are typically more profitable during periods of 
economic expansions than in the contraction periods. Hence during economic expansions, 
dilution cost of equity issuance is low but the cost of debt issuance is relatively insensitive 
to the point in the business cycle when firms offer debt securities. The model predicts that 
the equity announcement effect will be low and there will be a rise in the relative frequency 
of equity offers. The model also predicts that the adverse selection effect increases as 
investor uncertainty concerning the value of assets in place rises. Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993) find supporting evidence for their predictions. During economic contractions, 
debtholders bear greater risk and demand greater risk premiums. Hence during 
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be the case.  Consequently, during economic contractions equity issues will be greater and 
less frequent and a more negative stock price reaction should be observed.  
 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) also examine timing theories with non-rational 
market pricing. They look at a number of hypotheses regarding the timing of firm-specific 
returns. For example, they look at the timing hypothesis which refers to the notion that 
investors are overly optimistic about the prospects of issuing firms and consequently their 
reactions do not fully incorporate managerial incentives to time equity issues.  Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2006) also discuss the overconfidence hypothesis (e.g., Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Brous, Datar and Kini, 2001). According to Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2006, 93) this hypothesis states that “investors are overconfident about 
the precision of their private information, but not about the precision of public 
information.” A consequence of overweighting private information is that investors will 
under-react to new public information. Hence, corporate events that are associated with 
abnormal announcement returns should be followed by long-run abnormal returns of the 
same sign as the announcement abnormal returns. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) also 
discuss the argument of Brous, Datar and Kini (2001). If managers time equity issues and 
investors systematically underreact to the issue announcements, then one should expect to 
see that investors are disappointed when firms report post-issue earnings. That is, post-issue 
earnings announcement on average should be associated with negative stock price 
reactions.  
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market” issue. They look at the work of a number of researchers, including Baker and 
Wurgler (2000), Schultz (2004), Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) and Baker, Ruback and 
Wurgler (2006). They note that the main point in the study of Butler, Grullon and Weston 
(2005) is that “pseudo market timing can appear as real timing ability in small samples.” 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006, 96) also examine Baker, Taliaferro and Wurgler (2004) 
and Schultz (2004) and note that “what causes the apparent ability of firms to time their 
equity issues to periods that are followed by low market returns is still inconclusive.” 
 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) also look at the evidence on long-run post-issue 
stock returns. They report the stylized fact that stocks surprisingly generate low returns 
over the holding period of 2-5 years following an equity issue. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli 
(2006, 96) argue that “this long run return evidence challenges the efficient market 
hypothesis and motivates the development of behavioral asset pricing models.”  They also 
report the counter-evidence by a number of other authors (e.g., Brav, Geczy, and Gompers, 
2000; Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2000) who show that “the low post-issue return pattern is 
consistent with standard multi-factor pricing models, and tends to be concentrated in small 
growth stocks with active investment programs.” However, Eckbo, Masulis and Norli 
(2006, 96) note that “the proper interpretation of the low long-run returns following 
security issuances remains an unsettled issue.” Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) argue that 
the long-run performance evidence has important implications for the overall question of 
corporate timing and market efficiency.  
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market leverage ratios and that past stock returns do influence the ratio of debt to book 
value of assets. The latter finding supports the market timing theory that firms are more 
likely to issue equity subsequent to stock price increases. Table 3.7 below summarises the 
main findings about market timing. 
 
In summary, according to the market timing theory a firm would issue its equity 
when it is overvalued by the market and otherwise it would repurchase its shares from the 
market. Existing literature appears to give support to this practice. Both Graham and 
Harvey’s (2001) survey and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) study give support to the market 
timing theory. Huang and Ritter (2005) discuss the cost of equity issuance and find some 
support for the market timing theory. Kayhan and Titman (2007) find past stock returns can 
influence firms’ debt to asset ratio and this is evidence of market timing. However, a 
number of researchers have raised the question whether managers do indeed market time 
when issuing equities. For example, Schultz (2004) discusses the issue of pseudo-market 
timing.  Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) point out that a structural shift in the time series 
of excess long-term bond returns can create an illusion of successful forward-looking 
timing. Some researchers indicate other factors need to be taken into account when 
examining the market timing practice of firms. For example, Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993) point out the sensitivity of dilution cost of equity issuance to different phases of the 
business cycle. I now present the tabular summary of existing findings about market timing 
theory in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7:   Summary of literature review on Market Timing theory 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Graham and 
Harvey (2001) 
Capital 
structure 
theories and 
firm’s practices. 
Earnings dilution is the most 
important factor affecting 
firms’ decision to issue equity. 
The valuation of the stock is an 
essential factor in deciding 
when to issue common stock. 
 
Earnings dilution 
and valuation of 
stock should be 
considered in 
examining 
market timing 
practice. 
 
Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) 
Market timing 
and capital 
structure. 
Capital structure is the 
cumulative outcome of 
attempts to time the equity 
market. 
Firms with low leverage raise 
funds when their market 
valuations are high.  
Conversely, high leverage 
firms raise funds when their 
equities are low. 
Capital structure 
is influenced by 
market timing 
activities of 
firms. 
Leverage is 
related to timing 
activities of 
firms. 
Schultz (2003)   Pseudo market 
timing. 
The more firms can receive for 
their equity, the more likely 
they are to issue stock even if 
the market is efficient and 
managers have no timing 
ability. 
Security issuance 
activities might 
not be a result of 
market timing. 
Huang and Ritter 
(2005) 
Market timing 
theory of capital 
structure. 
Firms use external equity 
financing when the cost of 
equity relative to other 
securities is lower. 
The implied risk premium is 
the most important explanatory 
variables in the decision to 
issue equity. 
If firms adjust quickly toward 
a target capital structure, then 
market timing will have only 
short-lived effects on capital 
structure. 
 
Cost of security 
issuance should 
be considered as 
a main reason in 
any context. 
Whether firms 
adjust toward a 
target capital 
structure is an 
important issue. 
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Table 3.7:   Summary of literature review on Market Timing theory (contd.). 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Hovakimian 
(2006) 
Observed 
capital structure 
and market 
timing? 
Equity transactions do not 
have long lasting effects on 
capital structure. 
Distinction of 
transitory and 
permanent effect 
of security 
issuance on 
capital structure 
is needed. 
Butler, Grullon 
and Weston 
(2006) 
Managers’ 
ability to time 
market. 
A structural shift in time series 
of excess long-term returns can 
create illusion of successful 
forward-looking timing.  
Structural breaks 
(shifts) should be 
observed when 
examining 
market timing 
activities of 
managers. 
 
3.2.6. EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) provide evidence of existence of information content in 
accounting earnings announcements. They find significant positive correlation between the 
abnormal return in the month of an earnings announcement and the earnings change over 
that firm’s previous year’s earnings.  
 
Ball and Brown (1968) also test for market efficiency in relation to its reaction to 
good and bad news earnings announcements. That is, they test whether the market’s 
reaction is instantaneous and unbiased. They find evidence of post-earnings announcement 
drift. This suggests that the market under-reacts to the information content of earnings 
announcements and, hence, subsequent gradual adjustments must follow. 
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Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) formulate a model that explains price 
anomalies. In their model, they assume that “earnings follow a random walk” but that 
investors believe earnings alternate between two regimes, one in which earnings mean 
revert and one in which earnings trend. According to Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 
308), investors have “two cognitive biases” that are identified by psychological research: 
the “representative heuristic bias” meaning “the tendency of experimental subjects to view 
events as typical or representative of some specific class,” and the “conservative bias” 
meaning “the slow updating of models in the face of new evidence.”  
 
Denis and Sarin (2001) use a sample of 1,213 seasoned equity offerings to examine 
the stock price reaction to earnings announcements in the five years following seasoned 
equity offerings. They report positive excess returns in the four quarterly earnings 
announcements prior to a seasoned equity offering, but primarily negative (though not 
generally significant) excess returns for the twenty quarters post-issue. They find stock 
price reactions to post-SEO earnings announcements are significantly negative with an 
average abnormal return of -0.21%. Furthermore, they find that these abnormal stock price 
reactions are more than likely to be negative within the smallest quartile of equity issuers.  
Denis and Sarin (2001, 190) conclude that “for small firms, therefore, our results are 
broadly consistent with the over-optimism hypothesis.”  
 
Brous, Datar and Kini (2001) also report negative excess returns associated with 
earnings announcements following seasoned equity offerings, but when they adjust for non-
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earnings announcement.   
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine the impact of earnings announcements on 
managements’ decision to issue new equity.  They suggest that if earnings announcements 
are viewed too favourably by the markets, then managers would be encouraged to seek 
additional equity because they have an opportunity to sell shares at a premium.    
 
Landsman and Maydew (2002) find no evidence of a decline in the information 
content of earnings announcements over the past three decades. In fact, they find an 
increase in the informativeness of earnings announcements over time, as measured by 
abnormal stock price volatility and abnormal trading volume. 
 
Kothari, Lewellen and Warner (2004) study the market’s reaction to aggregate 
earnings news to examine the links between earnings, stock prices, and discount rates. 
Kothari, Lewellen and Warner (2004, 18) find that “market earnings are more persistent 
than individual firms’ earnings.” However, they do not find any relation between aggregate 
returns and past earnings surprises. They infer that there is no evidence of delayed reaction 
to aggregate earnings news. In addition, they find that aggregate returns are negatively 
correlated with contemporaneous earnings surprises. They report that, for the period 1970-
2000, stock prices increased 6.5% in quarters with negative earnings growth and only 1.9% 
otherwise. They also document that concurrent earnings explain about 5%-10% of the 
variation in quarterly market returns and 10%-20% of the variation in annual returns. 
  185Finally, Kothari, Lewellen and Warner (2004, 28) find that “aggregate earnings are strongly 
correlated with macroeconomic conditions, including measures of real activity and proxies 
for discount rates (T-bill rates, the term spread, and the default premium).”  
 
Nichols and Wahlen (2004) use the three theoretical links between earnings and 
share prices developed by Beaver (1998) and present new evidence on the relation between 
earnings and returns. They replicate and extend Beaver’s study using a sample of 31,923 
firm-year observations over the period 1988-2001.  Specifically, Nichols and Wahlen 
(2004, 264) look at the link between the current period earnings and future earnings - which 
they argue, will “provide information to develop expectations about dividends in future 
periods.” They argue that the latter expectations in turn provide information for the 
valuation of shares that indicates the present value of expected future dividends.  
 
Nichols and Wahlen (2004) find that the sign of annual earnings changes are 
significantly related to annual stock returns. Specifically, they find that the difference in the 
sign of the change in earnings is associated with a difference of over 35% in the average 
firm’s annual stock returns for their study period. They also find that the stock returns of 
10% of firms with the largest earnings increases outperform 10% of firms with the largest 
earnings decreases by an average of over 72% per year. In addition, they show that changes 
in annual earnings appear to contain more “value-relevant information” than changes in 
annual cash flows from operations.  
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exhibit higher stock returns in response to news of earnings increases than firms with low 
earnings persistence. This is because, they argue: “stock returns react more strongly to 
changes in earnings that are likely to recur than to changes likely to be transitory.” 
However, they did not find any such relation between earnings persistence and stock 
returns for earnings decreases, presumably, because “earnings decreases are typically not 
persistent.” 
 
Nichols and Wahlen (2004, 265) report that the market does not react completely to 
earnings news. In particular, “stock returns continue to drift up for firms with positive 
earnings changes and drift down for firms with negative earnings changes during the 60 
trading days after the release of quarterly earnings.” They group the firms in their sample 
into deciles based on unexpected earnings per share and find that the lowest unexpected 
earnings portfolio experiences an average negative abnormal return of 2.2% whereas the 
highest unexpected earnings portfolio enjoys a positive average abnormal return of 3.0%. 
 
Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004) examine 11,034 quoted prices for syndicated loans 
from 196 firms for 2,127 quarterly earnings announcements over the period from the last 
quarter of 1998 to December 2002. They investigate whether and when the syndicated bank 
loan price in the secondary market reflects information in quarterly earnings. They find no 
evidence of any price movements in the secondary loan market at the time of the release of 
the quarterly earnings announcement. However, they do find significant price movements 
in the secondary loan market around the time of monthly covenant reports to members of 
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upcoming quarterly earnings to be asymmetric between good and bad news firms during 
the pre-announcement period.  Finally, they document that the information content in 
syndicated bank loan prices is much more pronounced for firms with high intangible assets 
that experience declining earnings than firms with low intangible assets that also experience 
declining earnings.   
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) also test whether initiating a banking 
relationship will cause borrowers to become more transparent by examining the impact of 
earnings announcements and the return volatility associated with the announcements.  They 
find that earnings announcements result in a negative share price reaction, suggesting that 
the market views managers as having imprudently timed their bank loan, acquired a 
relatively inflexible loan, or have not used the proceeds effectively. Furthermore, they 
argue that if a banking relation results in improved transparency, the volatility of the 
abnormal returns should be lower after a firm announces a bank loan because of reduction 
in information asymmetry.  Surprisingly, they report that the volatility of abnormal returns 
around earnings announcement dates is greater subsequent to the acquisition of the loan.   
 
In summary, the literature shows some evidence that earnings announcements 
appear to be related to stock returns. The pioneering work of Brown et al. (1968) reports 
abnormal return on earnings announcement is positively correlated to the earnings change 
of the firm from the previous year. Baker and Wurler (2002) find favourably viewed 
earnings announcements do impact equity issuance. Nichols and Wahlen (2004) find the 
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Lewellen and Warner (2004) find aggregate earnings are more persistent than individual 
firms’ earnings. However, they find no relation between aggregate returns and past earnings 
news. Nonetheless, Kothari, Lewellen and Warner (2004, 3) point out that “a negative 
reaction to aggregate earnings is entirely consistent with a positive reaction to firm 
earnings.” 
 
Other researchers find mixed results for the correlation between earnings 
announcements and stock returns. For example, Denis and Sarin (2001) find evidence of 
positive excess returns in the four quarterly earnings announcements prior to a SEO, but 
primarily negative excess returns for the 20 quarters post-issue. Allen, Guo and Weintrop 
(2004) find no evidence of any price movements in the secondary loan market at the time of 
the release of the quarterly earnings announcement. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) 
find earnings announcements result in a negative share price reaction and the volatility of 
abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates is greater subsequent to the 
acquisition of the loan. Overall, however, the consensus is that earnings announcements are 
correlated to stock returns of announcers. Table 3.8 below summarises the main findings of 
this section. 
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performance 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Ball and Brown 
(1968) 
Information 
content of 
earnings 
announcement. 
The abnormal return on 
earnings announcement is 
positively correlated to the 
earnings change of the firm 
from previous year. 
Prior 
performance of 
firm is associated 
with 
announcement 
effect. 
Denis and Sarin 
(2001) 
Stock price 
reaction to 
earnings 
announcements 
following 
SEOs. 
There is evidence of positive 
excess returns in the four 
quarterly earnings 
announcement prior to a SEO, 
but primarily negative excess 
returns for the 20 quarters 
post-issue. 
Firms issue equity when the 
market overestimates the 
firm’s future earnings 
performance. 
Market timing 
can be present 
with any security 
issuance. 
Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) 
Market timing 
and earnings 
announcements. 
Favourably viewed earnings 
announcements impact equity 
issuance. 
Earnings 
announcements 
should be taken 
into account 
when examining 
market timing. 
Nichols and 
Wahlen (2004) 
Relation 
between 
accounting 
earnings 
information and 
firms’ stock 
returns. 
The sign of annual earnings 
changes are significantly 
related to annual stock returns. 
The stock returns of  ten 
percent of firms with the 
largest earnings increases 
outperform ten percent of 
firms with the largest earnings 
decreases by an average of 
over 72 percent per year. 
High earnings persistence 
exhibit higher stock returns in 
response to news of earnings 
increases than firms with low 
earnings persistence. 
Examination of 
stock returns 
following 
earnings 
announcements 
is necessary for 
any corporate 
event. 
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Table 3.8:   Summary of literature review on earnings announcements and firms 
performance (contd.). 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Allen, Guo and 
Weintrop (2004) 
Secondary 
syndicated loan 
market and 
information 
content of 
earnings. 
No evidence of any price 
movements in the secondary 
loan market at the time of the 
release of the quarterly 
earnings announcement.  
There are significant price 
movements in the secondary 
loan market around the time 
of monthly covenant reports 
to members of the syndicate. 
Prior information 
about firms does 
influence stock price 
reaction to 
announcements of 
earnings. 
Kothari, 
Lewellen and 
Warner (2004)  
Aggregate 
earnings news 
and the links 
between 
earnings, stock 
prices and 
discount rates. 
Aggregate earnings are more 
persistent than individual 
firms’ earnings. However, 
there is no relation between 
aggregate returns and past 
earnings news. 
Aggregate earnings 
and firm’s earnings 
have different 
influences on stock 
prices. 
Billett, Flannery 
and Garfinkel 
(2006). 
Long-term 
performance 
following 
announcements 
of bank loans. 
Bank loans do not reduce 
information asymmetry 
following earnings 
announcements. 
 
Is bank loan 
associated with 
negative earnings 
announcement? 
Information 
asymmetry 
(transparency) 
following 
announcements of 
bank loans needs 
further research. 
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Over the years, a number of studies have related accounting information to market 
performance.  Dambolena and Khoury (1980) present a model for predicting corporate 
failure that uses financial ratios and discriminant analysis. They use 19 financial ratios in 
their study, ranging from ratios measuring profitability to those measuring indebtedness. 
They find that their measures of ratio stability showed remarkable differences between 
failed and non-failed firms. In particular the standard deviation of the profit to net worth 
ratio of the failed firms on the year prior to failure exceed 0.50 whereas that for non-failed 
firms is in the range of 0 to 0.06.   
 
Dubofsky and Varadarajan (1987) examine the relation between diversification 
strategy and performance using both an accounting measure and market measures of 
performance. For an accounting measure, they use return on assets (ROA) to measure firm 
performance. They use the average ROA for each firm to reduce the probability that 
performance data from an unusually good or bad year would confound the analysis. They 
then divide each firm’s average ROA by its standard deviation for standardization 
purposes.  Dubofsky and Varadarajan (1987) also document the common measures of 
economic performance based on market return: Sharpe’s (1966) measure, Treynor’s (1965) 
levered and unlevered measures, and Jensen’s (1968) levered and unlevered measures. 
They note these market-return measures are based on average returns on each firm’s stock 
above the risk-free rate of returns. Dubofsky and Varadarajan (1987, 606) find that “the 
type of performance measure used – accounting and market based – seem to lead to 
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performance.” They reason that “Since market measures reflect the market’s perception of 
future earnings and accounting measures reflect a previous years’ earnings and a current 
balance sheet, there might be some discrepancy between the measures if a firm’s strategy 
has a lagged effect.” 
 
Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) examine the relations between ownership 
characteristics and operating performance up to ten years after going public for a sample of 
283 IPOs of US companies for the period 1980-83. Their measure of operating performance 
is operating income before depreciation, interest, tax and extraordinary items divided by 
end-of-year assets (EBITDA/Total Assets). They find that median operating return on 
assets declines from the year before the offering to the end of the first year of public 
trading.  
 
Kane and Meade (1998) use a set of transformed ratios to examine the association 
between financial ratios and stock returns. Kane and Meade (1998, 60) find that “some 
information is contained in scaled rank transformation of ratios that is obfuscated by either 
untransformed ratios or logarithmic ratio transformations.” According to Kane and Meade 
(1998) earnings growth has been shown to be positively correlated with stock returns 
(Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1969). Increased ex-post growth rates imply a greater 
likelihood of increased future earnings and sales.  Kane and Meade (1998) also report 
substantive evidence that stock returns are negatively correlated with dividend yields 
(Rozeff, 1984; Campbell and Shiller, 1998).  
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Liu and Thomas (2000) use first differences of earnings per share from both 
I/B/E/S
12 and Compustat databases to measure unexpected earnings. Liu and Thomas 
(2000, 73) reason that “earnings quality can be measured by the observed relation between 
current-period unexpected earnings and revisions of forecasts for future-period earnings: a 
stronger relation implies higher quality.” They Liu and Thomas (2000, 98) also argue that 
“inferences about the value relevance of accounting earnings made from simple regressions 
of unexpected returns on current unexpected earnings are potentially misleading.”  
 
DeFond and Hung (2003) examine analysts’ earnings forecasts for US firms for the 
period from 1993 to 1999 and find that 12% of the 8,886 firms with earnings forecasts over 
this period also have at least one cash flow forecast. They argue that analysts have 
incentives to make cash flow forecasts in addition to earnings when there is a relatively 
greater demand for cash flow information in valuing securities. They find that analysts are 
more likely to forecast cash flows for firms with (1) large accruals, (2) more heterogeneous 
accounting choices relative to their industry peers, (3) high earnings volatility, (4) high 
capital intensity, and (5) poor financial health. According to DeFond and Hung (2003), 
research in this area typically examines the usefulness of earnings and cash flows in 
securities valuation by investigating analysts’ cash flow forecasts. Thus, cash flow is an 
important variable in valuing and predicting future firm prospects.  
 
                                                 
12 I/B/E/S: Institutional Brokers Estimate System. 
  194 Nissim and Penman (2003) distinguish between operating liabilities and financing 
liabilities. They examine whether a dollar of operating liabilities on the balance sheet is 
priced differently from a dollar of financing liabilities. As operating and financing 
liabilities are components of the book value of equity, they reason that one can examine 
whether price-to-book ratios depend on the composition of book values.  Furthermore, 
because the price-to-book ratio is determined by the expected rate of return on the book 
value, they argue, if components of book value command different price premiums, they 
must imply different expected rates of return on book value. Thus, Nissim and Pennan’s 
(2003) argument also justifies my use of accounting measures of return to examine firm 
performance. 
 
However, Titman et al. (2004, 698) reason that increased investment expenditures 
may result in negative stock returns. They find that “firms that increase their level of capital 
investment the most tend to achieve lower stock returns for five subsequent years.” And 
that “the negative relation between abnormal investments and stock returns cannot be 
explained by either the risks or the characteristics of the firms and are independent of the 
previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.”  
 
Eberhart et al. (2004) examine a sample of 8,313 cases between 1951 and 2001 
where firms unexpectedly increase their research and development expenditures 
significantly. They find that for the five-year period following these increases, firms 
experience significantly positive abnormal operating performance. They also find that 
shareholders of these firms experience significantly positive abnormal stock. However, they 
  195point out that R&D increases are investment decisions not financing decisions and as such 
they are seldom announced. For this reason, Eberhart et al. (2004, 648) argue that “R&D 
provides an ideal test of the ability of the market to correctly incorporate the intangible 
information contained in a firm’s long-term investment decision.”  They find that 
“investors systematically under-react to the benefit of an R&D increase.”  
 
        In a bank loan context, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) use operating-
income-before-depreciation-to-total-assets, the net profit margin, the net return on assets, 
and capital-expenditure-plus-R&D-to-total-assets as measures of operating performance 
and investment. They find that operating performance of borrowers was poor in the year 
prior to the loan announcement and in the subsequent three years.  
 
In summary, the literature suggests that there must be a link between firm 
performance and their stock returns. This link is manifested directly or indirectly in many 
aspects of the firms’ operation.  For example, stability of firms’ financial ratios is related to 
success or failure of firms (Dambolena and Khoury, 1980). Measures of performance 
appear to be important in relations between firms’ policies and firms’ performance 
(Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 1987). 
 
Titman et al. (2004) find firms that significantly increase capital investments 
subsequently experience negative stock returns. On the other hand, Eberhart et al. (2004) 
find that for the five-year period following research and development expenditure 
increases, firms experience significantly positive abnormal operating performance. Finally, 
  196Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) report negative operating performance following 
announcements of bank loans.  
 
In Table 3.9 below I summarise the findings of the main papers in relation to the 
association between accounting and market returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  197Table 3.9:   Summary of literature review on accounting information and market 
returns. 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings and/or 
arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Dambolena and 
Khoury (1980) 
Ratio stability 
and corporate 
failure. 
Measures of ratio stability 
showed remarkable differences 
between failed and non-failed 
firms. 
Stability of 
financial ratios is 
relevant to tests 
of association 
between 
accounting 
information and 
market returns. 
Dubofsky and 
Varadarajan 
(1987)  
 
Diversification 
and measures of 
performance. 
The type of performance 
measure used – accounting and 
market based – seem to lead to 
conflicting inferences about 
the relationship between 
diversification strategy and a 
firm’s performance. 
 
Other factors 
might need to be 
considered in 
relation to the 
association 
between 
accounting return 
and market 
return.  
Mikkelson, 
Partch and Shah 
(1997) 
The relationship 
between 
ownership 
characteristics 
and operating 
performance 
(1980-1983). 
Ownership decreases from 
67% prior to IPO issue to 
43.7% immediately afterward 
and further declined to 28.6% 
after five years.  
Operating performance, 
however, is not related to 
ownership of officers and 
directors. 
Ownership can 
be significant 
explanatory 
variable? 
Kane and Meade 
(1998)  
 
Ratio analysis 
and rank 
transformation. 
Increased ex-post growth rates 
imply a greater likelihood of 
increased future earnings and 
sales.   
Stock returns are negatively 
correlated with dividend 
yields. 
 
If market 
valuation of 
firms is related to 
firms’ growth 
rates then stock 
returns should 
also be related to 
firms’ earnings. 
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Table 3.9:   Summary of literature review on accounting information and market 
returns (contd.). 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings 
and/or arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Liu and Thomas 
(2000)  
 
Stock returns and 
accounting returns. 
Earnings quality can 
be measured by the 
observed relation 
between current-
period unexpected 
earnings and 
revisions of forecasts 
for future-period 
earnings.  
Inferences about the 
value relevance of 
accounting earnings 
made from simple 
regressions of 
unexpected returns on 
current unexpected 
earnings are 
potentially 
misleading. 
 
There might be an 
inter-temporal 
relationship 
between earnings 
and expected 
earnings.  
DeFond and Hung 
(2003)  
 
Analysts’ earnings 
forecasts  and  
demand for cash 
flow information in 
valuing securities. 
Firms with earnings 
forecasts over this 
period also have at 
least one cash flow 
forecast.  
Analysts are more 
likely to forecast cash 
flows for firms with 
(1) large accruals, (2) 
more heterogeneous 
accounting choices 
relative to their 
industry peers, (3) 
high earnings 
volatility, (4) high 
capital intensity, and 
(5) poor financial 
health. 
Analysts’ earnings 
forecast do have 
implication for 
market returns. 
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Table 3.9:   Summary of literature review on accounting information and market 
returns (contd.). 
Researcher Theory/issue 
discussed 
Main findings 
and/or arguments 
Research  
Implication 
Nissim and Pennan 
(2003) 
Financial statement 
analysis and 
profitability and 
price-to-book ratios. 
If components of 
book value 
command different 
price premiums, they 
must imply different 
expected rates of 
return on book 
value. 
Need to take into 
account the expected 
rates of return on 
book value when use 
price-to-book ratio. 
Titman et al. (2004)  Capital investments 
and stock returns. 
Firms that 
significantly increase 
capital investments 
subsequently 
experience negative 
stock returns. 
Capital investments 
is related to long-
term under-
performance. 
Eberhart et al. 
(2004) 
Long-term abnormal 
returns and operating 
performance 
following R and D 
increases. 
Firms unexpectedly 
increase their R and 
D expenditures 
experience 
significantly positive 
abnormal operating 
performance in the 
long term. 
Shareholders of 
these firms also 
experience 
significantly positive 
abnormal returns. 
Capital efficiency 
appears to be a 
candidate for long-
term performance of 
firms. 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006)  
 
Firms’ long-term 
performance 
following bank 
loans. 
Operating 
performance of 
borrowers were poor 
in the year prior to 
loan announcement 
and in the 
subsequent three 
years.  
 
A closer 
examination of 
relation between 
bank loans and 
firms’ operating 
should be conducted.
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Table 3.10 below summarises the accounting variables used in measuring 
performance of firms. The accounting performance measures and the authors are listed in 
the table below.  
 
Table 3.10:  Accounting return measures 
Research Variable Definition 
Dambolena and Khoury 
(1980), Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen (2002) 
Return on Equity  Net Income/Equity 
Dubofsky and Varadarajan 
(1987) 
Return on Assets  Net Income/Total Assets 
Altman et al. (1977), 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006),   
Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
Operating Return of Assets  EBITDA/Total Assets 
Kane and Meade (1998)  Payout ratio Dividend/Net  profits  after 
tax 
Kane and Meade (1998)  Sales growth  Year-to-year  change  in 
firm’s sales. 
Nissim and Penman (2003)  Financial leverage  Net financing debt/common 
equity 
Liu and Thomas (2000)  Earnings per share  Net  Income/number  of 
shares outstanding. 
DeFond and Hung (2003)  Cash Flows to Total Assets  (Net Income+Dep)/TA 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006) 
Net profit margin  Net income/Sales 
 
  2013.3 HYPOTHESES 
 
3.3.1 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE AND ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS 
 
Based on the literature on information asymmetry and the “specialness” of bank 
loans, I argue that firms extended credit by banks must have signaled a good growth 
potential or good investment opportunity prior to announcements of bank loans, and they 
should also perform well subsequently. 
 
I test whether firms that announce syndicated loans perform well over the long term. 
I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H 3.1: There is no association between borrowers’ long-run performance and the 
announcement of syndicated loans. 
 
Also, as can be seen from the literature review section, an issue that has not been 
addressed in the capital structure debate is concerned with the impact different loan 
structures have on the value of equity.  Hadlock and James (2002) include bank loans in a 
pecking order framework to assess if bank loans provide financial slack. Their results 
suggest that asymmetric information motivates undervalued firms to seek bank loans rather 
than enter the public debt or equity markets. However, bank loans involve revolving credit, 
term loans, and hybrid loans.  A logical extension of the market timing argument is its 
application to the specific types of debt where the characteristics of a particular type of debt 
  202may have embedded options allowing managers to behave opportunistically.  Specifically, 
revolving credit loans allow more flexibility in the renegotiation of magnitude, maturity, 
and pricing than do term loans, and, hence, facilitates market timing by firms.  Also, if bank 
loans parallel other forms of finance, then the flexibility in market timing should be 
recognized favourably by generating positive long-run returns and should be particularly 
evident in loan structures that allow maximum flexibility. Lummer and McConnell (1989) 
classify loans based on their structure and find that the renegotiation feature of revolving 
credit loans is positively valued by the market.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) contend 
that banks’ ability to renegotiate debt can avoid inefficient liquidation. Since revolving 
credit has an embedded option to renegotiate, the increased flexibility should be valued by 
the market.   
 
In addition and as pointed out by Graham and Harvey (2001) financial flexibility is 
the most important factor in firms’ debt decisions. I formulate the following null 
hypothesis: 
 
H 3.2: Loan structures do not provide financial slack and enhance market timing. 
 
Given that firms have chosen bank loans as a financing source, I would expect that 
the revolving credit loan should be the most preferred type and that the market values the 
flexibility provided by this type of loan.  
 
 
  2033.3.2. STOCK MARKET REACTION TO EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
According to Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004), since both debt and equity represent 
claims on the firm’s assets, any change in investors’ expectations of future cash flows will 
influence the pricing of debt and equity securities. Since earnings announcements affect 
investors’ expectations of future cash flows, and syndicated loans are debts to borrowers, 
then investors should react to earnings announcements of borrowing firms. So, I formulate 
the following null hypothesis: 
 
H 3.3: The stock market does not react to earnings announcements regardless of 
earnings expectations. 
 
I reason that rationality would dictate that the market should reward firms whose 
earnings announcements are greater than expected. Just as in the case of long-term 
performance, I also wish to test whether the market views loan structures differently given 
the differing degree of financial flexibility offered by alternative loan types. So, I formulate 
the following null hypothesis: 
 
H 3.4: Stock market reaction to earnings announcements is not related to the 
degree of financial flexibility provided by different types of loans. 
 
 
 
  2043.3.3 ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE AND MARKET RETURNS 
 
According to Kothari (2001, 116) “an association study tests for a positive 
correlation between an accounting performance measure and stock returns, both measured 
over relatively long, contemporaneous time periods.” However, he points out that there is 
no causal relationship between accounting information and security price movements. 
Researchers test “whether and how quickly accounting measures capture changes in the 
information set that is reflected in security returns over a given period.” Kothari (2001, 
109) reasons that “a temporal association between current financial performance and future 
cash flows, as well as a contemporaneous association between financial performance and 
security prices or price changes is expected.” 
 
In this essay, I test whether abnormal market returns are related to annual report 
data. I examine whether past performance prior to the event has any influence on 
subsequent long-term performance of the firms. Also I examine whether there is any 
relation between the contemporaneous performance of borrowers and market returns. 
Finally, I investigate the relation between firms’ post-event performance and market return. 
I formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H 3.5: The market reaction to the stock of bank borrowers are not related to 
accounting measures of performance in pre- and post-announcement periods.  
 
 
  205H 3.6: Loan structures do not have any influence on the relation between 
borrower performance and market returns. 
 
In the next section, I describe my dataset and discuss the research methodology for 
measuring long-term performance of borrowers as well as the association tests indicated in 
the above hypotheses.  
  
3.4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  
In this section I first describe the dataset of my study and in the second section I 
discuss the methodologies used for examining long-term performance, stock market 
reaction to earnings announcements as well as the association between firm performance 
and market returns in existing literature. 
3.4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION  
 
This study uses the 5,465 syndicated loan announcements in the US over the 1995–
2000 period extracted from Thomson Financial Publishing’s International Financing 
Review (IFR).   Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) are used to obtain returns 
data over the period 1992 – 2003. This reduces the sample to 2,061 loan announcements, 
comprised of 1,551 revolving credit loans, 387 term loans and 123 hybrid loans.  To test the 
relation between accounting data and market returns, Compustat database is used to obtain 
  206financial information.  Some Compustat data are missing and after deleting these firms, 
1,094 firms are available with both accounting data and market returns.  
 
3.4.2. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this essay I examine the long-term performance of syndicated loan announcers 
from three different perspectives. Firstly, I use the event study methodology to test whether 
there is an association between long-term performance of borrowers and the initial market 
reaction to announcements of syndicated loans.  Secondly, I examine how the market reacts 
to pre-loan and subsequent quarterly earnings announcements of borrowing firms. Finally, I 
examine pre- and post-loan performance of borrowers using accounting data to see whether 
there is any correlation between the firms’ performance and market returns. In all cases, I 
focus on the affect that loan structures have on market reaction to borrowers’ stocks. 
 
3.4.2.1. Measuring long-term performance of borrowers. 
 
I use standard event study methods to examine the borrowers’ immediate share 
price response to the announcement of syndicated loans using three- and five-day event 
windows.
13 In addition, I use the market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
                                                 
13 Note that the method we use is the market model with GARCH (1,1). In our view, this can be seen as a test 
of robustness of the results that we used in the first part of thesis. 
 
  207approach to measure long-term performance of borrowers. Specifically, for each loan-
announcing firm, three-year pre- and post-loan announcement excess returns are examined.  
 
Following the existing literature, I conduct regressions using the GARCH (1,1) 
(Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model. It is argued that this 
model can be used to overcome the problem of time-varying systematic risk parameter (β) 
and time-varying conditional variance (Coutts et al., 1994 and Brockett et al., 1999). The 
details of the BHARs model as well as those for the GARCH (1, 1) model are  provided in 
Appendix 1.  
 
3.4.2.2. Discussion of research methodology for investors’ reaction to earnings 
announcements. 
 
According to Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006), to overcome the 
methodological concerns with measuring long-term returns, researchers use short-term 
event study methodology to measure returns around subsequent earnings events. The 
general argument is that if the negative long-run returns are due to changes in investor 
opinion about the companies’ prospects, then one would expect to see negative stock price 
reactions at the earnings announcements that follow the event. For example, Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) find that on an annual basis, borrowers experience –1.4% 
abnormal returns per year around earnings announcements. These negative numbers are 
economically and statistically significant. Their results also show that this annual negative 
abnormal return explains about 14% of the total annualized negative BHAR. They report 
  208that value-weighting the borrowing firms’ subsequent returns yields an estimated monthly 
abnormal return of –0.49% using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  or –0.36% using 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation. This amounts to an average underperformance 
of 4.2-5.7% annually over the following three years. 
 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) reason that the market learns from an 
earnings announcement. Hence, one can expect to see evidence of the long-run 
performance around earnings announcements. Excess returns for a five-day event window 
are associated with quarterly earnings announcements from 12-quarters prior to a loan 
announcement through 12-quarters subsequent to the loan announcement.  For these tests, 
the sample is partitioned into revolving credit loans, term loans, and hybrid loans.  Also, as 
evidenced in existing literature, the reason for using this association test is that it helps to 
overcome common problems with measurement of long-run performance.  
 
3.4.2.3. Discussion of research methodology for accounting return 
 
I also test whether market returns (i.e., CARs) are related to annual report data. I 
investigate whether pre- and post-announcement performances of borrowers are in any way 
related to the granting of a syndicated loan. Regressions of CARs for the five-day  event 
window are run on several accounting performance measures of borrowing firms to test 
whether there is an association between financial performance and market returns (i.e., 
cumulative abnormal returns). I investigate the relation between the loan announcement and 
financial statement information, by regressing the excess returns associated with a five-day 
  209event window on a number of financial ratios.
14   In these tests, the sample is further 
partitioned into positive-excess and negative-excess return announcements, respectively.  
 
I reason that in order for a firm to grow over time, sales must increase.   
Furthermore, the increase in sales can only proceed if there are assets to produce the goods 
or services of the firm. Asset growth is supported by internal equity in the form of retained 
earnings, external equity in the form of new common stock, inside debt in the form of bank 
loans and external debt in the form of public debt. Furthermore, the amount of retained 
earnings is a function of the firm’s dividend policy and profitability as measured by the net 
profit margin. An increase in the profitability can be used to increase dividends and/or 
retained earnings.   
 
The measure of growth used is the growth in sales (SGRO).  If sales grow and the 
margins do not decrease, more earnings are available for either distribution or reinvestment.  
The net profit margin (NPM) is an indication of the efficiency in the firm’s cost structure.  
The payout ratio (PO) describes how much of earnings are paid out as dividends.  The 
complement of the payout ratio is the plowback ratio.  Thus, the payout ratio is an indicator 
of how much a firm has to reinvest in their capital budget. Asset turnover (TAT) ratio 
indicates how effectively the firm is using its assets to generate sales.  Next comes 
operating-return-on-assets (OROA), an indicator of how effectively the firm is using its 
                                                 
14 Observations with missing Compustat data were eliminated.  In addition, a number of outliers were 
observed and these were adjusted iteratively to three standard deviations from the mean.  Our results are not 
significantly affected by these adjustments. 
  210assets to generate operating profit. I use cash-flow-to-total-assets (CFTA) to assess the 
relation between bank loans and accounting returns to bank borrowers and show how 
effectively the firm is converting sales into cash flow.  Another popular measure of 
profitability is the return on assets (ROA).  This measure is net income/total assets and 
reflects both the operating characteristics and the financing policies of the firm.  I use the 
total-debt-to-tangible assets (TDTG) to measure financial leverage and provide an 
indication of collateral in case of financial distress. That measure along with return on 
assets can be combined to generate the return on equity (ROE). Note that some accounting 
measures (e.g. OROA, TAT, TDTG) I use in this thesis are slightly different to those 
presented in Table 3.10 above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2113.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section I present the results of my study for each of research questions raised 
in this chapter. 
 
3.5.1. ASSOCIATION OF LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE WITH ANNOUNCEMENTS OF 
SYNDICATED LOANS. 
 
Table 3.11 shows borrower share returns for alternative time intervals.
15 It is 
apparent from this table that share return measured by cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) are highly and statistically significant for all loans three years prior to the loan 
announcement using the t-test. The non-parametric test also shows that the results are 
statistically significant. This suggests that borrowing firms of syndicated loans were viewed 
favourably by the market. This could be due to good performance of these firms or it might 
have been the case that they successfully engaged in market timing to raise funds needed 
for their operation. It is also apparent that the results were driven by both the revolving 
credit and term loans. However, for the two years prior to the loan announcement, the 
CAARs were negative but insignificant. This applies to both all loans and revolving credit. 
For term loans the one year period was positive. It might be the case 
                                                 
15  Please note that the results shown in Table 3.11 for the two event windows (three-day and five-day 
windows) are slightly different to those reported in Table 2.5 of the first essay. This is due to the fact that we 
only used the standard market model in the first essay but in this essay we augment the market model with 
GARCH (1,1). We view this similarity as a measure of robustness of our results. 
  212Table 3.11: Borrower share returns for alternative time intervals  (Equally-weighted) 
The number of trading days relative to the loan announcements is designated by Days and N 
indicates the number of loans. The mean cumulative abnormal returns were obtained using a 
GARCH (1,1) market model with equal weighting.  Positive (negative) indicates the number 
of announcements with positive (negative) cumulative abnormal returns.  Levels of 
significance are indicated by the t-values and generalized sign Z. The data include loan 
announcements over the 1995 – 2000 period. 
Days N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive: 
Negative  t 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Panel A:  All loans  
(-756,-505) 1693  4.54%  940:753  4.658***  7.080*** 
(-504,-253) 1817  -1.20%  885:932  -1.131  1.439 
(-252,-1) 1949  -0.86%  970:979  -0.829  2.307* 
(-2,+2) 2061  0.43%  1018:1043  2.815**  1.813* 
(-1,+1) 2061  0.31%  1020:1041  2.603**  1.901* 
(+1,+252)  2047  1.16%  1040:1007  1.076      3.087** 
(+253,+504)  1889  2.07%  1018:871  1.917*      5.650*** 
(+505,+756)  1693  2.89%  936:757  2.677**       6.499*** 
Panel B:  Revolving Credit  
(-756,-505) 1298  3.67%  730:568  3.370***  6.715*** 
(-504,-253) 1384  -1.68%  661:723  -1.385  0.477 
(-252,-1) 1470  -1.57%  719:751  -1.258  1.255 
(-2,+2) 1551  0.51%  771  :  780  2.917**  1.723* 
(-1,+1) 1551  0.31%  758  :  793  2.290*  1.062 
(+1,+252)  1543  3.39%  802 : 741   2.711**  3.502*** 
(+253,+504)  1425  2.98%  774 :  651   2.382**  5.133*** 
(+505,+756)  1293  2.86%  732 : 561   2.291*  6.543*** 
Panel C:  Term Loan  
(-756,-505) 308  8.90%  166:142  3.744***  2.414*** 
(-504,-253) 335  -2.60%  165:170  -1.167  0.817 
(-252,-1) 367  5.20%  204:163  2.565**  3.304*** 
(-2,+2)  387  0.04%  186 :  201  0.141  0.446 
(-1,+1) 387  0.02%  198  :  189  0.099  1.668* 
(+1,+252)  384              -3.22%  191 : 193  -1.463  1. 102 
(+253,+504) 352  0.65%  185  :  167  0.295  2.115* 
(+505,+756)  309  -1.88%  146 : 163  -0.854  0. 112 
Panel D:  Hybrid Loan 
(-756,-505) 87  2.06%  44:43  0.393  0.751 
(-504,-253) 98  10.40%  59:39  1.844*  2.899** 
(-252,-1) 112  -11.51%  47:65  -2.275*  -0.905 
(-2,+2)  123  0.56%  61 : 62  0. 801  0. 512 
(-1,+1)  123  1.13%  64 :  59  2. 070*           1.054 
(+1,+252)  120  -13.44%  47 : 73  -2. 686**  -1.782* 
(+253,+504)  112  -4.98%  59 : 53  -0.996  1. 143 
(+505,+756)  91  19.53%  58 : 33    3.902***      3.143*** 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
  213that the market was not certain about the investment opportunities or growth prospects 
facing these firms. In any case these firms did have a need for funds in the form of bank 
loans.  
 
Table 3.11 also reveals that for all holding periods following and including the loan 
announcement, CAARs are statistically significantly positive when all loans are included 
(except the first year (+1,+252) CAAR when t-statistic was used).  I find that CAARs are 
positive for the very short periods of three- and five-days around the announcement and, 
surprisingly, for the very long holding periods of up to three years following the 
announcement.  This is in contrast to the findings of Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) 
who report negative CAARs in the three years subsequent to the loan announcement.  
 
Here again, partitioning of the loans according to their type shows that it is 
revolving credit loans that are the driving force of the overall results.  The market reacts 
positively in the short run over the five-day period (-2,+2) and the positive CAARs persist 
over the following three years. These results are the same whether I use the t-test or the Z-
test (except for the 3-day period for the Z-test). A number of explanations are suggested for 
these results. First, it appears that the market values the screening and monitoring signals 
provided by the lender and this is reflected in the initial positive responses. Secondly, since 
these responses persist over the subsequent period it is likely that revolving credit loans are 
being used effectively to increase shareholder wealth for the borrowers.  Thirdly, these 
responses also indicate that the financial flexibility provided by the loans is valued by the 
market.  The fact that positive market reaction persists over time suggests the borrowers 
  214must have been creating value by investing in positive NPV projects above what the market 
originally anticipated and this activity was facilitated by the flexibility of revolving credit 
loans. In fact, my results are consistent with those provided in James and Smith (2000). I 
also find my results are consistent with Liu (2006) who reports that “firms maintain unused 
credit lines to keep down their borrowing while ensuring that they can quickly secure funds 
in an emergency, such as a sudden deterioration in the issuance environment for corporate 
bonds.” Our results are, however, inconsistent with Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001) who 
show that the introduction of the 1988 capital requirement in Canada “has significantly 
reduced the information content of lines of credit while the informativeness of term loans is 
not affected.”  In my view, while the latter result appears to be inconsistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Best and Zhang (1993)) at first glance, it 
is quite rational. The market has already taken the information content of these lines of 
credit into account in the presence of the new regulation.  
 
For term loans, a different story emerges.  The initial reaction of the market is 
positive but insignificant using t-test. The Z-test, however, shows that the results are 
significant at the 5% level for the three-day period. In the year following the loan 
announcement, the CAARs become strongly negative but insignificant. This might be due 
to the inflexibility of term loans and/or poorly performing investment choices.  As pointed 
out by James and Smith (2000), term loans are less flexible than revolving credit loans. 
They generally carry certain covenants that might restrict the options available to 
borrowers.  
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First, I observe a positive reaction for the three-day period (1.13%) and for the five-day 
period, the reaction is also positive (0.56%). However, only the result for the three-day 
period is significant using the t-test. In the year following the loan announcement, there was 
a negative and significant abnormal return (-13.44%). In the second year following the loan 
there was still a negative abnormal return (-4.98%) but the result was not significant. The 
abnormal return in the third year following the loan became increasingly positive (19.53%) 
compared to the previous year and the result was highly significant. Since the hybrid loan is 
a mixture of both revolving credit loans and term loans, I speculate that they still allow 
borrowers a certain degree of flexibility to match the financing with the investment needs.  
 
Finally, I can infer the nature of the distributions of the positive and negative 
CAARs from the positive/negative values.  For instance, for the revolving credit loans, 
there are a greater number of negative CAARs than positive CAARs in the three- and five-
day windows.  However, since the cumulative average abnormal returns are positive for 
these windows, the positive returns must be greater than the negative returns. Thus, this 
result confirms the “driving force” effect of revolving credits on the overall results on the 
announcement date. James (1987) reports positive responses accounted for 66% of the 
announcements in his study. Comparing the results with the negative responses to private 
placements, James and Wier (1988) conclude that banks “may indeed have a lending 
advantage over insurance companies and pension funds” and that “bank loans may well be 
a special form of “inside” debt.”  So, it can be seen that the market values highly the 
revolving credit loans. In addition, over the following three years, the positive/negative 
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greater as evidenced by the size of the CAARs.   
 
A different pattern emerges for the term loans.  Here the initial positive/negative 
numbers are similar to the revolving credit loans, but the positive CAARs are outweighed 
by the negative CAARs resulting in a negative, but insignificant cumulative abnormal 
return. Over the longer period, unlike the revolving credit loans, the number of negative 
CAARs for term loans is generally greater than the number of the positive.  Hence, I can 
infer that the loan type does play an important role in market valuation of the borrowing 
firm’s share. Because the hybrids have characteristics of both revolving credit and term 
loans, the results are mixed.
16  Thus, based on the results above I have to reject the 
hypothesis that long-term performance of borrowing firms is not associated with 
announcements of syndicated loans. I further reject the hypothesis that loan structure does 
not impact on stock returns of borrowers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The results using a value-weighted market index are virtually identical to those shown here. 
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BORROWERS. 
 
 Panels A to C of Table 3.12 presents the results of the impact of earnings announcements 
on the borrower’s share price prior to the announcement of the loan while panels D to F  
reports the impacts after the loan announcement.  Substantial differences can be observed  
in market responses to the earnings announcements before and after the loan.  It can be seen 
from the first three panels that prior to the loan being approved, the market views the 
earnings announcements positively and all are statistically significant.  This might be due to 
earnings announcements being more positive or less negative than the market anticipates. 
Liu and Thomas (2000) reason that: “changes in expectations of future earnings are related 
strongly to unexpected returns.”  If this were the case then my results suggest that market’s 
expectations of the borrowing firm’s future earnings must be favourable. The positive 
reaction to the announcements implies that the earnings these firms are reporting are 
viewed favourably by the market.  However, at this time the market is unable to distinguish 
if and what type of financing each firm will pursue and how the financial markets will 
accommodate their needs.   
 
 
 
 
  218Table 3.12:  Earnings announcement returns pre- and post-syndicated loan 
announcements for a five-day event window 
The table presents the results associated with quarterly earnings announcements.  Loan 
announcements are: all announcements (All), revolving credit (RC), term loan (TL) and 
hybrid loan (HY). N indicates the number of loans. The mean cumulative abnormal return 
was obtained using the GARCH (1,1) market model. Earnings announcements are 
indicated by negative (positive) signs for pre- and post-loan announcements.  Positive 
(negative) indicates the number of announcements with positive (negative) cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Levels of significance are indicated by the t-values and generalized sign 
Z. The data include loan announcements over the 1995 – 2000 period. 
Loan 
Type N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive: 
Negative t-value 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Panel A:  Earnings Announcements (-12,-9) Quarters  
All 3450  0.64%  1827:1623  5.864***  7.013*** 
RC 2852  0.57%  1500:1352  5.010***  5.957*** 
TL 428  0.84%  236:192  2.871**  3.345*** 
HY 170  1.24%  91:79  2.475**  1.887* 
Panel B:  Earnings Announcements (-8,-5) Quarters 
All 4372  0.47%  2287:2085  4.688***  6.847*** 
RC 3464  0.41%  1801:1663  3.663***  5.722*** 
TL 679  0.40%  349:330  1.859*  2.031* 
HY 229  1.54%  137:92  3.570***  4.171*** 
Panel C:  Earnings Announcements (-4,-1) Quarters 
All 4877  0.58%  2591:2286  5.910***  8.154*** 
RC 3799  0.47%  1995:1804  4.107***  6.328*** 
TL 805  0.94%  448:357  4.586***  4.861*** 
HY 273  1.06%  148:125  2.375**  2.514** 
Panel D:  Earnings Announcements (1,4) Quarters 
All 4949  0.48%  2596:2353  4.773***  6.979*** 
RC 3860  0.46%  2005:1855  3.976***  5.419*** 
TL 807  0.30%  427:380  1.403  3.269*** 
HY 282  1.21%  164:118  2.414**  3.659*** 
Panel E:  Earnings Announcements (5,8) Quarters 
All 4706  0.37%  2469:2237  3.191***  6.377*** 
RC 3679  0.45%  1947:1732  3.279***  6.085*** 
TL 769  0.15%  388:381  0.683  1.659* 
HY 258  -0.05%  134:124  -0.091  1.390   
Panel F:  Earnings Announcements (9,12) Quarters 
All 4510  0.43%  2297:2213  3.822***  3.789*** 
RC 3548  0.30%  1800:1748  2.396**  3.052** 
TL 734  0.66%  376:358  2.842**  1.817* 
HY 228  1.58%  121:107  2.348**  1.553 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
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Subsequent to the loan announcements, the market recognizes the differences 
among the firms and the reactions are dependent on the type of loan provided by the 
lenders.  Panels D through F in Table 3.12 show the only earnings announcements that are 
statistically significant for all periods are for firms that received revolving credit loans.  
Earnings announcements signal to the market past operating and financial performance, but 
not investment opportunities. This is consistent with Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004) who 
find that “when earnings announcements convey relevant information about borrowing 
firms the syndicated loan market expeditiously incorporates that information into the 
prices.” Firms with revolving credit loans have greater flexibility concerning future 
investment opportunities.  Hence, their financial flexibility is better matched to their 
investment opportunity schedules.  If investment opportunities change over time, firms can 
expand or contract their financing structure to accommodate their needs. This feature of 
revolving credit loans was emphasized by James and Smith (2000). Hadlock and James 
(2002) also report the flexibility of this type of loan in terms of financial slack. In addition 
to the flexibility, revolving credit loans also allow borrowing firms that have improved 
financial performance to renegotiate the loan on more favourable terms.  In contrast, 
earnings announcements for firms with term loans are not as powerful a signal in the year 
following the loan announcement (0.30%). Nevertheless, the result is significant when I use 
the generalized Z-test. The reason is that in the case of term loans borrowers cannot react as 
easily to changing circumstances. Furthermore, management may not be that confident in 
the future performance of the firm which may reduce creditworthiness.  Thus, they prefer to 
  220avoid loan renegotiation.  However, by the ninth quarter after the loan, the financing 
decision is old news relative to the earnings announcements and the announcements are 
viewed favourably as in the years before the loan.     
 
On the basis of my results I reject the hypothesis that the market does not view 
earnings announcements positively regardless of earnings expectations. I further reject the 
null hypothesis that stock market reaction on earnings announcements is not related to the 
degree of financial flexibility provided by different types of loan. 
 
3.5.3. ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE AND MARKET RETURNS 
 
The results in this section are interpreted in conjunction with the results obtained for 
the loan structure and the interpretation that was offered in the previous two sections. Table 
3.13 shows the relations between cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and accounting 
measures of firm performance one year prior to the loan announcement, the year of the 
announcement (contemporaneous), and one year after the announcement. In addition to 
partitioning the data according to the type of loan, I also partition the data according to 
whether the CARs are positive or negative for each loan announcement.   
 
Prior to the announcement of a syndicated loan, it is logical to perceive that 
financial statement ratios should provide some insight into how the market will react to the 
loan announcements. Firstly, for all loans combined and for revolving credit loans, total-
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debt-to-tangible-assets exhibit a positive relation
17 with the subsequent positive CARs. 
This is understandable given that bank loans increase the total debt of the borrowers. 
Furthermore, if the overall effect of bank loans is favourable as I found in the previous 
section then they should be positively related to each other. 
 
In contrast, the payout ratio exhibits a negative relation with the subsequent positive 
CARs.  This result is difficult to interpret. According to standard theory of corporate 
finance, I expect the higher payout ratio to result if firms did not have good growth 
prospects or good investment opportunities that result in a return on equity which is higher 
than the cost of borrowing. If this were the case then the market would not react favourably 
to loan announcements and consequently these firms should have negative CARs not 
positive CARs. For subsequent negative CARs, sales growth exhibits a negative relation. It 
might be argued that the market is in doubt whether firms continue to have good investment 
opportunities available for further growth. In addition, for revolving credit loans, total-
asset-turnover also exhibits an inverse relation to subsequent negative CARs.  By the same 
reasoning just as in the case of sales growth, here again, my interpretation is that the market 
is unsure about growth prospect of firms. However, for companies that subsequently secure 
term loans, only the payout ratio is significantly negative relative to the subsequent positive 
CARs but it has no significant relation for those with negative CARs.  Hybrid loans only 
exhibit a significantly negative return on assets to negative CARs.    
 
17 For presentation purposes, we have used three decimal places and zero arises from 
rounding.  
Table 3.13: Results of regressions on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on accounting measures. 
This table shows the results of regressions of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on accounting measures for borrowing firms. The 
sample was divided into firms that have positive CARs and those that experienced negative CARs. It was further subdivided into 
three types of loans: revolving credit, term loan and hybrid loan. The dependent variables are Return on Assets (ROA), Return 
on Equity (ROE), Total Assets Turnover (TAT), Total Debt to Tangible Assets (TDTG), Net Profit Margin (NPM), Sales 
Growth (SGRO), Payout Ratio (PO), Operating Retrun on Assets (OROA), and Cash Flow to Total Assets (CFTA).The 
regressions were run for both pre- and post-loan announcement periods as well as for the contemporary period. In the table 
Coefficient is represented by the abbreviation Coef.  
Positive All Loans  Negative All Loans 
  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year 
Variable  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
Constant  0.042 4.022 0.021 1.845 0.043 4.026 -0.034  -3.584  -0.018  -1.977  -0.013  -1.422 
Type  0.000  -0.064 0.004  0.753  -0.005 -0.803 -0.003 -0.603 -0.002 -0.398 -0.004 -0.896 
ROA  0.002 0.953 0.001 0.663 0.001 0.444 0.001 0.405 0.003 1.697
  0.004 2.599** 
ROE  0.000  -1.156 -0.001 -2.85**  0.000  -1.092 0.000  -0.869 0.000  1.384  0.000  1.337 
TAT  0.001 0.213 0.010 1.681
  0.005 0.976 -0.008  -1.878
  -0.012 -2.772**  -0.009 -1.912
 
TDTG  0.000 3.18**  0.000 2.36* 0.000 1.416 0.000 -1.119  0.000 -1.198  0.000 -0.604 
NPM  0.000 -0.340  0.002 1.991 0.000 -0.131  0.000 0.977 -0.001  -1.862
  -0.001 -2.692** 
SGRO  0.000 0.869 0.000 0.903 0.000 0.874 0.000 -2.327*  0.000 -2.888**  0.000 -2.789** 
PO  0.000 -4.07***  0.000 -1.514  0.000 -2.70**  0.000 1.521 0.000 0.865 0.000 -0.072 
OROA  -0.094  -1.263  0.312 3.81***  0.145 1.569 0.109 1.577 0.032 0.464 -0.119  -2.183* 
CFTA 0.125 1.265 -0.418  -3.47***  -0.194  -1.413 -0.083 -0.733 -0.166 -1.426 -0.041 -0.377 
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Positive Revolving Credit  Negative Revolving Credit 
  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year 
Variable  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
Constant  0.045 3.794 0.018 1.432 0.040 3.262 -0.034  -3.152  -0.018  -1.777  -0.009  -0.924 
ROA  0.000 0.200 -0.001  -0.647  -0.003  -1.409  0.001 0.440 0.002 1.315 0.005 3.082** 
ROE  0.000 -0.609  -0.001  -1.382  0.000 0.798 0.000 -0.484  0.001 1.895
  0.000 0.422 
TAT  0.004 0.618 0.016 2.3249*  0.012 1.738 -0.011  -2.219*  -0.015  -3.061**  -0.010  -1.921
 
TDTG 0.000  2.1165*  0.000  1.8991
  0.000 0.032 0.000 -0.894  0.000 -0.856  0.000 0.283 
NPM 0.000 -0.334  0.002 2.4933*  0.001 0.835 0.000 0.452 -0.001  -2.366*  -0.002  -3.48*** 
SGRO  0.000 0.9889*  0.000 1.540 0.000 2.0292*  0.000 -2.178*  0.000 -2.971**  0.000 -2.814** 
PO 0.000  -3.40***  0.000  -1.920
  0.000 -2.628**  0.000 1.139 0.000 0.403 0.000 -0.956 
OROA -0.103 -1.223 0.165  1.8068
  0.100 0.950 0.151 1.784
  0.074 0.955 -0.244  -3.60*** 
CFTA 0.152 1.371 -0.184  -1.304  -0.069  -0.430 -0.113 -0.846 -0.171 -1.311 0.124  0.973 
Positive Term Loan  Negative Term Loan 
  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year 
Variable  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
Constant  0.040 3.164 0.018 1.543 0.015 0.990 -0.032  -1.447  -0.015  -0.654  -0.050  -2.124 
ROA 0.003  1.715
  0.002 1.547 0.002 1.003 0.000 -0.051  0.003 0.808 -0.001  -0.263 
ROE -0.001  -1.992
  0.000  -1.070 0.000  -0.200 0.000  -0.332 0.000  0.173  0.000  0.815 
TAT  0.000 -0.035  0.001 0.226 0.002 0.269 0.012 0.935 0.012 1.266 0.013 1.279 
TDTG  0.000 0.778 0.001 3.502***  0.001 2.953**  0.000 -0.508  0.000 -0.078  0.000 0.416 
NPM  0.000 -0.394  0.000 -0.342  0.000 -0.202  0.002 1.275 0.001 0.404 0.002 1.610 
SGRO  0.000 1.070 0.000 -0.527  0.000 -1.092  0.000 -1.463  0.000 0.191 0.000 -0.810 
PO  0.000 -2.158*  0.000 -1.164  0.000 -0.224  0.000 0.426 0.000 0.773 0.000 0.580 
OROA  -0.135  -0.925  0.044 0.280 0.189 1.386 0.001 0.008 -0.277  -1.363  0.097 0.825 
CFTA 0.146 0.752 -0.104  -0.501  -0.315  -1.693
  -0.170 -0.727 -0.191 -0.646 -0.317 -1.343 
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Table 3.13 (continued) 
Positive Hybrid Loans  Negative Hybrid Loans 
  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year  Pre-One Year  Contemporaneous  Post-One Year 
Variable  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
Constant  0.101 0.549 0.086 0.635 0.027 0.373 -0.167  -2.408  -0.021  -0.324  0.037 0.942 
ROA  0.018 0.977 0.008 0.566 0.028 2.867*  -0.018  -2.181*  -0.005  -0.374  -0.001  -0.095 
ROE  -0.006 -1.519 -0.001 -0.364 -0.005 -2.973*  -0.001 -0.847 0.000  -0.168 0.001  0.815 
TAT  -0.037 -0.413 0.007  0.115  -0.021 -0.533 0.028  1.094  0.007  0.235  0.025  1.130 
TDTG  0.003 1.440 -0.001  -0.628  0.001 1.163 0.000 0.791 0.000 -0.029  0.000 -1.039 
NPM  0.006 0.692 -0.001  -0.153  -0.003  -1.078  0.006 1.591 0.002 0.411 0.004 1.894 
SGRO  -0.003  -1.105  0.000 -0.241  0.000 -0.145  0.000 0.467 0.000 -0.746  0.000 -0.543 
PO  -0.001 -0.455 0.002  2.009
  -0.002  -0.538  0.000 1.152 0.000 -1.161  0.001 1.396 
OROA -0.595 -0.679 1.217  2.110
  1.270 2.404*  -0.057  -0.095  -0.434 -1.288 -0.282 -1.354 
CFTA 0.155 0.156 -1.830  -1.731  -2.328  -2.948  1.555 1.444 0.619 0.680 -0.829  -1.486 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively 
 
 
 
  
The relations between accounting measures and CARs are much stronger in the year 
of the announcement with the revolving credit loans again driving the overall results.  At 
this juncture, the picture about the prospects of firms becomes clearer and the market reacts 
accordingly. For all loans, total-debt-to-tangible-assets and operating return on assets are 
significantly positively related to the contemporaneous positive CARs.  Return on equity 
and cash-flow-to-total-assets are significantly negatively related to the positive CARs.  For 
the contemporaneous negative CARs, total-asset-turnover and sales growth exhibit negative 
relations. Considering revolving credit loans, two operating performance variables, total-
asset-turnover and the net profit margin, are significant for both positive and negative 
CARs.  For positive CARs, the positive coefficients indicate greater performance is 
recognized by the market.  In contrast, for negative CARs, it appears better performance is 
discounted.  Notwithstanding, these two operating performance variables are positively 
related to their corresponding CARs regardless of whether they are positive or negative. In 
addition, sales growth is negatively related to the negative CARs.  Almost all measures for 
term and hybrid loans are not significant for positive CARs and all measures are 
insignificant for negative CARs.   
 
In the year following the announcements, for all loans, positive CARs are 
significantly negatively related to the payout ratio while negative CARs are inversely 
related to the net profit margin, sales growth, and operating-return-on-assets and positively 
related to return on assets.  Positive revolving credit loan CARs are related with payout and 
sales growth issues.  In contrast, for negative revolving credit loan CARs, the issue appears 
  226to be operating performance as indicated by the negative net profit margin, sales growth 
and operating-return-on-assets and positive relation with the return on assets.  For positive 
CAR term loans, the total-debt-to-tangible-assets ratio is significant.  The results for 
positive CARs for hybrids are mixed, though both operating and cash flow measures are 
significant.  For the negative CARs, neither term loans nor hybrid loans exhibit any relation 
to the accounting measures. 
 
In short, some variables are positively related to both negative CARs and positive 
CARS whereas other variables are negatively correlated with both positive CARs and 
negative CARs. These results also apply when I partition my sample into different types of 
loan.   
 
Thus, although there appears to be some evidence supporting my hypotheses that 
accounting performance and market returns are related, I can neither reject nor accept the 
hypothesis that favourable or unfavourable stock market reaction is related to performance 
of borrowers in the one year prior to or post-loan announcement. This conclusion can also 
be applied to the contemporaneous relation between firm performance and market returns 
albeit the relation between the two is much stronger. 
 
 
 
 
  2273.6 SUMMARY 
 
The existing literature on long-term performance of firms following corporate 
events is abundant but, surprisingly, research in this area for bank loans and, in particular 
for syndicated loans, is rare. In this essay I look at long-term performance of firms 
following major corporate events such as SEOs and bonds. The general finding is that 
security issuance – debt or equity - is followed by low long-term performance and this is 
puzzling because it was managers who initiated these activities.  I also noted that 
announcements of bank loans are different to other corporate events and as such long-term 
performance of borrowers should be in some ways different compared to other corporate 
events.  
 
I also reviewed the literature on capital structure issues. Specifically, I looked at the 
main theories of capital structures: the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the 
market timing (or windows of opportunity) theory. I noted that each theory explains the 
capital structure based on different behaviour of management of the firm. For example, 
market timing postulates that executives tend to time the market in the sense that they will 
issue equity when the firm’s stock is overvalued and repurchase it otherwise. 
 
I also examined the issue of whether firms adjust toward an optimal capital 
structure. The evidence found in the literature appears to be inconclusive. Researchers 
provide different evidence based on different methods of research and none of the 
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structure of firms.  
 
As far as the capital structure issues are concerned, it can be seen that previous 
studies have examined the broad debt versus equity issue without considering the role of 
bank loans in the capital structure decision. One exception is the study by Hadlock and 
James (2002) who examine the market timing and pecking order models of capital structure 
in the context of bank financing. I have shed some light on the issue whether bank loans 
can help explain management’s financing decisions and the firm’s capital structure.  
 
In addition, I review the literature on the impact of earnings announcements on the 
stock market reaction to the share price of borrowers. The underlying rationale is that the 
level of earnings will confirm market assessment of the firm performance. Finally, I also 
review the literature on the association between firm accounting performance and market 
returns. The reason for bringing this issue into my research is that I believe firm 
performance is likely to be closely associated with market reaction. 
 
In this essay I present the following findings. First, my results provide evidence that 
post-announcement abnormal returns are significantly positive. These results are consistent 
with the findings of previous studies by James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), 
Best and Zhang (1993), Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995), James and Smith (2000) 
and Gasbarro, Le, Schwebach and Zumwalt (2004). That is the market reacts favourably to 
announcements of bank loans. From the long-term perspective, I find that overall the 
  229borrowing firms outperform the market over a three-year period following the loan. This is 
in contrast to the study of Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006).  
 
Secondly, I find that overall my results are driven by revolving credit loans.  Since I 
use the market-adjusted model in my event study, I can reason that the performance of 
revolving credit firms outperform the market over the three years following the loan.   
However, I find that the longer-term performance for firms acquiring term loans is not 
significantly different from the market performance.  The longer-term results are mixed for 
the firms receiving hybrid loans. My results are consistent with previous findings of 
financial flexibility and those of loan structure. For example, Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1994) find that financial flexibility increases shareholder wealth. The results are also 
consistent with McDonald (1994) who finds that the market takes a positive view of loan 
commitments in the form of revolving credit loans. James and Smith (2000) give a useful 
discussion of the impact of the loan structure on announcements of bank loans. In addition I 
find support for Hadlock and James (2002) who indicate that bank loans reduce adverse 
selection issues and that the market values financial slack.  
 
Overall, it is apparent that the flexibility offered by the revolving credit loans to the 
borrowing firm is viewed favourably according to all my tests. The main reason is that it 
allows borrowers to match financing needs with investment opportunities. Furthermore, it 
also increases the financial slack of the firm. These two reasons combined understandably 
allow firms to achieve their ultimate goal, namely, maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. 
 
  230Thirdly, in this essay I also report that prior to loan announcement, the market 
reaction to announcements of quarterly earnings are also positive. I reason that it might 
have been the case that the market was unable to differentiate among the borrowing firms 
due to the fact that the earnings are all significantly positive. I also reason that at this 
juncture information asymmetry exists regarding the borrowing decision of the firm. The 
market does not know whether the firm is going to borrow from a bank or not or when. 
However, positive earnings do provide firms with a window of opportunity to raise funds 
on favourable terms.   
 
Finally, I did not find strong relations between excess returns and accounting 
information. Nevertheless, I can make the following inferences. First, it appears that the 
revolving credit loans are driving the overall results in their relation with financial 
information of the firm. This could be due to their large number and their stronger relation 
between accounting information and abnormal returns.  Ex ante, I observe that firms with 
higher debt-to-tangible-asset ratios and lower payout ratios are associated with a positive 
market reaction, while firms with lower total asset turnover and lower sales growth tend to 
produce a negative market response.  Ex post, I observe that the negative CARs are more 
closely related to subsequent financial performance than are the positive CARs.  In this 
instance, banks should be more rigorous in their monitoring of the poorer performing firms.  
In the case of firms with positive CARs, banks can afford to be less concerned with the 
borrower’s performance.    
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the market concerning the nature of the firm.  Consistent with previous studies, I find that 
revolving credit loans provide greater flexibility for the firm to match the sources of funds 
with the characteristics of its investment opportunities.  If management is confident about 
the future of the firm then it can acquire more funding in the form of a revolving credit 
loan. I find that this type of loan will give them the flexibility to renegotiate terms such as 
size, maturity, and borrowing rates, over time.  Conversely, if management is less 
optimistic about the future then it will seek a term loan in order to lock in the funding for a 
longer period and defer screening and monitoring associated with a new or revised loan.  It 
appears that a revolving credit loan is much more attractive than a term loan. Firms realize 
the advantages of this type of loan and this view is strongly endorsed by the market with 
positive response in share price of the borrowing firms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  232CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
 
Existing literature on bank loans shows some intriguing aspects of this type of debt 
instrument. These include James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang 
(1993), Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) and James and Smith (2000). The general 
consensus in the literature is that banks in the process of screening and monitoring their 
borrowers acquire private information. Banks can certify the status of a firm or signal to the 
market by granting loans to the firm. This is reflected in the market response to 
announcements of bank loans. Most studies report that the market views these 
announcements favourably. The announcement effects for bank loans are generally positive 
and significant.  
 
Previous studies also examine whether bank loans are likely to be reported in the 
financial press. For example, Lummer and McConnell (1989) report that favourably revised 
loans are more likely to be reported in the financial press than unfavourably revised loans. 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) focus on the share price response to the 
announcement of bank loans.  They report that bank loan announcements favourably 
impact the borrowers’ equity value. The source of information of loan announcements is 
also considered in existing literature. Mosebach (1999) argues that the information given in 
the financial press is redundant. However, he only uses information provided by a 
commercial source to arrive at this conclusion.  
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I also review the reasons why banks offer syndicated loans. Dennis and Mullineaux 
(1994, 2000) indicate that syndication is related to loan size, borrower’s credit rating, 
reputation of the lead bank and the collateral offered. Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey 
(1995) find that market responses are situation specific. They report that syndicated loans to 
less developed countries in the 1980s were viewed negatively by the market and this was 
reflected in negative stock returns during this period. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) argue 
that the ease of loan re-negotiability can create value for borrowing firms and the number 
of banks participating in a syndicate does affect this restructuring. They find that only the 
smallest syndicate in their study generates a positive and significant return and that there is 
an inverse relationship between the number of banks participating in the syndicate and the 
market responses. 
 
One important paper referenced in this thesis is that by Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006) who report that although the initial response is positive, firm performance 
over the subsequent three years is negative. Their results indeed show a reversal of positive 
announcement results. The mean (median) long run returns were reported at –32.7% (-
10.3%) in three years following the announcement date. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 
(2006) argue that if reversal were documented then this would indicate that the market was 
not only incorrect about the initial magnitude of the event’s effect, but also incorrect about 
the expected direction of the effect on firm value. They claim that this is the first robust 
evidence of reversal between the announcement and long run returns. Based on their 
findings they conclude that “loan announcements are misinterpreted by the market, both in 
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follows that “bank loans do not appear to be nearly so “special” as previously thought.” 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel’s (2006) results run counter to my results concerning the 
uniqueness of bank loans and information asymmetry. 
 
In addition to looking at the announcement effect and long-term performance of 
borrowing firms, some authors also look at the effect that loan structures have on stock 
market responses. For example, James and Smith (2000) find that the degree of financial 
flexibility associated with the loan structure is an important consideration in market 
responses.  
 
To recap, the literature review shows that banks continue to play an important role 
in financial markets. They continue to deliver “functional” services which are not available 
from non-bank intermediaries. Bank loans are still viewed as an important financial 
instrument for companies. 
 
Having reviewed the literature on bank loans, I raised a number of research 
questions related to syndicated loans. First, I asked the question whether the stock market 
views announcements of syndicated loans favourably. I find that overall the market views 
announcements of bank loans favourably. For the whole sample I report that the CAARs 
are 0.39% and 0.28 % for five-day event window and three-day event window, 
respectively. These results are not only positive but also statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The second research question I looked at in this thesis is whether loan structures have 
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show that this is indeed the case. I find that the results for the whole sample on the 
announcement date were actually driven by revolving credit loans.   The CAARs for 
revolving credit loans are 0.47% and 0.29% for the five-day window and the three-day 
window, respectively. The results are also statistically significant at the 1% level. I find that 
the announcement effects for term loans although positive, are insignificant for both event 
windows.  The results for hybrid loans (a combination of both revolving credit loans and 
term loans) are mixed. The third overarching research question that I address is whether the 
information source has an impact on announcements of syndicated loans. I use two sources 
of information, the International Financing Review (IFR) Platinum database, a commercial 
database, and the Dow Jones Interactive Index (DJII). My results show that the source of 
information does make a difference. This is shown in the three-day event window when 
announcements reported in the financial press are found to be positive and significant for 
revolving credit announcements and negative and significant for term loan announcements. 
My results are unique in this respect. 
 
Both pre- and post-loan announcement three-year periods are used to examine the 
performance of the borrowing firms. In the three years prior to the loan announcement the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of the borrowing firms were positive and statistically 
significant. Subsequently, I find that for all holding periods except the first year following 
the loan announcement, the cumulative average abnormal returns for all loans are positive 
and statistically significant using either the t-test or the Z-test. I also find that it is the 
revolving credit loans that drive the overall results. 
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A number of complementary research questions are raised in the thesis. The first 
question is whether borrower share price reacts differently to the number of announcements 
in a syndicated loan. I find that for the five-day event window, the IFR single 
announcements are significant while those for the DJII are not. In contrast, the DJII 
multiple announcements are significant while those for the IFR are not. All these 
announcement effects are similar in that they are all positive. For the three-day event 
window, however, only the results for revolving credit loans are significant. The second 
complementary question addressed is whether there is information leakage or post-
announcement drift in relation to announcements of syndicated loans. I examine the   (-10, 
0) and (0, +10) event windows and find some evidence of both information leakage and 
post-announcement drift in the case of revolving credit announcements
18. 
 
This thesis also examines whether market reaction on the announcement date and 
over the long-term are influenced by the degree of financial flexibility inherent in the loan 
structure. I find strong evidence throughout my tests that indeed the market values highly 
this feature of bank loans in general and of syndicated loans in particular. My study support 
the findings of previous studies (e.g. Lummer and McConnell (1989), Allen (1990), Preece 
and Mullineaux (1996), Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) and James and Smith 
(2000). The flexibility provided by revolving credit loans allows borrowers to use the funds 
when they are needed. Understandably, my results also support Hadlock and James’s 
(2002) argument that financial slack is highly valued by the market because it allows firms 
                                                 
18 The complete set of results are available from the author. 
  237to have more choice in making both financing and investment decisions. In addition, the 
financial slack created by revolving credit loans allows firm to enhance market timing of 
borrowing firms. 
 
I also address the question whether the market views favourably earnings 
announcements regardless of whether they are positive or less negative than expected. I 
find that earnings announcements are all positively viewed by the market and are 
significant prior to the loan announcement. I reason that at this juncture the market does not 
know whether firms will opt for a loan. Subsequent to the loan, this information becomes 
available and the market acts accordingly. I find that revolving credit loans are valued by 
the market in all three years following the loan announcement.  
 
Finally, I examine whether market reaction to borrower share price are related to 
accounting measures of performance in pre- and post-announcement periods. I do not find 
strong evidence to support this hypothesis. Nevertheless, I also find some evidence that the 
loan structure does influence the association between share price and firm performance.  
 
I note a number of limitations of my research. As mentioned in the introduction, a 
limitation of this thesis is that I did not use the matched-firm technique suggested in Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1999) to measure long-term performance of 
borrowers. I test whether there is any association between the announcement effect of 
syndicated loans and long-term performance of borrowers using the market adjusted buy-
and-hold abnormal return method. Nevertheless, all my results are internally consistent. I 
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value of the firm I still observe the differences in my results.  
 
Having pointed out the main limitation, I note that even the matching-firm 
technique itself is not free of shortcomings. The common benchmarks used for matching 
firms in the literature are size and the book-to-market ratio.  Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1999, 47) argue that “it is possible that size and book-to-market ratio do not adequately 
capture the risk difference between issuers and matched non-issuers.”   
 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006, 116) note that “the difference between the return 
to issuers and non-issuing matched firms is a measure of abnormal (or unexpected) returns, 
only if the two types of firms have identical exposures and matches to priced risk factors.” 
They report that “A number of studies have shown that the assumption of equal risk 
exposures is unlikely to hold.”  
 
Kothari and Warner (2006) also look at problems associated with measurement of 
long-term performance using matched firms. Kothari and Warner (2006, 15) point out that 
“event study tests are joint tests of whether abnormal returns are zero and of whether the 
assumed model of expected returns (i.e. the CAPM, market model) is correct.” Kothari and 
Warner (2006, 28)  note that “The joint-test problem remains in that any inference on the 
basis of BHAR hinges on the validity of the assumption that event firms differ from 
“otherwise similar non-event firms” only in that they experience the event.” However, this 
might not be the case. Kothari and Warner (2006, 28) point out that “since corporate events 
  239themselves are unlikely to be random occurrences, i.e., they are unlikely to be exogenous 
with respect to past performance and expected return, there is a danger that the event and 
non-event samples differ systematically in their expected returns notwithstanding the 
matching on certain firm characteristics.”  
 
It is certainly true that if the specification of the underlying model is incorrect then 
the inferences of the results or conclusion of the study are questionable. Apparently, to date 
no researcher has shown that a particular model has been free of measurement problems. 
Kothari and Warner (2006, 18) also point out that “power is higher with increasing sample 
size, regardless of horizon length.” Thus, in this respect, I am not too concerned with the 
power of my tests.  
 
The second limitation is that most of the borrowing firms in my sample are large 
firms. Therefore my results may be biased toward large firms. This bias is unavoidable 
because most syndicated loans are granted to large firms and it is syndicated loans which 
are of relevance to my topic.   
 
Last and not least, there have been few studies in the area of syndicated loans. To 
the best of my knowledge research in the area of long-term performance following bank 
loans is still in its early stage. The only paper that I have found in the literature is that 
provided by Billet, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006). This reduces the number of comparisons 
of my results with the existing literature. The upside of this situation, however, is that it 
provides a whole new area for future research. 
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In concluding my discussion of limitations on the research methodology, I quote 
Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1999, 198) who note that “the analysis of long-run abnormal returns 
is treacherous.” Furthermore, Byun and Rozeft (2003, 1065) point out: “in the current state 
of the art, one can find reason to criticize virtually any method of estimating long-run 
performance.”  Kothari and Warner (2006, 2) also sum up their work by noting:  “Short-
horizon methods are quite reliable. While long-horizon methods have improved, serious 
limitations remain. A challenge is to continue to refine long-horizon methods.”   
 
Finally, a number of research topics related to the study presented in this thesis can 
also be explored. For example, one can study the wealth effect of announcements of 
syndicated loans on lenders using the same data set and loan structure partition used in this 
thesis. Another important issue is whether firms that had revolving credit had more 
investment opportunities and whether these firms actually experienced liquidity problems at 
the time of applying for bank loans.  Other topics might include testing bank loans in the 
context of pecking order theory or the trade-off theory which has not been attempted in this 
thesis. Still another important topic is to undertake a cross-country study in order to 
establish the uniqueness of revolving credit loans. It would also be of interest to examine 
whether collaterisation can explain revolving credit results. In terms of event study 
methodology a rigorous review of the underlying logic and consistency of all the methods 
presented in the literature is urgently needed. Finally, one might wish to examine whether 
firms that announce syndicated loans do adjust their capital structures toward an optimal 
leverage ratio. The quest for asymptotic perfection continues. 
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APPENDIX 1: DISCUSSION OF EVENT STUDY 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this thesis, Eventus (version 7), a specialised software designed for event studies, 
is used. This software allows us to extract the price data from CRSP and calculate abnormal 
returns for firms as desired. The software also provides the user a number of options in 
terms of modeling. I use the market model in this study. To maintain consistency, I adapt 
the presentation of event study methodology presented in the Eventus 7 user’s guide.  
 
Although the program carried out all the instructions specified, it is necessary to 
describe the event study methodology used in this study.  I define the event of interest in 
this study as the announcement of a syndicated loan. To measure the stock market reaction 
to announcements of syndicated loans, I will use the market model to estimate abnormal 
returns around the announcement of a syndicated loan agreement. Day 0 is taken to be the 
event date. I estimate the normal performance of the securities using an estimation period 
of 255 days that ends 46 days before the event date and examine three-day (-1, +1) and 
five-day (-2, +2) event windows. These figures denote the number of days prior to and after 
the event date, respectively. The methodology assumes that the event is exogenous with 
respect to the change in market value of the security.  
 
 
  243If the market reaction is favourable, I would expect a positive abnormal return (AR) 
for the borrower’s stock. An abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual 
ex post return of the security over the event window and the normal return of the security 
over the estimation period.  The normal return is defined as the return that would be 
expected if the event did not take place. In other words, the abnormal return over the event 
window can be thought of as a measure of the impact of the event on the value of the firm.  
 
To take into account the presence of confounding effects I exclude from my sample 
firms which have one of the following events occurring in the event window periods. These 
are declaration of dividends, announcement of a merger, announcement of a new product, 
filing of a large damage suit, announcement of unexpected earnings, and change in key 
executive. One important point to note is that it will be more difficult for researchers to 
control for confounding effects if longer event windows are used. Also, firms that do not 
trade frequently (defined as missing data for at least ten trading days in a row) are excluded 
from my sample. 
 
In an event study framework, the results are based on the normality assumptions 
which are associated with large samples. Sample size tends to be a common problem in 
event studies. In my case, fortunately, I have a relatively large sample size and I am 
confident that the normality assumptions hold.  
 
 
  244As presented above, the event study methodology was developed to measure the 
effect of an unanticipated event on stock prices. It has to be pointed out that it is possible 
for syndicated loans to be an anticipated event given that the syndication process will take 
at least two weeks to complete and that the information might have been leaked before the 
official announcement date. For this reason, I will use both the signed date in the IFR and 
the official announcement date in the financial press.  
A. 1.1. MEASURING EVENT-PERIOD ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
In this thesis, I apply the market model with equal weighting to measure stock 
market reaction to announcements of syndicated loans. The predicted return is obtained by 
regressing the actual return of firm j on the market return in the estimation period using the 
market model: 
) 1 . 1 . (A R R t mt j j jt ε β α + + =
 
 
where Rjt  is the rate of return on the share price of firm j on day t; Rmt is the rate of return 
on a market index on day t; αj  is the intercept term; βj is the systematic risk of stock j; and 
the error term ε jt is a random variable that must have an expected value of zero (i.e. E (ε jt  
= 0)),  and is assumed to be uncorrelated with Rmt , uncorrelated with Rkt for k ≠ j, not 
autocorrelated, and homoscedastic.  
 
 
 
 
  245In the market model, Rjt was regressed on Rmt to obtain the below model which 
gives us the predicted return for firm j, that is: 
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∧ ∧ ∧
+ = β α
 
 
The daily abnormal returns (AR) for firm j are then obtained by subtracting the 
predicted return for firm j from the actual return for firm j: 
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The residual thus represents the return which is the unexpected or abnormal return 
caused by the announcement of the event. For each day in the event period the residuals are 
averaged across firms to produce the average abnormal return (AARt) for that day:  
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where N is the number of the firms in the sample. The reason for averaging across firms is 
to smooth out the noise. Hence the larger the sample, the better the ability of the model to 
single out the effect of an event.  
 
The final step is to cumulate the average abnormal return (AARt) for each day over 
the entire period to produce the cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, where 
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The cumulative average residual represents the average total effect of the event 
across all firms over a specified time interval (i.e. the event period). 
 
A.2.1.1. TESTING ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
To test the null hypothesis that announcements of syndicated loans do not have any 
impact on stock prices of borrowing firms, I use both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
The parametric test will be the Patell test and the non-parametric test is the generalized Z 
test.  
 
A.2.1.1.1. Parametric test: the Patell test 
 
Patell test is also referred to in the literature as a standardized abnormal return test 
or a test assuming cross-sectional independence. The purpose of standardization is to 
overcome the heteroskedasticity problem, i.e., different variances of abnormal returns.  
 
In order to ensure that each abnormal return will have the same variance, I use 
standardized residuals (abnormal returns). When dividing each firm’s abnormal return by 
its standard deviation (obtained over the estimation period), each abnormal return has an 
estimated variance of 1.0.  
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maximum likelihood estimate of the variance is  
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In equation  A.1.6  above, Rmt is the observed return on the market index on day t,    
m R   is the mean market return over the estimation period and Dj  is the number of non-
missing trading day returns in the D-day interval  TDb  through  TDe  used to estimate the 
parameters for firm j. 
 
 
Define the standardized abnormal return (or standardized prediction error) as  
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  248Under the null hypothesis, each SARjt follows a Student’s t distribution with Dj – 2 
degrees of freedom. Summing the SARjt across the sample gives: 
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The expected value of TSARt is zero. The variance of TSARt is  
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The test statistic for the null hypothesis that CAART1, T2 = 0 is 
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As cited in Eventus 7 (Cowan Research LC, 2002), under cross-sectional 
independence of the         and the Linderberg condition described in Patell (1976),   
   follows the standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. 
Z
j
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The above parametric test assumes the distribution of excess returns to be normal, 
independent and identically distributed. However, in many cases, the distribution of excess 
returns exhibits some patterns that differ from a normal distribution, i.e., it follows a non-
normality process. A number of researchers find that daily returns have a fat-tailed 
distribution (Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985).  
 
The above parametric test is also vulnerable to mis-specification caused by an 
increase in the variance of the distribution of event-day excess returns. Brown and Warner 
(1985) note that underestimating an event-induced increase in variances will lead to 
rejection of the null hypothesis more frequently than it should, even when the average 
abnormal performance is zero. For the aforementioned reasons, according to Kothari and 
Warner, (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) the use of parametric tests may very well 
result in the misspecification of tests and cause the researchers to draw an inappropriate 
conclusion.  
 
A.2.1.2. Non-parametric test: the generalized sign test  
 
To overcome the problems mentioned in the previous section, in this thesis I also 
use a non-parametric test called the generalized sign test to confirm the robustness of my 
parametric test. The generalized sign test is a refined version of the simple binomial (the 
sign) test. In the generalized sign test the proportion of stocks in the sample that should 
  250have non-negative abnormal returns under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance 
is determined first. This is estimated using the average proportion of stocks with non-
negative abnormal returns in the estimation period.  
 
According to this test, if abnormal returns are independent across securities, then 
under the null hypothesis, the number of non-negative values of abnormal returns has a 
binomial distribution with parameter p. The generalized sign test is given by 
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where       p0    is the observed fraction of positive returns computed across stocks in event 
day t. The advantage of the generalized sign test is that it takes into account the evidence of 
skewness in security returns. 
 
The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the proportion of positive 
returns is the same as in the estimation period.  More specifically, if the proportion of 
positive market adjusted returns in the estimation period is p% and the proportion of firms 
that have positive market adjusted returns on event day t is p0%, then the generalized sign 
test in this case is to test whether the difference between the two proportions is significant 
at a specified level (i.e., 1%, 5%, etc.). The actual test uses the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution (Eventus 7 user guide, Cowan Research L.C., 2002).  
 
  251A.1.2.  MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BORROWERS. 
 
To measure long-term performance of borrowers I use the market adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) approach. Specifically, for each loan-announcing firm, 
three-year pre- and post-loan announcement excess returns are examined.  As pointed out 
by Kothari and Warner (2006, 28): “An appealing feature of using BHAR is that buy-and-
hold returns better resemble investors’ actual investment experience than periodic 
(monthly) rebalancing entailed in other approaches to measuring risk-adjusted 
performance.”  
 
The market model buy-and-hold abnormal return over an interval (T1, T2) for firm j  
is defined as follows:  
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The market adjusted model is a special case of the market model where     
and    .  Empirical evidence has shown that the results from the two market models 
are in most cases similar. It should be pointed out that in this study I do not use matched-
firms to calculate BHARs (the second term on the right hand side of equation above). 
Rather, I use the market returns in place of the matched-firms’ returns to calculate BHARs. 
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  252In the second essay, following existing literature I run regression using GARCH 
(1,1) (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model.
19 I t  i s  a r g u e d  
that this model can be used to overcome the problem of time-varying systematic risk 
parameter (β) and time-varying conditional variance (Coutts et al, 1994 and Brockett et al., 
1999). The model can be described as follows (Harvey, 1990): 
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and  denotes all information available at time t -1. The conditional variance in this 
model is: 
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Finally, to supplement my parametric t-test, I also use the popular non-parametric 
generalized Z test. This allows us to overcome the skewness and kurtosis problems in 
                                                 
19 Note that the method we use in this part in respect of announcement effect is the market model with 
GARCH (1, 1). In our view, this can be seen as a test of robustness of the results that we used in the first 
essay. 
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